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ABSTRACT

SUPPLY-SIDE EDUCATION: RACE, INEQUALITY, AND THE RISE OF THE
PUNITIVE EDUCATION STATE
Daniel Stephen Moak
Marie Gottschalk
Adolph Reed
The 1930s were dominated by an understanding that unemployment and inequality were
primarily the result of structural failures of the market economy. However, the
unraveling of New Deal liberalism throughout the 1940s and 1950s shifted ideological
understandings of problems like unemployment, poverty and racial inequality to
explanations focused on individual deficiencies. This development had dramatic
consequences for federal education policy. Buttressed by a coalition of civil rights
groups and educational organizations pushing for federal involvement in education,
Democratic policymakers turned towards education as a cheaper and more effective
replacement to earlier redistributive taxation and full employment policies. The success
of this coalition in passing the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act meant that
the institutions of the federal education state were designed with an eye towards solving
poverty, unemployment, and racial inequality. This left public schools vulnerable to
political attack as these social problems failed to disappear. By the end of the 1960s,
Democratic politicians and civil rights groups began to call for greater accountability and
!iv

punishment for schools that failed to live up to expectations. This critical view was
eventually adopted by Republicans and conservative interest groups, who pushed for the
introduction of market forces in public education as a necessary corrective. These earlier
developments explain why punitive sanctions became the cornerstone of federal
education policy, with particularly negative consequences for racial minorities and poor
communities.
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Chapter One
The Politics of the Federal Education State: Faith in Education and the Turn
Towards Punitiveness
The belief that education holds the key to individual success, social mobility and
national competitiveness has driven the construction of an expansive and increasingly
punitive federal education state committed to addressing broad social problems through
the public education system. This project traces the origins and contours of federal
primary and secondary education policy and institutions since the 1930s. My central
claim is that federal policymakers built an education order in which faith in education as
a solution to poverty, unemployment, and racial disparities led to the development of an
increasingly punitive education state. Those on the left concerned with inequality,
unemployment and the status of racial minorities—but ultimately unwilling to
fundamentally challenge the economic system—looked to education as the most effective
way to solve these problems. By adopting an understanding of these problems as best
addressed at the individual rather than the structural level, these actors turned to
education as an alternative to more direct economic redistribution or federal intervention
in the labor market. Most accounts of the modern education state focus on the 1980s and
the Reagan revolution as the origin of a punitive shift away from an egalitarian
orientation in federal education policy. Examination of the ideological and political
compromises of the 1940s and 1950s and the initial construction of federal educational
institutions in the 1960s reveals that the roots of modern punitive education polices run
much deeper.
!1

The presence of a powerful and punitive federal education state is surprising when
looking to the not-too-distant past. In the 1930s, the national discussion of education was
dominated by a powerful coalition of educational progressives and civil rights activists
during the Great Depression that advocated for public educational institutions and a
pedagogy centered on transforming the existing capitalist economic order with the aim of
greater equality through economic redistribution and full employment. With several
academic journals as outlets, this coalition included prominent educators and black
intellectuals and received support from many of the most powerful civil rights and
educational organizations throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s. However, a changing
international context and domestic political situation that shifted decidedly to the right
and was increasingly less tolerant of challenges to the economic order in the post-WWII
era gave rise to a different dominant coalition and understanding of education. Unlike the
previous coalition that pointed to macroeconomic causes and solutions to inequality and
poverty, the new educational coalition framed education as a particularly effective means
of addressing poverty, unemployment, and racial disparity. This emergent education
ideology, committed to equality of educational opportunity in order to fairly and
effectively incorporate individuals into a free market economy, was fully institutionalized
into the federal education state with the passage of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (ESEA) in 1965.
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The ideological developments of the 1930s through 1950s and the
institutionalization of these ideas in the ESEA mark the beginning of a new, liberal
incorporationist education order.
This new order was liberal in its commitment to extend to all the liberal democratic ideal
of equality of opportunity through education. Furthermore, this commitment to equality
of opportunity was to be backed by a robust commitment of the federal government. The
order was incorporationist in its goal of bringing all citizens, particularly racial
minorities and other previously disadvantaged groups, into the broader existing economic
and social structures. For racial minorities, incorporation implied integration and
educational opportunity in order to ensure they would be able to compete on equitable
terms with their white counterparts. Incorporation implied the elimination of arbitrary
barriers —like race or economic condition— to success, adjusting individuals to succeed
in the established societal structures. For many it also implied assimilation into the
dominant cultural norms and expectations of the middle and upper classes. Importantly,
incorporation implied that the broader existing economic and social structure would
remain intact. Since the 1960s, this commitment to liberal incorporation has been the
dominant educational order, what Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek refer to as “the
constellation of rules, institutions, practices, and ideas that hang together over time.”1
The liberal incorporationist education order, tracing its ideological roots to the
debates of the 1940s and 1950s, has structured federal education policy ever since the
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Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development, (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2004): 14.
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passage of the ESEA in 1965. The liberal incorporationist order justified an expansive
federal commitment in the realm of education. It also led to demands that schools be
held accountable for addressing poverty, unemployment and racial inequality. These
lofty expectations meant that funding was attached to increasingly harsh measures to
ensure accountability. The measures have punitive consequences for teachers, students,
and schools. Teachers who fail to raise test scores face loss of pay and firing; students
who fail to meet sufficient scores on standardized exit exams face denial of high-school
diplomas; and schools that fail to achieve benchmarks on face transformation into a
charter school, privatization, or closure. The educational commitments established
during the New Deal and Great Society have driven the rise in increasingly punitive
education policies.
While many scholars have noted the neoliberal turn in governance of education
and social policy more broadly, the change has typically been described as a conservative
reaction to the excesses of the progressivism of the New Deal and Great Society
programs. However, my study of the first forays of the federal government into the realm
of education policy at the height of the Great Society, as well as an understanding of the
debates among educational professionals that occurred in the 1930s and 1940s,
complicates this account. The justification for, and crafting of, the ESEA positioned
education as a poverty and unemployment program, and relied on an understanding that
education policy should ultimately support and strengthen existing competitive economic
structures by making them more fair and efficient through providing equal opportunity.
!4

In an important shift, the liberal incorporationists positioned poverty, unemployment, and
wage disparity as fundamentally individual failings rather than the result of
fundamentally flawed economic system. As the federal role was justified in new
ideological terms, public funding of education did in fact increase, but it did so at the
expense of undermining the ideological justification for more direct means of addressing
poverty, unemployment and inequality. Furthermore, this ideological understanding of
education had profound consequences for federal education policy, as it supported the
construction of a powerful federal education state that, abetted by the rise of the Reagan
coalition, would increasingly shift towards punitive policies as the education system
failed to meet the lofty goals set by the liberal incorporationist order.
Overview of Argument
My account begins with the debate over the purpose of education during the Great
Depression. Beginning in the early 1930s, a group of progressive educators known as the
social reconstructionists articulated a vision of education and the public school system as
the handmaiden of economic transformation. Led by George Counts and his best selling
1932 pamphlet Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?,2 the social
reconstructionists were highly critical of the excessive individualism, exploitation, and
widespread poverty that characterized the existing economic order. The inclusion of John
Dewey and Harold Rugg, among others, meant that this group included many of the most
prominent education leaders of the era. The social reconstructionists advocated for a new
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educational outlook in which teachers in the public schools would be the vanguard of
social transformation away from an exploitative economic system.
As the social reconstructionists were pushing for changes to the economic
structure in the 1930s and early 1940s, a group of black intellectuals was urging civil
rights groups to shift their focus to an economic analysis of the problems facing blacks in
the United States. Some of the most influential black leaders of the era, including Ralph
Bunche, A. Phillip Randolph, and Doxey Wilkerson, comprised this group. These
authors cautioned that the existing strategic course had placed too much emphasis on the
racial aspect of problems like poverty and unemployment. They pushed for an analysis
that placed the origins of these problems squarely as a result of an exploitative economic
system. This group was committed to a vision of economic democracy, in which the
education system would educate students on the importance of interracial class
consciousness, the necessity of unionization, and need for government-supported full
employment.
Remarkably, these economic progressive visions of education’s purpose were
some of the most prominent views expressed throughout the 1930s and into the early
1940s. Both the social reconstructionists and economic democrats offered an
understanding of education that stressed the need to ground education policy and aims in
a strong commitment to economic equality as a critical aspect of democratic citizenship.
Ultimately, since these groups traced the responsibility for unemployment, poverty and
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racial inequality to the economic system, any educational program that hoped to address
these problems would have to take aim at the economic system itself.
Despite their prevalence, these economic analyses always sat uneasily with many
on the political left who were less comfortable directly challenging the economic system.
Influential intellectual leaders including Charles S. Johnson (sociologist and editor of the
National Urban League’s journal Opportunity), Howard Hale Long (associate
superintendent of the public schools in Washington, D.C.), and prominent psychologist
Kenneth Clark directly challenged the wisdom of pursuing a political agenda centered on
economic claims. Throughout the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, a fierce debate played out
among those on the left over how far to push the challenge to the existing order. Within
the progressive education movement, the social reconstructionist position competed with
the position offered by the social efficiency progressives. Although both fell under the
broad banner of the progressive education movement, they differed considerably in
respect to their end goals and pedagogy. Social efficiency progressives were committed
to developing the educational tools that would most efficiently aid the adjustment of the
individual into the existing economic and social structures. These educators pushed for
the implementation of educational tools like intelligence and achievement testing, student
tracking and vocational training to aid in the creation of a meritocratic society.
Importantly, the social efficiency progressives saw the appropriate role of education as
facilitating the entrance of students into the existing economic and social structure by
providing the appropriate skills necessary to succeed in the labor market.
!7

A similar divide characterized thinking about black education, as several
prominent black intellectuals who were uncomfortable with the more radical claims of
the economic democrats, called instead for a program of racial democracy. This group
sought fair incorporation into the existing order, or for blacks to be treated “like everyone
else,” rather than broad transformation of the economy.3 Instead of capitalism, these
authors identified racial prejudice and cultural problems among lower-class blacks as
foundational to disparate levels of black poverty, unemployment and other social
inequalities.4 The educational perspective of these racial democrats was centered around
preparing black students for fair competition with their white counterparts through
programs aimed at combating white prejudice, facilitating cultural assimilation or
acculturation, and ensuring the equitable provision of educational opportunity. These
scholars saw public education as one of the most effective means of addressing the most
pressing problems facing the black community including poverty, unemployment and
racial inequality.
A number of important political developments in the 1940s and 1950s help
explain why the racial democracy and social efficiency visions of education became
dominant. The shifting international context at the end of the WWII meant that the
federal government was particularly concerned about domestic racial politics. Facing the
need to appeal to a number of non-white nations, the federal government increasingly
3

L. D. Reddick, “What Should the American Negro Reasonably Expect as the Outcome of a Real Peace?”
The Journal of Negro Education (Summer, 1943), 569.
4

Indeed, many of these authors openly embraced a capitalist economy as essential to protecting individual
freedom.
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embraced integration and racial democracy as a means of demonstrating the appeal of the
economic and political system of the United States.5 At the same time, federal courts
became increasingly sympathetic to challenges to Jim Crow under the Equal Protection
Clause. In the critical 1954 Brown case, the Supreme Court based its decision on the
psychological harm (rather than material) harm that segregation posed to black children,
an argument that emerged from scholars committed to racial democracy. The judiciary’s
increasing willingness to accept equal protection arguments strengthened the hand of
racial democrats.6
Another critical factor in the demise of the economic coalition was the brutal
political repression of many of the most vocal supporters of social reconstruction and
economic democracy during the Second Red Scare. As several scholars have noted, the
loyalty investigations of the 1940s and 1950s had a chilling effect on individuals and
coalitions on the political left.7 The investigation of prominent intellectuals on the left
like George Counts, Harold Rugg, and Doxey Wilkerson by state and national
government officials had serious consequences for the ability of economic progressives to
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See Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton:
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Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma,” The Journal of American History 91,
no. 1 (June 1, 2004).
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See Landon R. Y. Storrs, The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left (Princeton:
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the American School (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
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maintain social networks or organize politically. Indeed, under the threat of loyalty
investigations, many openly rejected or substantially modified their earlier positions.
Finally, the shifting macroeconomic position of federal policymakers in the 1940s created
an environment that was much more amenable to the vision of education put forth by the
social efficiency progressives and racial democrats. Moving away from a firm
commitment to full employment, policy actors increasingly supported a commercial
Keynesianism that privileged concerns about inflation and pursued tax cuts as the most
effective means of economic management. Unlike their New Deal predecessors who
argued unemployment was in large part the result of fundamental flaws in a market
economy, commercial Keynesians shifted explanatory focus to the individual, arguing
that unemployment was largely the result of marginal workers failing to keep up with
skill demands of the changing labor market.8
Changes in the international context, court doctrines, political repression and
macroeconomic policy beliefs created a political situation in which the collective
understanding of the purpose of the public education system shifted away from the
economic progressive understandings that dominated the 1930s and 1940s. These
political developments created the conditions that led to the establishment of a liberal
incorporationist order in education. A broad coalition united by a commitment to
providing equality of educational opportunity in a free market economic system

8

See Robert M. Collins, The Business Response to Keynes, 1929-1964 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1982); Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: America’s Enduring Confrontation with Poverty
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supported this new liberal incorporationist education order. Racial democrats, pushing
for fair incorporation into the existing economic and social structures, argued that such a
commitment was necessary to address the undemocratic relegation of blacks to inferior
status simply because of skin color. Social efficiency progressives, commercial
Keynesians, and conservative economists backed this commitment to equitable
educational opportunity as the most efficient way of ensuring individual success in the
labor market, and of effectively using national human resources. They positioned
education as the best policy tool available to address the problems of poverty,
unemployment, and racial disparity. Additionally, by the 1960s, as it became clear that
the liberal incorporationist ideology was better able able to accommodate the changing
political environment, many prominent supporters of economic democracy shifted their
positions to align more closely with that of liberal incorporation. Among this group were
George Counts, Ralph Bunche, Abram Harris, who all significantly modified or rejected
their previous support of economic democracy.9 The education policy proposals that

9

Not everyone abandoned the economic democracy position. Several authors and public servants
continued to maintain this position well into the 1960s. For example Willard Wirtz, President Lyndon
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President Harry Truman, and Bayard Rustin, a lead organizer of the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs
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emerged were committed to facilitating incorporation into the existing economic and
social structures, rather than challenging them.
Importantly, this understanding of education guided the construction of the federal
education state. The interpretation of poverty, unemployment, and racial disparity as
attributable to individual deficiencies in skill or culture helped build a coalition of
policymakers committed to addressing these problems through an expansive federal
education state. The liberal incorporationist framing of education as a solution to
poverty, racial disparity and unemployment provided a powerful vehicle for the
establishment of the first major federal intervention into the realm of primary and
secondary education policy, the 1965 ESEA. Indeed, it was this ideological framing that
proved especially effective at neutralizing and overcoming much of the fierce and
longstanding legislative opposition to an expansive federal role in education.
In addition to the providing the justification for the ESEA, the liberal
incorporationist understanding of education shaped the particular education policies that
emerged.
In his message to Congress urging passage of the ESEA, President Lyndon Johnson
underlined its importance by arguing, “with education, instead of being condemned to
poverty and idleness, young Americans can learn the skills to find a job and provide for a
family.”10 This interpretation of the origins of poverty, unemployment and racial
disparity drove the institutional structure of the ESEA, which was centered around

10

Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, “Report on Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
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providing compensatory funds for schools with high numbers of disadvantaged students.
The decision to invest heavily in education was a clear indication of the move away from
more directly interventionist approaches to address these problems, as policymakers
sought to attack the hypothesized individual causes of poverty and unemployment rather
than pursue broad macroeconomic solutions such as a full employment through publicsector job guarantees, aggressively redistributive taxation, and a robust social safety net.
Passage of the ESEA represented institutionalization at the federal level of the
liberal incorporationist ideology that had emerged from earlier debates over the purpose
of education. The institutionalization of this ideology marks a significant moment for
the development of accountability policies in education. The understanding of education
as the central mechanism for overcoming poverty and unemployment also drove many
policymakers and scholars to criticize public schools and teachers as responsible for these
problems and to demand strict accountability for federal funds distributed by the ESEA.
Senator Robert Kennedy (D-NY), Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel,
psychologist Kenneth Clark and other liberal incorporationists led the charge in the 1960s
for extensive evaluation and reporting requirements, and pointed to standardized tests as
the best means of evaluating program success.11 The belief that the equalization of
educational opportunity would help eliminate poverty, unemployment and racial
disparities drove these policies.

11
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Notably, the ESEA and subsequent federal education policies did substantially
increase federal funding of public schools, addressed some of the most egregious funding
inequities in the education system, and facilitated partial desegregation. However, it is is
important to recognize that many of these same policies pushed the federal education
state in a punitive direction. Despite evidence that schools had limited, if any, capability
to substantially raise student test scores, federal funding was attached to requirements
that demanded that schools demonstrate that the money was being put to good use, which
most often meant an ability to show an increase in student test scores. As the association
between effective use of federal money and test scores tightened in the mind of
policymakers, students, teachers, and schools were increasingly subjected to policies that
punished for failing to live up to expectations. As the liberal incorporationist order
triggered broad support for federal involvement in education, it also triggered demands
for accountability due to suspicion of the role existing educational institutions had played
in perpetuating social problems.
The liberal incorporationist terms on which the ESEA was established has framed
and structured subsequent developments. As federal investment in education failed to
show the lofty results predicted by the liberal incorporationists, federal policies grew
increasingly punitive. Early reports indicating educational programs targeted towards the
poor had little to no effect on educational outcomes prompted swift reaction from
Congressional actors. Disappointed policymakers pushed passed a number of
amendments in the 1960s and 1970s that increased evaluation and reporting requirements
!14

for ESEA programs and strengthened the reliance on standardized achievement tests as
the best evaluation metric. Additionally, these amendments mandated strict sanctions
against states and schools systems that failed to meet expectations and increased funds
for the enforcement activity of federal agencies in charge of oversight.
While segments of the Republican Party provided some of the fiercest opposition
to the liberal incorporationist order, this opposition mostly centered on the
appropriateness of a federal role, not over the understanding of education that it implied.
By the mid-1980s with the ESEA firmly established, and on the heels of the explosive
federal report A Nation At Risk, warning of the national peril posed by a failing public
education system, much of the Republican opposition to federal involvement had
dissipated. But the Republican embrace of the liberal incorporationist order also opened
avenues for the party to craft educational policies that aligned closer to its ideology. As
Robert Collins has noted, a given ideological commitment like liberal incorporation in
education, “offe[rs] policy formulations which diffe[r] significantly in their ideological,
political, and economic potentials.”12 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Republican
policymakers, national business organizations, and a number of civil rights groups voiced
increasing concern over the fact that public schools had failed to raise standardized test
scores and eliminate racial disparities on these tests. This concern, coupled with the
persistence of poverty and perception of a workforce unprepared for changing globalized

12
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economy, led these groups to push for the introduction of market incentives to increase
accountability in the public school system.
Policies like high stakes standardized tests, merit-based teacher pay, mass closings
of schools or firings of teachers deemed underperforming, and the expansion of charter
and private options in schooling became solutions to a system in crisis. Crucially, all of
these policies are consistent with the liberal incorporationist understanding of the purpose
of education. These policies were predominantly promoted by the federal government
through legislation like the Improving America’s Schools Act under President Bill
Clinton, the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act under President George W. Bush era, and
the Race to the The Top (RTT) initiative under President Barack Obama. This list of
legislation indicates the consolidation of bipartisan consensus around the a punitive
education state committed to the introduction of market incentives in public education..
The introduction of market incentives and punitive education policies has not
undermined the liberal incorporationist education order. In fact, these reforms are the
result of a constant source of tension embedded within the liberal incorporationist order.
The vision of education as a solution to poverty, unemployment, and racial disparity
meant that the continued existence of these problems spurred continuous calls for
education reform. Debates over the benefits of charter or private schools or strict
sanctions have all centered on how best to achieve liberal incorporationist goals. Recent
shifts towards punitive accountability and school choice policies are driven by the belief
that if schools are effective in raising test scores and reducing racial disparities on these
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achievement metrics, it will ultimately lead to a reduction in poverty, unemployment,
and racial inequality. And as earlier, the willingness to fund the buildup of an
increasingly punitive education state corresponds with a rejection of interventionist
macro-economic policies to address these problems more directly. Critically, the
increasing use of privatization, high-stakes testing, and mass firings of public school
teachers do not represent a challenge to the liberal incorporationist order established
during the Great Society, but are rather an increasingly destructive extension of the
institutional and ideological commitments it established.

Rethinking the Origins of the Federal Education State
The effects of the punitive accountability turn in education policy have been a
major focus of education researchers, particularly in the wake of NCLB and RTT. While
these reforms have been promoted as solutions to an inequitable and deficient education
system, several scholars have found that these reforms have had distinctly negative
consequences for students, teachers, and the public education more broadly. Researchers
have found evidence that the high-stakes tests and punitive turnaround strategies for
failing schools such as transformation into charters, merit pay for teachers, privatization,
and school closure required by NCLB and RTT have had numerous and severe
unintended consequences. In the classroom, studies have suggested that these reforms
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have narrowed the curriculum,13 caused teachers to focus on borderline or “bubble”
students most likely to increase their test scores,14 led to deceitful reclassification or
expulsion of low performing students as a means raising test averages,15 increased
teacher turnover and decreased teacher satisfaction,16 and increase in student dropout
rates.17 Scholars have also found that these negative consequences disproportionally
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affect the poor, racial minorities, and urban communities.18 These negative consequences
and their inequitable distribution have led to serious concerns that the current educational
policy landscape has hobbled the democratic responsiveness and purpose of public
education.19
As evidence of the negative consequences of recent educational reforms has
become widespread, scholars from several disciplines have sought to explain the origins
of these policies. Though otherwise very valuable, many of the most influential recent
accounts fail to recognize the deeper roots and the key turning points in the development
of modern educational politics just sketched. While some scholars suggest that the
ideological roots trace for current reforms stretch back the late 1970s,20 education
professor Ann Winfield reflects a broad consensus in claiming, “the historical dividing
line that marks the starting point for the present era, few would argue, is the election of
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Ronald Reagan.”21 According to these accounts, the “conservative restoration” brought
to power a broad coalition of groups opposed to opposed to egalitarian Great Society
education policy. This coalition composed of religious conservatives seeking greater
funding for religious schools and a greater religious emphasis in the public classroom,22
neoconservatives concerned about declining test scores and a decaying national culture,23
and neoliberal and corporate interests seeking to introduce market forces in public
education are pointed to as the the progenitors of the current constellation of punitive
education policies.24
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Several existing accounts point to the inflammatory 1983 Nation at Risk report
and the 1988 ESEA reauthorization as critical moments in the reorientation of the federal
education state.25 As fears of a loss of national standing and decreased social mobility
drove public dissatisfaction with public education, this coalition successfully pushed for
reforms that centered on holding schools accountable. The changes initiated by the
political right were solidified in the 1990s as members of the Democratic Party
recognized the need to adjust their stance as Republican efforts gained traction with
voters. This shift accelerated as it became clear that the many of the educational policies
advocated by Republican Party appealed to many racial minority and urban families,
constituencies that were traditionally Democratic.26 Since the passage of the NCLB in
2001, Democrats and Republicans have been united in pressing for market-based reforms
as a means of improving education. Importantly, this bipartisan consensus on the
appropriate role and policies of the modern federal education state is positioned as having
its foundations in the “watershed of a new economic and political world order” ushered in
by Reagan Revolution.27
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Like the scholarship emerging from other disciplines, much of the recent political
science scholarship on the development of the federal education state maps a distinct shift
in the 1980s from a progressive focus on educational equality to policies promoting
excellence through standards and accountability.28 Political scientists Patrick McGuinn,
Paul Manna, and Jesse Rhodes all characterize the early federal education state
established in the 1960s as an equity regime focused on targeting funds to disadvantaged
students. These authors all point to the 1980s as a moment of a paradigm shift in
education, when excellence replaced equity as the guiding principle of the federal
education state, ushering in policies designed to raise the educational achievement of all
students through standards, accountability, and standardized testing.29
It should be clear that from the perspective defended here, the ideological change
and periodization stressed by the equity to excellence account is at best overstated,
because it severely neglects crucial contributors to these developments. It fails to offer an
explanation for the fact that demands for accountability for failing schools, and policies
like sanctions and annual testing designed to ensure laggards were held accountable, were
embedded in the original construction of the federal education state in 1965. The most
vocal supporters of accountability policies in federal education came predominantly from
the political left and minority groups in the 1960s and 1970s. To fully grasp this
development requires an understanding of the how the ideological cleavages and battles
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of the 1940s and 1950s resulted in the construction of a federal education state centered
around holding schools responsible for solving poverty, racial disparity and
unemployment. Accountability politics and policies were firmly established in the
federal education state well before the 1980s.

Pointing to the 1980s as the origins of

this movement masks the considerable ideological continuity between the 1960s and
1980s in federal education policy.30 The accountability turn in education policy emerged
from the ideological battles of the 1940s and 1950s and was firmly institutionalized in the
Great Society expansion of the federal education state.
This accounts adds to a growing literature that argues that the political
compromises and state-building activities of the New Deal and Great Society eras were
critical to facilitating the neoliberal turn in social policy.31 Analysis of the scholarship
that traces this dynamic in the welfare state suggests that looking to these eras is critical
in understanding the modern education order. Marie Gottschalk demonstrates how the
political context and strategic decisions in the 1940s and 1950s tied the labor movement
in the United States to support of job-based health benefits and the private welfare state
model, a political settlement that proved to be a substantial barrier to the development of
universal insurance over the long run.32 Similarly, in their examination of development
30
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of Medicare, Morgan and Campbell show how a coalition of southern Democrats and
conservative Republicans turned to a “delegated welfare state” model of private, state,
and local operation as a means of state-building in the post-WWII context that was no
longer supportive of broad expansion of the federal welfare state. Although this was
politically expedient in the 1960s, this institutional structure hampered effectiveness and
exposed the program to political attacks and market-based reforms as the political
environment shifted.33 Detailing the transition from welfare to workfare, Eva Bertram
demonstrates that the foundations of the punitive workfare state were laid in the 1960s by
powerful southern Democrats in Congress.34 Margaret Weir argues that the possibility for
robust public employment programs was undercut by the War on Poverty which
constructed policies based on an understanding that attributed poverty to individual
attributes rather than larger structural forces.35 An examination of ideological debates of
the 1930s through the 1950s, and the state-building activities of the Great Society is key
in understanding the origins of the punitive accountability education policies that
characterize the current era.
In surveying the deeper origins of current policies and institutions, scholars of
American political development have argued that the role of race looms large in
explaining the peculiarities of the American social welfare state. This scholarship, which
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focuses on the ways in which race has shaped the institutional structure of the welfare
state, suggests the need for close attention to the role of racial hierarchies in shaping the
development of the education state. In his examination of New Deal social welfare
policy, Robert Lieberman argues that “race inhibited the development of a strong, unitary,
centralized welfare state in the United States,” as the desire to maintain racial hierarchies
drove policymakers to develop a decentralized, non-contributory social welfare programs
designed to push blacks to the margins of the welfare state.36 Similarly, Judith Russell
argues “institutional racism” shifted the approach of the War on Poverty to a service
delivery model of largely ineffectual programs, despite the overwhelming preference of
black leaders that the federal government focus on jobs and employment issues. Russell
suggests the refusal of federal officials to acknowledge the demands of the black
community limited the programs that emerged from the Great Society.37 In her study of
the federal penal state, Naomi Murakawa demonstrates how the state-building activities
of racial liberals in the 1940s through 1960s combined with conservative hardliners to
build a more “fair” penal system, but one that was capable of locking up significantly
more citizens, especially poorer non-white citizens.38 Finally, Lani Guinier has noted that
the legal strategy of the racial liberals pursuing desegregation through the courts in the
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1950s limited the direction of subsequent social policy by reframing the structural origins
of racism as a problem of individual psychology.39
In addition to shaping the institutional structure of the welfare state, scholars from
a wide array of disciplines have shown how racial ideology has shaped the political
demands and agendas of individuals and coalitions, particularly of those of black
Americans. The important political and policy consequences of developments in racial
ideology points to the need for an examination of the role of race in structuring the
ideological contours of the educational order. Several scholars have demonstrated how
the embrace of particular racial ideologies had important consequences for the political
demands of black Americans. In his study of tracing the marginalization of class-based
accounts of racial oppression among prominent black intellectuals in the 1920s through
the 1940s, historian Jonathan Holloway demonstrates the way in which “people have
used ‘race’ to constrain the possibilities of radical politics and social science thinking.”40
Touré Reed demonstrates how the Urban League’s embrace of assimilationist theories
emerging from the social sciences led to a racial uplift agenda that focused on changing
individual behavior rather than structural transformation as the best means of addressing
racial and economic inequality.41 Similarly, historian Leah Gordon demonstrates how the
post-WWII retreat from New Deal economic liberalism and the rise in antidiscrimination
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and antiprejudice policies were facilitated by federal and foundation support of social
science that identified prejudice and attitudes, rather than labor exploitation and class
struggle, as the source of racial oppression.42
Adolph Reed, Robert Korstad, Nelson Lichtenstein, and Risa Goluboff have
shown how these developments in the understanding of race facilitated a shift in black
political demands from a focus on union organizing and redistributive economic demands
in the 1930s and 1940s to a politics centered on legal administrative demands for equal
inclusion into existing social structures by the 1960s.43 In his examination of housing
policy in Chicago, Preston Smith demonstrates how the post-WWII adoption of “racial
liberalism” by black elites legitimized their claim to leadership and help consolidate a
liberal politics that limited political demands to “equal treatment in the marketplace.”44
Smith traces the class-inflected nature of this politics, showing how black elites targeted
racial segregation reform while accepting the class-segmented housing arrangements
promoted by pro-growth white business and political elites. Tracking the consequences
of these settlements for the current political landscape, Lester Spence examines the
neoliberal turn in black politics over the past few decades. Spence argues that the
“neoliberalization of black politics” replaced political organization and mobilization with
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a politics “in which racial inequality is managed through black elite-promoted techniques
designed to get black people to act according to market principles.”45
Close attention to the ideological and institutional structuring of race in American
political development helps illuminate why certain ideologies, coalitions and institutions
gained prominence and how they continue to shape the educational landscape. The
debates and developments in the ideological understanding of race and racial inequality
in the 1930s through the 1950s were central to building the educational coalition and
politics that proved integral in the push to build a federal education state. As this
coalition succeeded in institutionalizing their demands with the 1965 ESEA, the
expectation that public education would eliminate broader racial disparities significantly
affected the structure of the educational programs and policies that emerged. The
consequences of these early debates and institutional developments shaped by race
continue to reverberate in the educational order today.
One of the greatest strengths of these works has been the incorporation of ideas,
coalitions, and institutions in a comprehensive account of political development. Rogers
Smith notes the importance of analytical approaches that include both ideas and
institutions in explanations of political change. Smith argues that ideas are crucial
“constitutive elements” of political order, but that accounts of political development must
also include the institutional focus as “[i]deas can produce political change only when
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particular, identifiable political institutions, groups, and actors advance them.”46 This
project will trace the political development along what Smith refers to as the “spiral of
politics.”47 Smith suggests a model of general political development in which ideas are
essential constitutive elements in constructing coalitions that press for institutional
change, which ultimately change the political context. Smith’s argument is one that
highlights the importance of ideas, as “coalitions, institutions, and the policies they
eventually produce are all constituted in significant measures by the ideas that define the
shared purposes of the coalitions and the aims of the governing officials who create
institutions or seek to turn existing ones to their ends.”48
The shortcomings of existing accounts tracing the development of the education
state suggest the value of this type of APD approach. The close focus on the growth of
the federal role in education has obscured the ideological continuity guiding its
development for the last fifty years. An examination of the ideas that shaped, and
continue to shape, the institutional development of the federal education state is a critical
component in understanding the educational order. In addition to the ideological focus,
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understanding the current landscape requires an investigation of the individuals,
coalitions, and institutions enlisted in supporting one idea over another, which ultimately
explains why some ideas win and others lose out. Providing a compelling explanation for
the current educational order dominated by a pedagogy devoted to holding schools,
teachers, and students accountable through increasingly punitive means requires an
approach that takes ideas, coalitions, and institutions seriously.
The 1965 passage of the ESEA represents the institutionalization of a particular
vision of education that cannot be understood without a comprehension of the
ideological, institutional, and political battles that paved the way for its passage and
structured its creation. The construction and motivation for the ESEA was driven by a
liberal incorporationist ideological understanding that positioned federal involvement in
education as necessary for providing equality of opportunity and an essential program for
addressing poverty, unemployment, and racial disparity. The dominance of this
understanding of education during the 1960s represented an ideological and political
victory for those committed to shoring up the liberal capitalist order. Throughout much
of the 1930s and 1940s, a sizable group of academics and educational organizations were
committed to a much different vision of education. This coalition advocated for the use
of schools and education more broadly to end excessive individualism and the
competitive nature among students, to instill working-class solidarity, and to position
teachers as the vanguard in the transition to a different economic and social order. The
fierce debate was settled as the liberal incorporationist vision ultimately proved better
!30

able to accommodate the shifting political context of the nascent Cold War, a resurgent
business community, and a federal judiciary increasingly sympathetic to claims under the
Equal Protection Clause.
The liberal incorporationist understanding of the purpose of education, and the
social problems it could and should address drove actors to articulate specific educational
programs and policies, and create educational institutions that reflected this idea. The
justification for the ESEA was built solidly on liberal incorporationist ideas, and these
ideas shaped the policies of the new federal education state and the means by which these
polices would be evaluated. The institutionalization of this vision of education in the
federal education state had substantial long-term effects as the liberal incorporationist
ideology has shaped development of education policy for the past fifty years.
Establishing education as the solution to poverty, unemployment, and racial disparity
ensured continued dissatisfaction with public education and drove punitive reforms.
Attention to these ideas and the context in which they originated illuminates why the
federal education state developed when it did, why federal education institutions took the
form they did, and why actors advocated for particular educational policies. In other
words, an analysis of ideas guiding the federal education state demonstrates “why the
different components of the political order adhere to it and why its central objectives are
what they are.”49
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This account of political development in education policy demonstrates that the
liberal incorporationist ideology was distinct from previous ideological interpretations of
the role of education and important for the construction of a political coalition that
pressed for a federal education state and specific educational policies. This ideology was
the dominant justification for institutional change represented by the ESEA and continues
to be the dominant frame for current understandings of the role of education.50 The
liberal incorporationist order structured and limited subsequent developments in
education policy and facilitated the rise of punitive policies.

Chapter Outlines
The dissertation begins with a focus on the coalitions that engaged in heated battles
over the future of education in the United States from the 1930s to the 1960s. Chapters 2
through 4 trace the rise and fall of the economic transformational coalition and its
replacement with a coalition committed to an educational system that did not radically
challenge existing economic structures. I show that throughout the 1930s and into the
1940s, a powerful alliance of educational progressives and civil rights activists advocated
for an educational pedagogy centered on transforming the existing social structures, with
the aim of greater equality through economic redistribution. These educational
progressives stressed the need to ground education policy and aims in a strong commitment
to economic equality as a critical aspect of democratic citizenship.
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The development of this economic egalitarian coalition fostered the growth of a
counter-movement of racial liberals and social efficiency educators seeking a fairer and
more effective education system within the existing economic framework. These groups
ultimately formed a broad coalition united by a commitment to equality of educational
opportunity in a free market economic system, or what I term a liberal incorporationist
ideology. Significantly, the purpose of education that emerged from the battles of this time
period was strongly connected to human capital and culture of poverty theory. Liberal
incorporationists advocated for equality of opportunity for all races within the existing
economic structure and pushed for the development of standardized testing as means of
guiding education policy and holding educators accountable.
Chapter 2 traces the individuals that made up two distinct coalitions within the
progressive education movement, mapping the political and policy cleavages between the
social reconstructionist educational coalition grounded in a critique of the economic system
and a counter coalition of social efficiency progressives committed to introducing scientific
educational methods in order to aid the adjustment of individuals into the labor market.
Chapter 3 outlines a similar divide within black educational thought between an economic
democracy coalition committed to an educational program that challenged the economic
order, and a racial democracy coalition that sought to institute educational policies they
believed would facilitate integration into the existing public institutions and economy.
Chapter 4 examines how the changing political context of the 1940s and 1950s, and the
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response by individuals and coalitions to these changing conditions, led to the victory of
liberal incorporationist ideology in education.
Having examined the ideological battles that preceded it, Chapter 5 focuses on the
construction of the federal education state and the institutionalization of the liberal
incorporationist order. Covering the period between 1960 and 1975, this chapter examines
how the ideological understanding of education that emerged from prior debates structured
the institutions of the new federal education state, with a particular focus on the role of
federal policymakers and the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and
its subsequent amendments. Chapter 5 traces how liberal incorporationist ideology drove
policy and institutional construction of the federal education state in the ESEA. The
moment when Democrats succeeded in institutionalizing the federal role in education
policy coincided with a moment of dramatic limitation in the commitment to use federal
power to intervene in the national economy for redistributive purposes. This political
context, coupled with the decisive ideological victory of the liberal incorporationist
coalition described in earlier chapters meant that much of the programmatic structure that
emerged from the ESEA established a liberal incorporationist pedagogy and understanding
of public education’s purpose. This understanding served as the basis for much of the
punitive policies of the modern education state. Rather than stressing the need for
economic reform, Great Society liberals shifted towards a narrower vision of equality that
focused on the provision of equitable opportunity to succeed as sufficient for democratic
legitimacy.
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The belief that education was central in overcoming a culture of poverty and
developing human capital drove the debate over ESEA. This belief subsequently
determined the contours of federal programs and policies. As Democrats backed off earlier
commitments to full employment and strong federal intervention in the economy, they
increasingly looked to the public schools as a solution to the problems of poverty and
unemployment. The retreat of the Democratic Party from redistributive policies was
accompanied by increasingly punitive policies in the education state. From the start, the
nascent federal education state relied on standardized tests and sanctions as a means of
holding recipients of federal funds accountable. Furthermore, it was liberals that were the
most vehement in calling for these punitive accountability policies. My account runs
counter to much existing scholarship, which views the ESEA as a progressive triumph that
was later shifted towards punitiveness with the reemergence of a powerful conservative
coalition during the Reagan era. By ignoring the ideological underpinnings of the ESEA
and the fundamental ideological continuity of the education state after its passage, scholars
have failed to grasp the role of the ESEA and Great Society liberals in setting the education
state on a path towards punitiveness.
The concluding chapter briefly traces the emergence of an era of bipartisan
consensus from the 1970s to the present. An analysis of the recent developments in the
federal education policy, such as Improving America’s Schools Act from the Clinton era,
the No Child Left Behind Act of the Bush era, and the Race to the Top Initiative and Every
Student Succeeds Act under President Obama, shows that the parties have converged on a
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common ideological understanding about the purpose and problems of education. Public
education is seen as broken and the federal government is viewed as the most effective
driver of badly needed reforms. Policies like high stakes standardized tests, merit-based
teacher pay, mass closings of schools deemed underperforming, and the expansion of
charter and private options in schooling became bipartisan solutions to a system in crisis.
These policies have had particularly harmful effects on the poorest students and
communities. The past twenty years have represented a remarkable period of agreement
over the purpose of education and the role of the federal government. Significantly, the
development of this broad and durable bipartisan coalition pressing for educational reform
occurred in era that many scholars have characterized as marked by unparalleled
polarization. The result is a firmly entrenched federal education state committed to
punitive accountability policies, with particularly pernicious consequences for the most
disadvantaged.
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Chapter Two
To Reconstruct or Adjust? The Battle within Progressive Education, 1920s-1940s
Education is an economic issue -- if not ‘the’ economic issue of our time...
It’s an economic issue when countries that out-educate us today are going to out-compete us
tomorrow. For years, we’ve recognized that education is a prerequisite for prosperity. And yet,
we’ve tolerated a status quo where America lags behind other nations...
Meanwhile, when it comes to black students, African American students trail not only almost
every other developed nation abroad, but they badly trail their white classmates here at home -an achievement gap that is widening the income gap between black and white, between rich and
poor.
-Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on
Education Reform at the National Urban League Centennial Conference, July 29, 2010

There is agreement today across the political spectrum in the United States around
the idea that the education system is in crisis, and that educational reforms are key to
solving myriad social problems. The above quote from President Obama is indicative of
the current consensus on the problems and purpose of education. Both major political
parties and important interest groups have voiced concerns about the quality of schooling,
the effectiveness of teachers, the difficulty of the curriculum, the need for more
accountability, and the comparative effectiveness of the public education system in the
United States. Underlying this diagnosis of school deficiency is a remarkable consensus
about the purpose of the education system. Elites from across the political spectrum
promote the idea that the public education system should be centered around imparting
skills that offer individuals the potential for future success within the existing social and
economic order. From the political right, this view of education is defended as the most
efficient way of ensuring that individual earnings are tied to the skills the individual
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brings to marketplace, that there is a steady supply of skilled workers for the labor
market, and as the best means of preserving the nation’s international preeminence.51 The
political left embraces this understanding out of a belief that an education system ordered
on these principles provides the best means of economic mobility for the meritorious, and
provides a path to success even for individuals from traditionally disadvantaged groups.52
This current political consensus on education understands the broader economic
structure as set, and therefore the proper focus of the education system is to ensure that
all children have an equal shot at success (or failure) in the existing social order.
Although promoters of this vision of education acknowledge that such a system entails
winners and losers, the goal is to create an educational system that ensures that winners
and losers are determined on individual merit, not on the circumstances of birth. Under
this view, critiques of the education system have been twofold. First, critics charge that
the system broadly does not effectively prepare students for the demands of the labor
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market. Second, the education system faces criticism for providing some groups better
preparation for future success than others.
What is striking about this vision of the purpose and function of education in
American society is its narrowness. The role of education is reduced to developing and
then efficiently and equally distributing the abilities of individuals to compete in the
existing social and economic order. If these educational conditions are met, subsequent
inequalities that arise are viewed as essentially justified. Absent from this vision of
education is any notion that it is possible or desirable for the public education system to
challenge the existing structural order which guarantees that even equitable educational
opportunity ultimately results in inequality.53 In short, the current educational consensus
has no broader social vision for challenging the extreme inequities that can result from a
capitalist economic system.
This chapter seeks to explain the emergence and current prominence of this view
of education. An examination of the past indicates that this is a relatively recent
historical development, and that this particular vision was not always the hegemonic
force in education that it is today. The Progressive Era in the early decades of the
twentieth century was characterized by a growing national faith that methods and
knowledge of the sciences could be harnessed as a means of addressing national concerns
such as the growth of large corporations and corruption in government. A group of
individuals who held similar hope for the promise of science in guiding best practices in
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the organization and methods of teaching dominated the national conversation in
education during this time period. Broadly known as the progressive education
movement, these social scientists and educators advocated for a sharp departure from the
traditional curricula and methods of teaching, pushing for new approaches that were
better suited to address current national problems and needs. United by their faith in
science and their rejection of traditional educational methods, the progressive education
movement had a powerful and continuing effect on the ideas and methods of nation’s
education system. However, the broad label of Progressive Education masks substantial
and significant differences within this group. As educational historian David Labaree has
noted, “[t]he progressive education movement in the United States was not a single
entity, but a cluster of overlapping and competing tendencies.”54 This chapter traces the
most significant division within the progressive education movement throughout the
1920s and 1940s - the division between the social efficiency progressives and the social
reconstructionists.55
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The social efficiency progressives believed that the primary purpose of education
was to facilitate the successful integration of children into the existing economic and
social landscape. Many in this group came from the world of educational psychology
and were firmly committed to the use of quantitative measurement including intelligence,
aptitude, and achievement tests as a means of determining educational best practices.
Social efficiency progressives pressed for educational opportunity to be distributed on the
basis of intelligence and likelihood of success, and advocated for a differentiated
curriculum based on student ability. Alternatively, the social reconstructionists believed
that the public schools, teachers, and the curriculum should be primarily concerned with
educating students about social problems, as well as preparing students with the tools to
address these social problems directly. In the wake of the stock market crash of 1929 and
the nascent New Deal, the social reconstructionists were highly critical of the excessive
individualism, extreme competitiveness, and economic exploitation that characterized the
existing economic and social institutional landscape.56 Unlike the social efficiency
progressives, the social reconstructionists advocated that students of all abilities be
educated together and were highly critical of standardized tests. More broadly, the
central cleavage between the two groups was that whereas the scientific efficiency
progressives believed that education should help adjust the individual for success in the
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existing social order, the social reconstructionists argued that the schools should help
prepare students to fundamentally change the social order.
This chapter focuses on the key individuals and organizations of the two
progressive groups. It begins by outlining the core ideological commitments and the
educational program of the social efficiency progressives through an examination of the
writings of some of the most important members of this coalition. This group dominated
the progressive educational landscape for much of the early decades of the twentieth
century. However, the stock market crash of 1929 and the extended economic hardship
of the Great Depression gave rise to a rival group of progressives, the social
reconstructionists. The second part of the chapter maps the educational reforms and
ideological commitments of the social reconstructionists. Given the radicalness of their
critiques, this group of progressive educators held surprising influence throughout the
1930s. The different educational ideologies of these two groups of progressive educators
led to distinct, and often contradictory, policy prescriptions from the two coalitions.
These educational disagreements mapped onto broader political disagreements between
the two groups over fairness of a capitalist economy, the requirements of equality of
opportunity, and support of New Deal policies. These two groups vigorously competed
with one another for the soul of public education. Understanding the differing political
commitments and policy differences and between these two groups is central to
understanding why one group ultimately proved more successful in implementing its
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educational programs. Indeed, the consequences of the victory by the social efficiency
progressives continue to reverberate throughout the education system today.

The Social Efficiency Progressives
A powerful new coalition of academics and educators, the social efficiency
progressives, emerged in the early decades of the twentieth century. In the spirit of the
era, this group of progressive educators pressed for dramatic educational reforms, arguing
that children and society more broadly could best be served by creating a more rational
and systemic approach to education. Many of the most prominent members of the social
efficiency progressive coalition, including Edward L. Thorndike, Henry H. Goddard,
Charles H. Judd, and Robert M. Yerkes, came from the newly emerging academic field
of psychology. Education was also emerging as an academic field and separate
department in many universities, and influential early members of the field such as John
Franklin Bobbitt, Elwood P. Cubberly, David Snedden, and Charles Prosser were also
social efficiency progressives. Although this coalition was certainly not uniform in their
ideological outlook, it was united by several common commitments and beliefs about
needed educational reforms. Focused on the need to make the schools more efficient and
more reflective of the needs of society, social efficiency progressives proposed a number
of reforms to school governance, organization, and teaching methods, including tracking,
intelligence testing, standardized achievement testing, routinized teaching methods, and
vocational education. This educational vision was accompanied by a belief that children
were fundamentally not equal in intelligence or potential value to society, and efficiency
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therefore demanded that children of different intelligence be treated differently. This
group of progressives advocated turning away from the rote formalism of the three R’s
that implied teaching students of all abilities the same thing and the tendency to focus on
college preparation in high school with methods that were scientifically proven to be
effective and were more appropriate for each student’s ability and future station in life.
The educational vision and ideological commitments of the social efficiency progressives
dominated the landscape of the early progressive education movement.

Scientific Management
One of the core commitments that united social efficiency progressives was a
desire to introduce the principles of industrial management into the public school system.
Largely inspired by Frederick W. Taylor’s writings about effective industrial
management, social efficiency sought to adapt the management principles outlined by
Taylor to the day-to-day operation of the school. For this group of progressives, the
implementation of industrial management methods such as routinization, constant
evaluation, differentiation, and efficiency provided promising avenues of reforming the
education system. The desire to introduce scientific management techniques spawned
dramatic reform proposals that touched nearly every aspect of the schooling, including
administrative organization, the curricula, and the act of teaching itself.
One of the staunchest and most influential advocates of intruding the logic of
industrial management into the schools scientific management was John Franklin
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Bobbitt. A long-time professor of school administration at the University of Chicago,
Bobbitt also served briefly as assistant schools superintendent of Los Angeles and
Toledo.57 Bobbitt was one of the most enthusiastic proponents of extending the methods
of business management into the schools, a position he outlined early in his career for the
1913 Yearbook of the National Society for the Science of Education. In the extensive
piece, entitled “The Supervision of City Schools: Some General Principles of
Management Applied to the Problems of City-School Systems,” Bobbitt argued that since
“[e]ducation is a shaping process as much as the manufacture of steel rails,” it made since
to apply the scientific management techniques used in business to realm of education.58
Extending the metaphor of the school as a business, Bobbitt’s educational approach
described school administrators as supervisors, the teachers as workers on the line, and
the students as the educational products, and put forth a number of management
principles designed to maximize efficiency in education. In this new educational system
envisioned by Bobbitt and others, “‘social efficiency’ is to become the chief watchword
and the chief aim.”59
The most pressing tasks in applying scientific management techniques to the
school was to develop standards in order to rationalize and routine the educational
process. Bobbitt argued that each subject should have a set of concrete standards that
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outlined the expectations of what students should know by the time of the completion of
each grade. Bobbitt cited favorably the example of math standards that required students
to complete a certain number of problems with a set level of accuracy within a given time
limit as an ideal type of standard. Bobbitt believed that similar standards could and
should be set for every school subject.60 Standards were the foundation of the scientific
management program, as they allowed for the evaluation of which teaching methods
were most effective as well as the personal evaluation of students, teachers and
principles.
Importantly, given that the usefulness of standards was largely a function of the
ability to make different aspects of the educational process comparable, the most
effective standards would involve reducing the educational process to easily quantifiable
and comparable metrics. Social efficiency progressives believed that quantifiable
standards could even be set for subjects such as history and social studies. The faith in
the ability to quantify and measure all aspects of the educational process is reflected in
Edward Thorndike’s exclamation that ‘[w]hatever exists, exists in some amount.”61 The
development of quantified standards would allow for quick and easy comparison of
students and teachers within schools, as well as comparisons between different schools
using the same standards.
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Significantly, for Bobbitt, the setting of these standards was not the role of the
teachers or others within the education system. Rather, the educational standards should
be set by the needs of the broader community, and the demands of labor market in
particular. Bobbitt’s belief that “it is the need of the world affairs that determines the
standard specifications for the educational product,” led him to privilege the input of
business and corporate leaders in the creation of education standards.62 Bobbitt argued
that “[t]he commercial world can best say what it needs,” and called for the “business
world …. [to] state in specific terms the kinds of educational product that it desires in the
workers that come to it.”63 By informing the schools about the labor needs of industry,
Bobbitt hoped to use educational standards to help schools shape and prepare the students
for their position in the labor market.
Given the role of the schools in helping to facilitate entry into the labor market,
social efficiency progressives believed that one function of a rationalized school system
was to sort students into different categories based on ability and future vocation.
Bobbitt advocated for differentiation of standards based on the “native ability” of
students and envisioned three separate tracks of educational standards based on the
results of intelligence test.64 Significantly, Bobbitt claimed that differentiation of
standards allowed for schools to begin the process of preparing the students for the
vocational task and social role for which their intelligence best suited them. As Bobbitt
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argued, “differentiation of standards on the basis of native ability is closely related to the
differentiation of standards according to vocational and social destiny.”65 Differentiation
would allow for the development of different standards and curricula for the different
groups of students, which would ultimately smooth the transition of each group of student
into their appropriate place in the labor market.66
The commitment to different educational tracks based on intelligence scores was a
central aspect of the social efficiency progressive movement. Edward Thorndike echoed
Bobbitt in calling for the differentiation of educational standards and resources on the
basis of intelligence, arguing “[i]t certainly is not reasonable that the intellectually ablest
5 per cent of boys should be kept in school to an age only four months beyond that to
which the least able are kept” and that “increased resources should be used to aid young
men and women whom nature and nurture have chosen to profit from schooling.”67 The
differentiation of standards was framed as a means of rationally distributing educational
resources. This differentiation of educational standards also supported subsequent social
and class differentiation, framing the unequal distribution of educational resources and
opportunities as a rational extension of meritocracy.
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The creation of standards was also meant to help define the role of the teachers in
the classroom and to determine the most effective teaching methods. In applying the
methods of scientific management in business to the classroom, Bobbitt conceptualized
the teacher as an assembly line worker whose “task is to turn out a product of definite
sort in the shape of developed abilities within the pupils.”68 According to Bobbitt, “[t]he
burden of finding the best methods is too large and too complicated to be laid on the
shoulders of the teachers,” instead, the “doctrine of scientific management” required that
teaching method should instead be determined by school administrators.69 The quantified
common educational standards would allow school administrators to determine the
effectiveness of a variety of different methods in helping students meet the standards for
each subject. The goal was a standardized approach in all classrooms, as Bobbitt argued,
“[a]fter experimentation and statistical comparisons have shown the methods that are
best, then these methods must be used by the teachers.”70
For the teacher, the implementation of scientific management techniques would
mean the substantial loss of professional autonomy. The social efficiency progressives
believed that the the freedom of teachers in the classroom had to be curtailed, as it
implied variation from methods that had been shown to be effective. As Bobbitt claimed,
“Teachers cannot be permitted to follow caprice in method. When a method which is
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clearly superior to all other methods has been discovered, it alone can be employed.”71
The methods proposed by Bobbitt, Thorndike, and others removed teachers as the
authorities in education, replacing them with the administrators who evaluated which
methods were most effective. The role of the teacher reduced to little more than that of a
technician implementing methods that had been determined to help students reach the
standards set for each grade and subject.72
Finally, in addition to rationally distributing educational opportunities and
defining the appropriate role of the teacher, social efficiency progressives valued the
ability of educational standards to aid in accountability. Once clear standards had been
set and effective methods been determined, there could be no excuse for failing to
produce the desire educational product. Although the development of standards held the
possibility of accountability for principles and administrators, it was clear that social
efficiency progressives were most interested in evaluating the performance of teachers.
Bobbitt claimed that current system of promotion and salary tied to length of service was
irrational and argued that it should be replaced by one in which teacher appointment,
promotion, and salary were all tied to their ability to get their students to reach the
appropriate educational standards.73 Furthermore, according to Bobbitt, the
implementation of standards would provide supervisors with “incontestable evidence of
inefficiency against the weak teacher who cannot or who refuses to improve. And the
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present day difficulty of removing such a teacher from the service, transferring her, or
retiring her, will be instantly overcome.”74 As on the efficiently managed shop floor, the
implementation of scientific management techniques in the schools would aid supervisors
in the identification and termination of inefficient workers. Bobbitt argued that
accountability in education required more or less constant testing of the students and
extensive record keeping, just as it did in the business world.75
Bobbitt was one of the earliest and most vocal advocates of the the introduction of
scientific management techniques, but he certainly was not alone. The desire to
implement scientific reforms that would increase the efficiency of the educational system
was shared by many other prominent social efficiency reformers, including Edward
Thorndike, David Snedden, Charles Judd, and Henry Goddard.76 Elwood Cubberly, an
well known and early leader in the emerging field of educational administration, offered a
nearly identical assessment as that of Bobbitt in 1916, writing:
Our schools are, in a sense, factories in which the raw products (children)
are to be shaped and fashioned into products to meet the various demands
of life. The specifications for manufacturing come from the demands of of
twentieth-century civilization, and it is the business of the school to build
its pupils according to the specification laid down. This demands good
tools, specialized machinery, continuous measurement of production to see
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if it is according to specifications, the elimination of waste in manufacture,
and a large variety in the output.77
The faith that reforms that had revolutionized the factory floor could also help
revolutionize social institutions motivated many of the progressive efforts of the day.
This faith also was a significant factor in the expansion of the one of the most
consequential educational reforms to emerge from this era: widespread standardized
testing.

Testing
The desire to introduce scientific management techniques into the schools was a
primary driver of increased demand for the development and implementation of
standardized tests in education. Social efficiency progressives argued that efficiency
demanded the use of standardized tests to determine both the appropriate educational
track for students and also to evaluate the success of schools in meeting newly developed
standards. As a result, educational psychologists devoted substantial time and resources
to developing intelligence tests, meant to differentiate students by inborn intelligence, and
also achievement tests, meant to evaluate the progress students had made towards
meeting newly developed standards. These tests would be the central tools in the attempt
to reorganize the schools in most socially efficient manner, allowing for appropriate
distribution of educational resources, determination of the best educational methods, and
increased accountability.
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Although the goal of widespread standardized testing of intelligence and
achievement in education had long been the goal of the social efficiency progressives,
this position gained substantially broader endorsement after World War I (WWI). As the
United States entered the conflict, the military turned towards to scientific management
techniques as a means of efficiently dealing with the dramatic increase in the scale of
operations and number of soldiers for which it was now responsible. The Army hired a
number of the nation’s most prominent psychologists, including Edward Thorndike,
Henry Goddard, Lewis Terman and Robert Yerkes, to help implement new methods of
dealing with massive increase in manpower. Seizing the opportunity, Yerkes led a team
of psychologists that developed and deployed an intelligence test in 1917 and 1918. The
forty-minute test given to groups of new recruits was designed to help military authorities
quickly and efficiently identify those candidates that were intelligent enough to be
officers, as well as identify those who were unfit for service due to low intelligence. As a
greater number of soldiers were tested, the psychologists developed intelligence
guidelines for increasingly specific army vocations. Ultimately, throughout the War,
more than 1.75 million soldiers took intelligence tests. The adoption of intelligence as a
category that influenced placement was a radical development for the military, which had
never considered intelligence or mental capacity a meaningful qualification prior to
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WWI. By the end of WWI, the United States military had fully embraced psychological
methods and intelligence testings.78
The widespread use of intelligence tests in the war effort helped legitimize and
popularize the concept of intelligence and its potential use for guiding social institutions.
By 1920 Henry Goddard, a prominent psychologist and first person to translate the Binet
intelligence test into English, asserted that “this army experience it is no longer possible
for any one to deny the validity of mental tests.”79 After the war, social efficiency
progressives quickly turned their attention back to the schools and attempted to
implement a similar program in education. In their post-War assessment of the Army
intelligence tests, Robert Yerkes and Clarence Yoakum, two of the individuals intimately
involved in developing tests, advocated for the introduction of intelligence tests in
schools. In discussing the practical applications of testing after the end of the war, the
two psychologists proposed “that children should be classified in accordance with mental
ability either as they enter school or shortly thereafter and that mental ability should
thereafter be taken into account in connection with their educational treatment.”80 Much
like their function in military, social efficiency progressives hoped that the tests would be
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used to sort children into their appropriate track, and eventually the vocation most suited
to their intelligence level. In 1919, the General Education Board, a philanthropic
organization funded by John D. Rockefeller, provided $25,000 for the development tests
designed to measure the intelligence of children in elementary schools. The group of
psychologists that comprised the committee in charge of developing the standards was
comprise of many of the same individuals who had developed army intelligence tests,
including Lewis M. Terman, Edward L. Thorndike, and Robert M. Yerkes. Yerkes served
as chairman, the same role he served in the military effort, of the new effort to develop
intelligence tests for elementary school students,. The committee developed two different
tests, and by 1920 had secured an agreement from the World Book Company to publish
and distribute the new tests under the title of “National Intelligence Tests.”81
According to social efficiency progressives it was not only tests of intelligence
that would prove useful in education, achievement tests were also critical to ensuring an
efficiently run educational system. Edward Thorndike, the educational psychologist who
had been in charge of examining the accuracy of the intelligence tests during the War,
pressed for the extension of both intelligence and achievement testing in education,
arguing, “[e]ducation is one form of human engineering and will profit by measurements
of human nature and achievement, as mechanical and electrical engineering have profited
by using the foot-pound, calories, volt, and ampere.”82 Similarly, Henry Goddard
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advocated for the introduction of an initial intelligence test to sort students into
appropriate educational tracks, to be followed by frequent testing of achievement
throughout the educational career of the student. The ultimate goal, was “not only to give
each student a mental rating but to discover by proper tests the special abilities of various
students with an idea to guiding them in their choice of work or profession.”83 The faith
that social efficiency progressives placed in the ability of tests to accurately determine
intelligence and measure educational achievements meant that this group proselytized for
the extension of testing throughout the educational process.
The enthusiasm for testing was largely motivated by the desire to increase the
efficiency of the schools. The psychologists advocating for intelligence and achievement
tests fundamentally agreed with Bobbitt’s prescription for school reform, and viewed the
extension of testing as a necessary aspect of bringing scientific management to the
education system. Goddard argued that “a knowledge of the intelligence level and a
conscious effort to fit every man to his work in accordance with his intelligence level, is
the surest way of promoting social efficiency.”84 The introduction of testing would allow
for the sorting and assignment of students to the most appropriate educational track for
their intelligence level and for a tailoring of the educational program to the future place in
the labor market as determined by the mental capacity of the student. The social
efficiency progressives believed that this reform would represent a substantially more
efficient school system, as it avoided wasting educational resources on those with low
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intelligence who could not benefit, and allowed for greater educational investment in the
highly intelligent students who would be most likely to benefit.85 Edward Thorndike
captured the centrality of testing of the social efficiency progressive educational vision in
a 1920 Harper’s essay, where he argued:
Exact and complete knowledge about the correlations of mental traits will
be of enormous importance for the utilization of man-power by schools,
churches, employers, and the state. When we have such exact knowledge,
we shall be able to make up a bill of specifications of the sort of intellect
and character required for a certain job, select men efficiently instead of
haphazard, and train them according to their individual needs instead of
indiscriminately.86
The legitimacy granted to the psychologists after their perceived success in World War I
meant that these recommendations carried substantial weight. By the 1920-1921 school
year, over one million school children had been given general intelligence tests, and over
two million achievement tests had been administered in a number of school subjects.87

Heredity
The desire of social efficiency progressives to increase testing in the education
system, was motivated to a substantial degree by the belief that intelligence was a
fundamentally fixed and heritable individual quality. Social efficiency progressives such
as Thorndike and Goddard were some of the most prominent national exponents of the
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theory that intelligence was a trait passed down from parents to children. This genetic
theory positioned intelligence as a static trait of individuals, meaning that there was little
that social institutions could do to alter this inherited individual trait. Many of the
educational reform proposals of social efficiency progressives, including differentiated
curriculum and standards, the routinization of teaching, and greater focus on vocational
education, were motivated by their understanding of the nature of intelligence as a
genetic trait.
The belief in the heritability of intelligence meant that social efficiency
progressives had a particular interest in the family background of students. Henry
Goddard pushed for teachers to collect information on the intelligence of student’s
relatives, arguing “could we but know the ancestral tendency of all children in out public
schools, we would have one very helpful guide toward the direction in which the child’s
mind could be most easily and successfully developed.”88 For Goddard, if a student’s
family background containing a number of low-intelligence or “feebleminded”
individuals, it was a good indication that the student was likely also of low intelligence
given that intelligence was a genetic trait. Thorndike traced the differences in
intelligence levels to the “enormous amount of variation in the nature of fertilized ova
which are the original nature of men.”89 This belief that intelligence was heritable also
provided the foundation for the belief that there were identifiable intelligence differences
between sexes, social class, and in particular, racial groups. Pointing to the fields of
88
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psychology and anthropology, Thorndike asserted that there was ample evidence that
“there are inborn difference between human strains” when it came to intelligence.90 In a
1946 article outlining his belief that intelligence was correlated to racial groups,
Thorndike compared racial groups to different breeds of cows, arguing:
Jersey cows, Guernseys, Holsteins, Herefords, etc. are distinguishable as
Norwegians, South Italians, Bantu Negroes, and Japanese are. Cows can
be ranked on value scales for production of milk and butterfat, for
production of meat, for resistance to disease, etc., as men can be ranked
for intellect, character, skill, and other qualities serviceable for human
welfare.91
Given the social efficiency contention that educational resources should be distributed on
the basis of the intelligence, the belief in racial differences in intelligence necessarily
implied racial difference in educational resources.
In addition to the assertion that intelligence was inherited, the social efficiency
progressives also argued that it was essentially an unalterable individual trait, much like
hair color. Thorndike also believed that the inborn trait of intelligence was correlated
with a number of other socially desirable and hereditary traits, asserting that “in human
nature good traits go together. To him that hath a superior intellect is given also on the
average a superior character; the quick boy is also in the long run more accurate; the able
boy is also more industrious.”92 For the social efficiency progressives, the measurement
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of intelligence in school children could then be used as a proxy for a number of desirable
traits and ultimately, future success.
The identification of intelligence as a static trait possessed by the individual
meant that it could be a particularly useful tool in efficiently organizing the education
system. As Thorndike wrote, “[a]n individual’s intelligence compared with that of other
individual’s of his age is within limits, a stable, permanent characteristic of him. It can
be at least roughly measured and the measurement used to prophesy and direct his
career.”93 Social efficiency progressives argued that because intelligence was a
unchangeable trait within the individual and was highly correlated with other desirable
qualities and the likelihood of future success, individual intelligence was a particularly
useful tool in engineering an efficient education system. If an individual’s intelligence
was fixed at birth, then the assignment of an individual to a particular educational track
on the basis of intelligence test made sense from a scientific management perspective.
The differing distributions of inborn intelligence required different educational curricula
and experiences for different levels of individual intelligence.94
Importantly, the belief in the fixed nature of intelligence also implied that there
was little that teachers, schools, or the educational system more broadly could do to
change the social destiny of the individual student. This understanding justified existing
inequalities in wealth and power as largely the natural result of differences in
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intelligence. Goddard argued that failure to grasp the unchangeable nature of intelligence
had resulted in dangerous public acceptance “of the sophistry ‘that education and
environment will offset the handicap of heredity.’”95 The belief that intelligence was
hereditary meant that the educational vision social efficiency progressives was one in
which the transformative power of education was necessarily limited. In his discussion
of the racial differences of intelligence, Thorndike reflected his belief in the limited
ability of education to change fundamental aspects of heredity, claiming, “if large random
samplings of North Europeans and Central Africans … were given identical opportunities
from birth and fully tested at age twenty, there would be substantial differences in ability
to manage ideas and symbols in favor of the North Europeans.”96 The educational
implications of this belief were clearly anti-egalitarian, as equality in education would
mean an inefficient distribution of educational resources. Instead of treating every
student the same, Thorndike argued that it was important to recognize “the differences
between the genes of races,” and that “education should be informed about the raw
material with which it operates.”97 Similarly, Goddard pressed for educational reforms
that acknowledged “all children are not of equal value,” and pushed for a distribution of
educational resources based on the principle that “[e]ach child has a value to society in
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proportion to his degree of intelligence.”98 Focusing more educational resources and
opportunities on the most intelligent was efficient because those with low intelligence
could not benefit from increased educational opportunities. Failure to tailor educational
opportunities on the basis of intelligence also harmed the most intelligent, as they were
forced to learn at the slower pace of their less intelligent peers. Social efficiency
progressives therefore advocated for a distribution of educational resources and
differentiated educational tracks that reflected the distribution of intelligence.99

Political Commitments
The ideological positions of the social efficiency progressives that motivated their
educational reform proposals, including the heritability of desirable traits and the drive to
implement scientific management techniques, also structured their broader political
beliefs and positions. The consequences of these beliefs became particularly clear in the
wake of the market crash of 1929 and the subsequent New Deal policies. Although the
individuals in this group were broadly progressive, many were openly hostile to the
reforms pursued by the New Deal coalition and by their more radical colleagues in the
progressive education movement. The ideological commitment of the social efficiency
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progressives caused many to portray broad political and economic reforms as
irresponsible, undemocratic, and inefficient.
The belief in the wide variation of fixed levels of intelligence shaped the social
efficiency progressives’ understanding of democracy. Although Henry Goddard
acknowledged that “[t]he essential point of democracy is that every citizen shall have a
chance to say whom he thinks is the best,” he also believed that only those with high
levels of intelligence were suited to lead.100 For Goddard, the “perfect Government” was
an “Aristocracy in Democracy,” where the most intelligent were elected to lead.101 A
knowledge of varied intelligence levels was central to the democracy, as “a perfect
democracy is only to be realized when it is based upon an absolute knowledge of mental
levels and the organization of the social body on that basis.”102 Thorndike offered a
similar understanding of democracy, noting that “[t]he argument for democracy is not that
it give power to all men without distinction, but that it gives greater freedom for ability
and character to attain power.”103 For Thorndike, the fact that “the abler persons in the
world … are more clean, decent, just, and kind” made them ideal leaders. Thorndike
openly advocated for leadership on the basis of intelligence, arguing, “[i]t seems entirely
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sage to predict that the world will get better treatment by trusting its fortunes to its 95- or
99-percentile intelligences than it would get by itself.”104
Social efficiency progressives justified this elitist vision of democracy on the
utilitarian grounds that giving the most resources and the reins of power to the most
intelligent would ultimately result in greater social benefit than a more egalitarian
distribution of power. This position also provided substantial justification for the status
quo, and the extreme inequities in income and power that characterized the 1920s.
Thorndike viewed these inequities arising from “natural processes which gives power to
the men of ability to gain it and keep it,” and argued that these inequities were
fundamentally moral because “[s]uch men are, by and large, of superior intelligence, and
consequently of somewhat superior justice and good-will.”105 By justifying existing
power disparities as both natural and desirable, the social efficiency progressive ideology
was essentially a ruling class ideology.106
The Great Depression, and the widespread economic chaos and unemployment
that resulted, provided a fundamental challenge to the faith in ruling class. The federal
elections of 1932 ushered in unified control of the congress and the Presidency under the
Democratic Party, as the Republicans lost over 100 seats in the House of Representatives,
12 seats in the Senate, and lost the Presidency in a landslide. The newly-elected
Congress rushed to enact the dramatic economic reforms President Franklin D.
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Roosevelt. These reforms, and much of the New Deal policy agenda, were based in part
on significant distrust of the business and financial elites, who were believed to bear
substantial culpability for the catastrophic consequences of the Great Depression. The
market crash of 1929 and the subsequent New Deal policies substantially shifted power
from private business to the federal government, and laws such as the National Labor
Relations Act shifted power from management to workers. Weighing in on this new
political climate, many social efficiency progressives were skeptical of New Deal policies
that pushed for greater equality in industrial relations and in economic distribution of
resources.
Henry Goddard had been explicit in his criticism of a left politics centered on
economic redistribution well before the market crash. In 1920, he claimed that those
advocating for economic redistribution and greater incomes for laborers were
fundamentally misguided because they failed to take into account the differences in levels
of intelligence. Goddard criticized the idea that laborers and workmen needed the same
kinds of housing, luxuries, and incomes as their more highly intelligent fellow citizens.
According to Goddard, individuals with different levels of intelligence required different
economic resources to be content. Furthermore, Goddard claimed that even if society
were to give more resources and higher wages to those with low intelligence, the end
result would be the same since this group always has foolish spending habits and inability
to save and plan ahead. Goddard argued that these fact fundamentally undercut the
arguments of those advocating for better housing, better incomes, and more opportunities
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for the poor. As Goddard rhetorically asked, “How can there be such a thing as social
equality with this wide range of mental capacity?”107 In the aftermath of the market crash
of 1929, Goddard remained hostile to redistributive politics and sought to blame those
with low intelligence for the negative consequences of the Great Depression. In an 1931
address commemorating the anniversary of the Vineland laboratory, where he had helped
Yerkes and others develop the Army intelligence tests, Goddard stated:
The very serious problems that are confronting us right now in
unemployment and the consequent poverty and starvation are to a very
large degree due to the fact that the great mass of these people have not
had the intelligence and foresight to save some of their earnings, when
they had employment at good wages, in anticipation of just such
difficulties as they are now facing.108
Although the market crash and prolonged depression had caused many in the United
States to rethink their faith in business leaders and question the fairness of a loosely
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regulated capitalist economy, Goddard remained convinced of the fundamental efficiency
of organizing social institutions along the lines of intelligence.
Goddard was not alone in his continued adherence to scientific efficiency and
hereditarian ideological commitments in the starkly changed political environment. In a
1936 article, Edward Thorndike directly criticized the “desire to have many or all men
equal” that he believed served as the foundation of many of the recent New Deal reforms,
claiming that “equality is a false and useless God.”109 Thorndike argued that the push for
equality was both against the tendencies human nature and inefficient. Rather than on
focusing on equalizing material wealth, Thorndike asserted that “[i]t is better to expend
the time and energy in increasing goods than in equalizing them.”110 Thorndike still
claimed that the best means of improving human welfare and increase the overall wealth
of the country to give favorable opportunities and more resources to the most intelligent
“rather than to distribute them equally.”111 Even as much of the country was calling for
greater equality in economic distribution in the face of the prolonged hardship of the
Great Depression, social efficiency progressives continued to advocate for strongly
differentiated opportunities and outcomes distributed on the basis of intelligence.
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The Social Reconstructionists
The changed political context of the Great Depression caused many to question
the core ideological commitments of the social efficiency progressives. The social
efficiency progressives maintained their allegiance to their pre-1929 educational
programs even as the Great Depression spurred the rise of new coalition of progressive
educators. While still progressive in their opposition to the rigidity and formalism of
traditional schooling methods, this new group of educators had core ideological
differences with the social efficiency progressives and rejected much of their educational
proposals. Known as the social reconstructionists, this new coalition was highly critical
of the excessive competitiveness and individualism that they believed characterized
American life and the education system. In stark contrast with the social efficiency
progressives, the social reconstructionists rejected educational tracking, were suspicious
of standardized testing, and argued that teachers should have the central role in leading
transformation of social and economic institutions that the Great Depression had exposed
as fundamentally unfair. Throughout the 1930s, the social efficiency progressives and
social reconstructionist offered starkly different visions of a path forward for the
progressive education movement.

George Counts and the Alternative Progressive Vision
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With unemployment hovering around twenty percent, the national income at half
of what it had been three years earlier, and an outbreak of violent incidents between
police and desperate men with no means to support themselves or their families, the year
1932 was at the heart of one of the most tumultuous periods in the nation’s history.
Franklin Roosevelt’s decisive victory against an incumbent president provided a good
indication of the widespread disillusionment in the existing political order, and a hunger
for extensive political change to drag the country out of depths of the Great Depression
and to ensure that such an event could never happen again. The dissatisfaction in
structural status quo was soon extended to the public education system, as educational
professionals began to take a critical look at the role of public education system in
society. In the wake of the extreme conditions, some academics began to express
frustration over “feelings of impotence against the depressed conditions that threatened
the children’s health, school budgets and even their own jobs.”112 It was in this context
that George Counts, a professor at the Teachers College, launched the social
reconstructionist movement in education in a series of speeches before several national
meetings before leading educators in February of 1932. The speeches, later published as
Dare the School Build a New Social Order?, offered both a critique and a path forward
for progressive educators progressives seeking dramatic reform in the new context of the
Great Depression.
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In his speeches, Counts offered deep criticism of the existing social, political and
economic structures. Spelling out the existing contradictions of a system in which “dire
poverty walks hand in hand with the most extravagant living the world has ever known”
and “an abundance of goods of all kinds is coupled with privation, misery and even
starvation,”113 Counts laid the blame squarely at the feet of the “ideal of rugged
individualism...used to justify a system which exploits pitilessly and without thought of
the morrow.”114 Educators, specifically, were condemned for the role of the school in the
current crisis, as Counts claimed existing schools were organized around preparing
students to fit into and embrace the problematic existing social orders. This had led to an
educational philosophy that made success “an individual rather than a social goal,
driv[ing] every one of us into an insane competition with his neighbors.”115 This critique
ultimately indicted the existing form of capitalism and “its deification of the principle of
selfishness,”116 leading Counts to proclaim “if democracy is to survive in the United
States, it must abandon its individualistic affiliations in the sphere of economics.”117
In the extreme volatility of the early 1930s, Counts sensed a moment of great
possibility. With the times “literally crying for a new vision of American destiny,”
Counts argued that the “teaching profession, or at least its progressive elements, should
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eagerly grasp the opportunity which the fates have placed in their hands.”118 If teachers
“could increase sufficiently their stock of courage, intelligence, and vision, [they] might
become a social force of some magnitude.”119 Counts called teachers to “make certain
that every Progressive school will use whatever power it may possess in opposing and
checking the forces of social conservatism and reaction,”120 and instead “become centers
for the building, and not merely for the contemplation, of our civilization....We
should....give to our children a vision of the possibilities which lie ahead and endeavor to
enlist their loyalties and enthusiasms in the realization of the vision.”121 For Counts, this
involved the active cultivation of “democratic sentiments” in schoolchildren as a means
of to bring about desirable social reconstruction.
This represented a major challenge to the social efficiency progressive positions.
Counts’ proposals of greater teacher autonomy in direction of the classroom ran directly
counter to the routinized and standardized role that scientific management techniques
demanded in order to ensure efficiency. Furthermore, his argument for the teacher-led
development of educational content as a means of combatting social conservatism was
directly counter to the fundamental belief of social efficiency progressives that
educational standards and curriculum content should largely come from the business
leaders who best understood the skill demands of the labor market. Counts’ critique of
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the social order was fundamentally also a critique of an education system designed to
differentiate children and prepare them life in an extremely inequitable social system,
which was the educational system for which scientific efficiency progressives had long
advocated.
For Counts, this position was untenable. In a speech given at the annual
convention of the Progressive Education Association in Baltimore in 1932, Counts
addressed this directly, telling the audience “If an educational movement, or any other
movement, calls itself progressive, it must have orientation; it must possess direction.”122
Counts charged that by maintaining silence in the classroom on major political issues,
progressive were complicit in the creation of a system that favored the upper-middle
class. Clearly aware that the progressive education movement had been wary of the label
of “indoctrination,” Counts nonetheless told the audience that “[n]eutrality with respect to
the great issues that agitate society, while perhaps theoretically possible, is practically
tantamount to giving support to the forces of conservatism.”123 This critique was
especially stinging considering both the audience and the dire circumstances of the
economic calamity facing most Americans.
Counts offered a clear path forward for educators and politicians concerned about
what type of social reform to pursue in the wake of the Great Depression. Noting that
“[t]here can be no good individual apart from some conception of the good society; and
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the good society....must be fashioned by the hand and brain of man,”124 Counts issued a
clear call to teacher to “deliberately reach for power and then make the most of their
conquest”125 and “the school must shape attitudes, develop tastes, and even impose
ideas.”126 The vision put forth was one in which a clear vision of social good (and one
quite distinct from the ‘rugged individualism’ of a capitalist economy) was the guiding
educational principle, with teachers taking a leading role in the development of a new
social order through the schools. Education was to be the midwife of social
transformation.

Building the Social Reconstructionist Coalition
The challenge issued by Counts soon drew other prominent educational figures to
join the call for teachers to usher in a new social order. William H. Kilpatrick, who at the
time was perhaps the nation’s second most famous progressive educator (behind only his
mentor, John Dewey), soon joined the cause with the publication of Education and the
Social Crisis. At the time of publication, Kilpatrick, also on the faculty of the Teachers
College, was well-known for his development of the popular “project method” of
teaching, the establishment of the National Conference on Educational Method, and for
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founding The Journal of Educational Method.127 Like Counts, Kilpatrick criticized the
extreme individualism that the schools were currently emphasizing, and called for the
teaching of cooperative attitudes to schoolchildren instead. Like Counts, Kilpatrick’s
critique was couched in a broader critique of the existing economic order, and he called
for a new order based on social control of economic institutions. For Kilpatrick, teachers
would be a vital as leaders of a coalition seeking broader social reform.
Another of Counts’ colleagues at the Teachers College, Harold Rugg, soon joined
to call for a more socially conscious schooling. Rugg was another high profile educator,
with widespread name recognition. In addition to his professorship, Rugg was the
director of research at the progressive Lincoln School in New York City, and in 1929 had
written a series of textbooks called Man and His Changing Society, in which the social
purpose of schooling was central. The series was quite successful, selling 1,317,960
books and 2,687,000 workbooks between 1929 and 1939.128 In December 1932, Rugg
clearly indicated his embrace of Counts with an article in Progressive Education entitled
“Social Reconstruction Through Education,” in which he forcefully claimed “[n]othing
less than thoroughgoing social reconstruction is demanded, and there is no institution
known to the mind of man that can compass that problem except education.”129 Rugg
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echoed the call by Counts for teachers to engage in the problems of the day, and construct
an educational program centered on the problems of the current social situation. Rugg
argued that in the current era, this would mean a new educational program in which youth
“will be brought to see how the concept of laissez-faire in the marriage of politics and
economics has produced enormous inequalities in wealth and social income....the
disastrous imperialistic exploitation of agrarian and non-militarized peoples, and thus to
mad international rivalries and world war.”130 The ultimate goal was the reconstruction
of a society no longer based on the “doctrine of individual success through competition,”
but rather one in which students would have a “strong loyalty for the brotherland of all
men on the earth.”131 The open embrace by another prominent educator (and an educator
with one of the most widely used textbooks of the era) suggests the breadth of influence
the social reconstructionist idea.
Individual professors were not the only ones that showed interest in the social
reconstructionist position. The National Education Association (NEA), at the time the
largest and most powerful education group in the nation, also suggested that it was
sympathetic to this new approach to the education in the early 1930s. In his 1932 report
to the Association’s annual meeting, Fred J. Kelly, the president of the NEA’s Committee
on Social Economic Goals for America, issued a call strikingly similar to that of Counts.
After acknowledging Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order, the report called on the
NEA to take the lead in transforming the social order. In a remarkable passage for an
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organization that had traditionally been quite timid in embracing controversial political
positions, the report stated, “The NEA is saying, and I hope saying more or less
militantly, that a social order can be built in which a social collapse such as the present
one, will be impossible. They are saying further that the educators of America propose to
assume major responsibility for building such a social order.”132
The records of the annual meeting of the NEA throughout the 1930s provide
evidence that the ideas of the social reconstructionists were taken seriously and that many
in the organization supported this mission for the association. The proceedings of the
1933 annual meeting are littered with favorable references to Counts, Kilpatrick, and
Rugg. In a speech before the general session entitled “Applying Ethics to Economics,”
Robert Moore, the Secretary of the Illinois State Association, argued that the breakdown
in the economic system offered both a challenge and an opportunity to teachers. With
specific reference to Harold Rugg and William Kilpatrick, Moore excoriated “rugged
individualism” and proclaimed that, “[t]he public mind must be informed of the evils of
the present system of economics.”133 Moore claimed that, “such diffusion is in part the
work of teachers, since they are teachers and molders of the minds of youth. Teachers
must have a real understanding of the wrongs in recent economic practices,” and “a
burning zeal to correct them.”134
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In another speech before the general session on the issue of “Teacher Training for
the New Age,” H. L. Donovan, the president of Eastern Kentucky State Teachers College,
noted that he “thoroughly agree[d] with Dr. George Counts” on the issue of the role of the
teacher in ushering a new age.135 Donovan then called for a new teachers education that
stressed the knowledge of social and political programs that produced teachers who were
“active, aggressive, competent, and effective participants in society” and who were
willing to engage in politics and run for political office.136 The annual conventions also
served as a means for some of the most prominent social reconstructionists to address the
NEA directly, as Kilpatrick did in his 1935 speech that reiterated key positions from
Education and the Social Crisis. Kilpatrick told the assembly that “the effecting of the
desired social-economic changes will have to be a matter of decades, so that
education....can and must be a significant factor in the process.”137 The attention given to
these ideas about the active role of teachers in reforming education to help reform society
further demonstrates the penetration of social reconstructionist ideology into the most
mainstream educational organizations.
The American Historical Association (AHA) was another source of support for
the social reconstructionist position. Noting the importance of social studies curriculum
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for “the life, the institutions, the thought, the aspirations, and the far-reaching policies of
the nation in its world setting,” the AHA undertook a multiyear study on how schools
should arrange the social studies curricula.138 The conclusion of the study, published in
1934, offered an analysis of how schools should teach social studies based on “the
conclusion that, in the United States as in other countries, the age of individualism and
laissez faire in economy and government is closing and that a new age of collectivism is
emerging.”139 In an echo of Counts’ thoughts on the possibility of neutrality in education,
the report noted, “Education always expresses some social philosophy, either large or
small, involves some choices with respect to social and individual action and well-being,
and rests upon some moral conception.”140 The report found that current educational
orientation emphasized “the traditional ideas and values of economic individualism” and
warned that failure to adjust would “intensify the conflicts, contradictions,
maladjustments, and perils of the transition” that it saw as inevitable.141 Given the failure
of the capitalist economy in its existing form, the report stated:
[t]he great purpose of American public school....is to prepare the younger
generation for life in a highly complex industrial society....that is in rapid
transition to from an economy based on individual enterprise and
competition for private gain to an economy essentially co-operative and
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integrated in character and dependent for efficient operation and careful
planning on co-ordination of production and consumption.142
The similarities in the report’s findings and recommendations were directly in line with
those proposed by Counts two years prior. Teachers were to abandon attempts at
neutrality, and the schools were to prepare students for the new social order. The AHA
report provided unqualified supported the social reconstructionist vision for public
education.143
The position initially advocated by George Counts thus quickly gathered support
from a variety of sources. Equally striking given the fairly radical nature of the claims,
their deviation from previous progressive positions, and the stature of the individuals
making the case was the very limited criticism that the social reconstructionist position
faced. Although there were a few journalists that called some of the assumptions about
the viability and appropriateness of this position, the response to the increasing popularity
from the vast majority of scholars and educators was either silence or support.144 In the
early 1930s, the position outlined by Counts was supported by a broad coalition of
educators and social scientists as a feasible and desirable path forward in reforming the
public education system.
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The Social Frontier
With the individual efforts of prominent scholars already bringing significant
attention, a group of professors and graduate students centered in the Teachers College
decided to establish a regular journal to provide a unified voice for the social
reconstructionist position. After George Counts agreed to serve as the editor, the
founding members spent much of 1934 gathering funding, working out organizational
structure, and gathering material for the new journal, which was to be called The Social
Frontier. The inaugural issue of new journal was published in October of 1934, and the
journal found immediate support, with over 2,000 subscriptions for the first edition.145
The journal opened with a message on the mission of the journal from William
Kilpatrick, who was serving as the chairman of the board of directors. Kilpatrick noted
the auspiciousness of the past few years and boldly laid out the vision of the journal,
noting “education has an important, even strategic, role to play in the reconstruction of
American society,” and that the organizers’ goal was to make “The Social Frontier a
prime medium for the development of a constructive social consciousness among
educational workers.”146 The initial edition attempted to unify the strands of
progressivism from a variety of academic sources, a tactic that would remain a strength
of the journal throughout its existence. The cover of the first journal carried a quote from
the previously cited AHA report on social studies about the transition to the age of
collectivism, and the journal contained articles by prominent intellectuals from various
145
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academic fields including historian Charles Beard, economist Harold Laski, philosopher
Sidney Hook, psychologist Goodwin Watson, and sociologist Henry Fairchild. All took
seriously the challenge the opening editorial’s call to actively shape a new educational
frontier, recognizing that reform would “either make easy or difficult the transfer of the
democratic ideal from individual to social foundations.”147
The first issue of the journal was also notable for clear statement of support from
John Dewey, the most renowned and respected educational scholar of the era. In what
was to be the first of many articles for The Social Frontier, Dewey offered a full-throated
defense of the social reconstructionist vision.148 Hitting the familiar criticisms of “rugged
individualism,”149 and the essential conservatism of teachers attempting to remain
neutral,150 Dewey noted that there was a clear means through which teachers, and the
system of education more broadly, could lead a transformation of the existing societal
structures. According to Dewey, the public education system should be reformed around
a purpose of “[l]aying the basis, intellectual and moral, for a new social order,” which he
hoped would “arouse a new spirit in the teaching profession and to give direction to

147

George S. Counts, Mordecai Grossman, and Norman Woelfel, eds., “Orientation,” The Social Frontier 1,
no. 1 (October 1934.): 4.
148

John Dewey had a standing column in every issue for many years.

149

Dewey wrote: “The assumption is - or was - that we are living in a free economic society in which every
individual has an equal chance to exercise his initiative and his other abilities, and that the legal and
political order is designed and calculated to further this equal liberty on the the part of all individuals. No
grosser myth ever received general currency.”(John Dewey, “Can Education Share in Social
Reconstruction?,” The Social Frontier 1, no. 1 (October 1934): 11).
150

Dewey warned against teacher adherence to a notion of neutrality, arguing “The plea that teachers must
passively accommodate themselves to existing social conditions is but one way - and a cowardly way - of
making a choice in favor of the old and the chaotic”(Ibid., 12),

!81

radically changed effort.”151 Dewey continued to reiterate his support throughout his
association with the journal, with his considerable prestige and influence offering a
prominent boost to the social reconstructionist vision.152
Although much of the first issue involved a restatement and consolidation of
many previously expressed ideas, the first volume (issues 1-9) provides a good indication
of the types of articles and topics that would be central throughout the journal’s ten year
existence. The editorial pages and articles touched repeatedly on topics ranging from the
most recent meeting of the NEA (the first of what would become a regular update to
readers on the positive and negative actions of other education associations, with the
NEA and Progressive Education Association being primary targets),153 to evaluations of
the promise and limitations of President Roosevelt’s New Deal programs (another
ubiquitous topic of discussion in the journal),154 the need for centralization and greater
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federal presence in education,155 and presciently, the danger of loyalty oaths and
conservative opposition.156
The pages of The Social Frontier also provide a good indication of the popularity
of the social reconstructionist position. The journal often reprinted newspaper editorials
and letters of support received from educators across the country. Although not all of the
editorial reaction to the first edition was positive, The Social Frontier did receive
encouragement from several prominent newspapers, including the New York WorldTelegram, which noted, “the contents of the first number are indeed gratifying,” The
Portland Oregonian which proclaimed that if the contents of “the first issue are a fair
indication of what is to come, at least the new collectivism is to have a brilliant and clear
advocacy,” and a glowing review from The New York Times, whose editorial board raved:
That men of such high professional knowledge and strong patriotic
purpose should undertake this venture will at any rate lead to a fresh
appraisement of educational values in the face of the changing order and
make against the lethargy into which fixed systems are so apt to lead....It
is a good thing for society to have such educational leaders out on the
frontiers, ever in search for the better.157
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The first several issues indicate broader support from education community, including
professors of education, professional groups like the Colorado Education Society, and
prominently placed educational bureaucrats.158 Positive reviews also streamed in from
other progressive organizations like the Consumer Research Bulletin, whose editor
exclaimed, “I think your journal has by far the best combination of intelligence and social
drive …. in what it is talking about, of any periodical published today.”159 The positive
reception of The Social Frontier and the social reconstructionist vision for education
would not last. Indeed the very popularity and the seriousness with which the education
community seemed to take the charge for social reconstruction of the social, economic
and political institutions prompted vociferous opposition from both conservative groups
and the social efficiency progressives.

Progressive Divisions
The division between the social reconstructionists and the social efficiency
progressives represented a significant split within the broader progressive education
movement. Throughout the 1930s and into the early 1940s, these two groups articulated
distinct visions of progressive education reform. The varying, and in some instances,
opposing proposals of the educational programs of the two coalitions flowed from their
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fundamentally distinct understandings of the purpose of education and its relation to the
broader social and economic structures.
The social efficiency progressives understood the role of education to be the
efficient integration of students into the existing social and economic landscape. This
belief resulted an educational program that focused on detecting the most efficient means
of organizing the education system around this goal. Furthermore, the belief that children
were unequal in intelligence meant that an efficiently organized education system
required differentiation, with educational resources and opportunities distributed on the
basis of these inequalities. This set of beliefs about the purpose of education and human
nature led to the advocacy of a particular set of educational policies, including
educational tracking, widespread use of intelligence and standardized achievement tests,
and increased emphasis on vocational education.
The social reconstructionists viewed the role of the education system as primarily
one of helping to bring about desired social transformation. This coalition critiqued
existing economic and social institutions as fundamentally unfair, arguing that they
favored a small class of wealthy individuals at the expense of the masses. For the social
reconstructionists, the existing educational system and the proposals of the social
efficiency progressives were part of the problematic social order because it was organized
largely reproduce and justify existing economic and social arrangements. The
appropriate role of teachers and the education system more broadly was to prepare
students 8to change these unfair social arrangements, rather than to prepare them for roles
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in the existing landscape. This belief about the purpose of education resulted in
proposals for classroom instruction focused on social problems of the community,
economic literacy, project based learning in common classroom, and the inducement of
economic class mentality.160 Social reconstructionists pushed for significant teacher
autonomy and academic freedom in developing their preferred methods in the classroom,
and advocating for social reforms outside of it.161
Significantly, these groups understood their visions to be in conflict with one
another. Much of the motivation behind the organization of the social reconstructionist
coalition was in response to what they viewed as the deficiencies in the social efficiency
progressive vision. The editorial board of The Social Frontier criticized social efficiency
progressives as “apostles of merely transmissive education,” stating that they “would
have schools contribute to nothing but repetition of what society already is or is
doing.”162 Given the dramatic events and prolonged economic suffering of the Great
Depression, the social reconstructionists argued that reducing schools to “a mere tool
implement that is applied to social material as instruments for molding, stamping, and
welding are lied to steel in a factory” was a deeply problematic educational vision that
promised to reproduce an unfair social order.163
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The social efficiency progressives were similarly critical of the educational vision
of the social reconstructionists. One of the most vocal critics of the social
reconstructionists was Charles H. Judd, a professor and educational psychologist at the
University of Chicago who also worked as the director of education program of the
National Youth Administration. In a number of articles throughout the 1930s, Judd
characterized the social reconstructionists as “extremists” who were “repelled by
logic.”164 Judd criticized the unwillingness of this group to make use of the important
educational methods found to be effective through experimentation and “scientific
instruments of evaluation.”165 Judd was publicly critical of prominent social
reconstructionists such as Charles Beard, and in particular, George Counts. Judd accused
Counts of being “blinded by the present-day shadow of unemployment which darkens the
world,” and of reducing teachers to role of teachers to nothing other than “correct[ing]
the evils of capitalism and industrialism.”166 According to Judd, in their zeal to move
past the “formalism of certain types of logical arrangements, they have discarded all
organization.”167 For Judd and other social efficiency progressives, the failure of the
social reconstructionists to understand that “[th]e cure for industrial chaos is intelligent
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adaptation of individuals to the conditions which surround them” had resulted in an
educational program that was unwise and unsound.168
Throughout the 1930s, one of the central and most pressing cleavages between the
two groups of educators remained over whether schools should adjust individuals to the
demands of the social order, or whether they should play a role in transforming these
fundamentally unfair social institutional arrangements. The consequences of the differing
perspectives were particularly clear when it came to the relationship between the labor
market and the classroom. In a 1940 article entitled “Occupational Adjustment of Young
Adults,” Judd reiterated the social efficiency progressive commitment to organize the
schools around the demands of the labor market. He argued that inefficient organization
of curriculum in many schools had contributed to the high levels of unemployment. Judd
suggested that part of the unemployment problem could be traced to the fact that the high
school still tended to train students for college and professional life, despite the fact that
the vast majority would end performing jobs that required substantially different skill
sets. According to Judd, “the curriculum of these schools has not been changed to keep
up with changes in the population and in vocational opportunities; it is still largely
organized to prepare students for the professions.”169 Judd, like many social efficiency
progressives before him, was arguing that the education system needed to better reflect
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the skill demands of the available jobs, and to design curriculum tracks that better
reflected the student’s social destiny. By focusing too much on preparing students for
college through classical training, the schools were doing a disservice to the students and
society by training too many students for jobs that they would never have.170 This
perspective framed the inefficient organization of schools and curriculum as a substantial
factor in the overproduction of students with professional training, which ultimately
contributed to their unemployment when they could not find a job in the oversaturated
job market.
At the time that Judd was making his argument for efficient organization as a
means of addressing unemployment, William Carr, the director of research for the NEA,
articulated a very different understanding of the relationship between school and the labor
market. Carr and the broader NEA at the time were staunch advocates for many of the
educational reforms proposed by the social reconstructionists. Carr was called to appear
before a Congressional hearing on the “Concentration of Economic Power,” and was
asked about the mismatch of students receiving professional training and the number that
actually went on to work in white collar professional jobs. In his testimony, Carr argued
that the fact that there were so many students on the college and professional track rather
than the vocational track was primarily due to student demand. According to Carr,
students preferred these courses because they understood them as the path towards jobs
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that promised higher wages and more prestige.171 Rather than adjust the curriculum and
force students into particular courses based on intelligence or achievement, Carr
suggested that economic reforms could be used to change the preferences of students in
the classroom. Referencing the high numbers of students choosing to pursue professional
rather than vocational education, Carr told the committee, “I can imagine, for instance,
that if I could take a group of high school students and tell them, ‘If you will go into
domestic service you can look forward to $25 a week,’ that situation … would not exist,
in quite as great a degree, at least.”172 Carr’s suggestion reflected the broader social
reconstructionist perspective of the need to adjust institutional and economic
arrangements outside the walls of the schoolhouse to better serve students. As prominent
historian and Social Frontier contributor Harold Laski noted, “those who seek any
serious adaptation of our educational system must work for the transformation of the our
economic system as the necessary condition of their success.”173 This was a clear point
of disagreement between the social reconstructionists and social efficiency progressives.
The differences in the educational vision of the two groups of progressive
educators also reflected fundamentally different understandings of the requirements of
democratic governance. The social reconstructionists emphasized the need for
171
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introducing a spirit of cooperation and respect for fellow students in the classroom as a
necessary reform to the anti-democratic competitiveness and excessive individualism of
the existing social order. This implied the need for a common and egalitarian classroom
where students of all backgrounds and abilities learned together. Additionally, social
reconstructionists stressed the need for schools to provide economic literacy on the
consequences of various economic arrangements, because “[u]nless the average citizen is
the final arbiter of economic issues, democracy is functioning poorly.”174
For the social efficiency progressives, democracy required differentiation. The
social efficiency progressives argued that because children by their nature had differing
levels of intelligence, merit, or talent a truly democratic educational system would take
this into account when developing an educational system. As Henry Goddard argued,
“[i]f democracy means equal opportunity for all … then special classes are required; for
no child has an equal opportunity in a any class where he is forced to mark time because
the majority are slower than he.”175 The hope was that educational differentiation in the
schools would better prepare those individuals that were best suited for leadership. For
the social efficiency progressives, differentiation of educational opportunity and social
power on the basis of intelligence represented a rational and beneficial organization of a
democratic nation.
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These two visions of progressive education competed for the soul of the education
system throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s. As discussed in chapter 4, when the
extreme economic instability and policy experimentation of the New Deal era gave way
to a more conservative era of involvement in WWII and the subsequent Cold War, the
changed political context proved particularly unfavorable to the political and educational
programs of the social reconstructionists. Given how much the social reconstructionist
position was dependent upon commitment to broader social transformation, once the
political support for dramatic economic transformation subsided, the energy behind the
social reconstructionist educational vision also faded. Although social efficiency
progressives also faced challenges in the post-WWII context, ultimately, their educational
vision and policy proposals were much better positioned to accommodate the demands of
the more conservative political era.176
Grasping the fundamentally distinct visions and political implications of the
educational programs of these two coalitions is critical for understanding the origins of
many of the educational policies of today. As historian of education Ellen Lagemann has
noted, “one cannot understand the history of education in the United States during the
twentieth century unless one realizes that Edward L. Thorndike won and John Dewey
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lost.”177 The quote from President Obama that opens this chapter, which positions the
education system as centrally economic program that has been inefficiently distributed
opportunity for future success on the arbitrary basis of race (rather than the more
meaningful basis of merit, and all determined by standardized achievement testing), has
more than a passing similarity the social efficiency progressive vision. The Obama
administration’s educational reform agenda, with its focus on standardized tests,
increasing teacher accountability, and national standards is also much more reflective of
the policies advocated by the social efficiency progressive than those of the social
reconstructionists.
Although understanding the divisions within the progressive education movement
and the ultimate victory of the social efficiency progressive vision provides critical
insight into the current educational moment, to fully appreciate the contours of the
modern education policy landscape requires an understanding of the racial politics that
has shaped their formation. Chapter 3 turns to an exploration of the cleavages that
divided black political organizations - which in some ways were quite similar to those
dividing the progressive education community - and the consequences for education
policy.
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Chapter Three
Education vs. Economy: Race and Class in Black Political Visions, 1930s - 1950s

The 1930s through the 1950s represent some of the most tumultuous and
significant years in black politics in America. As Risa Goluboff has noted, the popular
and scholarly focus on the politics of this era has often emphasized the fight against
segregation in transportation, education and private accommodations as the dominant
priorities of black politics. This view is often accompanied by a triumphalist
interpretation of the political victories of this era, culminating in the 1954 Supreme Court
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, that set the stage for the subsequent
achievements of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s.178 This interpretation of this
era obscures critical and substantial divisions within black politics. A full accounting of
these years requires understanding the deep and fundamental disagreements within black
politics about the source of, and the policies required to overcome, racial subordination in
the United States.
Much like the progressive education movement, black political movements from
the 1930s through the 1950s were riven by divisions over interpretations of the existing
economic landscape. The central cleavage in black political thought during these years
was between economic democrats and racial democrats. The economic democrats argued
that the racial subordination was fundamentally a problem of the exploitative economic
system, and advocated prioritizing solutions such as interracial labor organization,
178
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economic redistribution, and public job creation as the most effective ways to address the
poor position of black Americans. The pedagogical approach of the economic democrats
thus included teaching students about the problematic aspects of existing social and
economic institutions, and encouraged educational program that promoted class
solidarity, educated workers, and unionization. Alternatively, racial democrats interpreted
the primary problem facing blacks as arbitrary exclusion on the basis of skin color. They
were committed to the goal of fair incorporation into the existing economic and social
order. Racial democrats placed great faith in the ability of equality of educational
opportunity to facilitate the fair incorporation of black students into economic order, and
thus pushed for an educational program that privileged combatting segregated schools,
combatting racial prejudice, and ensuring equitable opportunity. Importantly, the two
groups disagreed vehemently over the fundamental compatibility of the existing
economic institutions with democracy, and over the ability of education to address racial
subordination in absence of broader economic reform.
This chapter examines the competing political visions of economic democrats and
racial democrats. The chapter begins by describing the fundamental political
commitments that distinguished these two coalitions in the 1930s and 1940s. The most
significant distinction between these two groups was the disagreement over whether to
pursue racial incorporation into the existing social and economic order, or to
fundamentally challenge and change this order. After identifying the broad political
visions of these groups, the chapter then turns to an examination of how these visions
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guided the differing educational programs promoted by the two coalitions. As in the
case of the progressive education movement, examining the divisions within black
politics during this era is critical for understanding why education policy took the shape it
did. The ultimate victory of the racial democrats and their vision of education continue to
shape the educational landscape today.

The Problems with Democracy
The clearest indication of the disagreements over the appropriate direction for
black politics, and the implications for education policy, come from articles of The
Journal of Negro Education (JNE). The debates that raged in the pages of the JNE in part
reflected earlier intellectual debates over the purpose of education from the Progressive
Era. In the early 1930s, there were substantial disagreements over whether to pursue
integration in education. Indeed several authors argued against strong efforts at
integration that they saw as unlikely to be achieved,179 and instead advocated embracing
segregation as an opportunity to control the education of black students.180 As Ralph
Bunche noted, in 1935 these voices came from across the political spectrum, with Marcus
Garvey and the “back to Africa” movement on the same side as adherents to the
“economic separatism” ideas of Booker T. Washington in expressing doubts about the
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efficacy and desirability of pursuing integration.181 Others like Congregationalist
minister Buell Gallagher advocated embracing segregation in order to build black schools
aimed at reconstructing broader societal institutions, eventually including segregation.182
Perhaps the most prominent scholar to question the pursuit of integration in the 1930s
was W.E.B. Du Bois. Although Du Bois clearly felt that “mixed schools” would be
preferable in a perfect world, given the degree of white opposition, the efforts of blacks
would be better spent in improving the schools that black children attended. Indeed, he
noted several benefits of segregated schools, arguing “when our schools are separate, the
control of the teaching force, the expenditure of money, the choice of textbooks, the
discipline and other administrative matters of this sort ought, also, to come into our
hands, and be incessantly demanded and guarded.”183 Although the push for
desegregation had it skeptics within the black political community, by the 1930s, it was
clear that majority of black activists and organizations were firmly in support of pursuing
integration.
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Those in favor of integration represented by far the majority position among black
political thinkers in the mid-1930s, attracting a broad coalition from across the political
spectrum. The editors of The Journal of Negro Education (JNE) and Opportunity: A
Journal of Negro Life,184 and The Journal of Negro History (JNH) all endorsed
integration as an appropriate political goal. Du Bois’s support of a planned segregated
economy led the NAACP to openly repudiate his view, which resulted in his resignation
in 1934 as editor of Crisis, the NAACP’s flagship publication.185 The journals published
the most prominent black intellectuals, who in large part also advocated the pursuit of
integration in education. The NAACP, which had been founded in part as an explicit
repudiation of the accomodationism of Booker T. Washington and whose founding
platform included a commitment to the elimination of segregation, was already pursuing
a legal strategy aimed at integration by the mid-1930s.186 Even the normally cautious
National Urban League (NUL) actively joined the push for integration during the
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mid-1930s.187 The opposition to segregation was supported by a variety of other political
organizations on the left as well, including the Workers Party, the Socialist Party, and the
Communist Party.188
Importantly, the broad coalition supporting a project of desegregation consisted of
groups with substantial ideological disagreements over pedagogy, the role of education in
society, and the political path forward for blacks in the United States. Although the
dimensions of disagreement were many, the most consequential division that emerges
from an analysis of the early discussions within this community centered on whether to
pursue a political program centered on economic or on racial democracy. The economic
democracy position pointed to broad economic inequality resulting from an economic
system that concentrated wealth in the hands of the few at the expense of the majority of
workers.189 This ideology suggested a vision of reform that centered on confronting a
capitalist political economy to redress inequality.190 The support for integration from this
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view stemmed from a broader commitment to expanding democracy to all aspects of
economic life, including the workplace.191 The racial democracy framework identified
the failure of the United States to fully extend civil and political rights to blacks as a
fundamental flaw in American democracy. Advocates of racial democracy argued that
until all citizens were guaranteed equal access to the social and economic opportunities
offered by the free market, the United States had failed to live up to its democratic ideals.
Programmatically, racial democracy ideology privileged securing individual equality of
opportunity within the existing political and economic order, and as such the elimination
of segregation was central to this political project.
The fact that these two ideological programs were both united in the fight against
integration throughout the 1930s and into the mid-1940s masked important differences in
the end goals of groups within the black popular front coalition. The writings of central
figures and the educational programs of black political organizations during this period
reveal the starkly divergent understandings of the purpose of education and appropriate
pedagogical approaches suggested by these different ideological outlooks. This chapter
draws from articles published in the JNE, the JNH, and Opportunity as well as the
political programs of the NAACP and the NUL to highlight these distinct educational
visions.
Broadly, those subscribing to the racial democracy position identified segregation
as a violation of the equality of opportunity ethos. Inequities in education were
191

In fact, as historian Nelson Lichtenstein notes, “integration and desegregation might well be products of
this struggle, but they were secondary to the main objective” (Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the Union: A
Century of American Labor (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003): 79).

!100

considered especially pernicious as they ultimately put minorities at a disadvantage in the
labor market and led to a host of other arbitrary disparities between white and black
citizens. Ideally the schools should offer an equitable chance to black and white students
to succeed or fail, ensuring that those of equal merit had the same footing when leaving
the public education system. Given the understanding that the races did not differ when
it came to intelligence, any disparity in educational outcome could be considered a failure
of the education system to provide equal opportunity. The central concern with equitable
outcomes for those of equal merit led to a natural focus on metrics of comparison of
inputs and outputs between white and black schools and students, including school
funding, intelligence tests, achievement tests, and teacher quality.192 Pedagogically, this
meant a focus on determining best methods of eliminating differential educational
outcomes between similar white and black students as well as testing to ensure that racial
outcomes were indeed substantially similar.
Those committed to an economic democratic vision tended to view segregation as
symptomatic of the types of inequities and exploitation that resulted from a relatively
unrestrained capitalist economic system. This meant that the fight against segregation
was not necessarily primary in the ordering of political grievances, but was rather
connected to a larger program of broad economic demands such as higher and equal
wages, fair employment, political enfranchisement, and fostering interracial class
solidarity. Inequities in education were not necessarily more problematic than inequities
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elsewhere, a reality reflected by the fact that in general economic democrats focused
much less on the specifics of educational policy and organization. However, schools
could serve as important sites in which to foster worker solidarity and much of the
pedagogical practices that were advocated tended to stress the importance of grounding
education in the problems of the community and connecting these problems to the
existing economic order. There was substantial criticism of the excessively
individualistic and competitive ethos that of the existing school system and suspicion of
the value of standardized educational programs and tests.
Economic Democracy
An examination of the pages of the JNE and the JNH demonstrates that
throughout the 1930s and into the mid-1940s, the center of gravity in black political
thought was grounded in a commitment to economic democracy that was strongly critical
of the existing economic order. Many advocating the economic democracy position had
deep ties with unions and left political parties. This group also included several of the
most prominent black academics and government employees. Writing in the wake of the
Great Depression and during the height of the New Deal, these authors identified
exploitation under the existing economic order as the central problem facing blacks in the
United States.
For the economic democrats, a political program centered on organizing the black
masses as workers provided the clearest means of confronting the existing economic
order. While individual economic democrats differed on many particular policy
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prescriptions and end goals, they were united by their belief in the fundamentally
economic nature of the problems facing blacks in the United States. This was an
important unifying commitment and distinguished this group from the other dominant
strand of black intellectual thought, which sought to center black politics on racial
solidarity. Despite several common policy positions, the boundaries of the economic
democracy ideology were in part advanced by drawing clear differences with more
traditional civil rights organizations advocating racial inclusion in the status quo. In
1936, just one year after he had helped found the National Negro Congress, John P. Davis
wrote, “There can be little doubt that the inequalities experience by the Negro masses
under the New Deal stem from economic and not racial causes.”193 This clear
identification of the primacy of the economic over the racial was echoed by former
school superintendent E.E. Lewis in the JNE’s 1939 yearbook devoted to the position of
blacks in the social order. Lewis argued that when comparing the importance of racial
and economic elements in the problems facing blacks, “one is led inevitably to the
conclusion that the economic rather than the racial factor is fundamental.”194
Many economic democrats were focused on the economic system as not only a
problem for blacks, but as a challenge to the democratic ideal more generally. The
existence of broad economic inequality was interpreted as evidence of an unjust
economic order that concentrated wealth and power in a the hands of the wealthy few at
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the expense of the vast majority of workers. Those who were able to unfairly accumulate
wealth and power had an outsized voice in the political process, which they used to rig
the system further in their favor. Ralph Bunche, one of the most prominent black
intellectuals of the era, argued that democracy had never truly been extended to blacks or
the working class as “modern democracy … was early put out to work in support of those
ruling middle-class interests of capitalistic society which fathered it.”195 Unsurprisingly,
blacks had faired particularly poorly under this system that consistently favored the
interest of the largely white middle and upper classes.
Identifying the economic causes as the primary source of problems facing black
Americans suggested a significantly different agenda than identifying racism as the
central problem. Pivotal to the political program of the economic democrats was the
unionization of the black working class.196 Ralph Bunche, a professor of political science
at Howard University, clearly articulated the central vision of many in this group in 1939.
Bunche advocated for a for a program that “place[d] less emphasis on race and more on
economics and broad political and economic forces.”197 This political program would
“avoid dependence on professional Negro leaders” and instead turn to labor leaders, and
“devote its full energy to toward the incorporation of Negro workers in labor unions, and
would carry on incessant educational propaganda among both black and white workers
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toward this end.”198 George L.P. Weaver, the director of the civil rights committee of the
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), mirrored many of Bunche’s sentiments.
Weaver stressed the importance of economic solidarity over racial solidarity arguing,
“We must not only consider the raising of the black worker to a position of equality, but
must also consider raising the standards of all workers,” and suggested that an
“enlightened labor movement more and more considers this a workers‘ problem, instead
of a Negro problem.”199 This stance was echoed by Willard Townsend, the first black
man elected to the board of the CIO who pointed to the labor movement, noting “Since I
firmly believe that economic security is a forerunner of social and political impartiality, it
would follow that the Negro must look to organized labor for economic security.... the socalled racial problem is a workers’ problem and must be solved by the organizations and
education of workers.”200
Beyond the call to unionize, full employment was the most common policy
proposal that united those pushing the economic democracy view. The focus on full
employment was driven not only by the belief that it would materially benefit blacks
given their disproportionate share among the unemployed, but that the widespread
availability of work would alleviate one of the main drivers of racial tension. George L.P.
Weaver noted that full employment would strike at the heart of “racialism” among whites
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and blacks alike, which he understood to be founded on “the fear of job insecurity and
competition.”201 Throughout the JNE, the belief that problems between the races were
primarily driven by job scarcity and economic competition was a common refrain from
the economic democracy camp.202 As Professor Lloyd Bailer articulated, the focus on
full employment was thus driven by the belief that “the most important single issue
facing the non-white population is the attainment of economic equality and that in so
doing numerous other disadvantages presently suffered will be eliminated
automatically.”203
The economic democrats saw advancement on the employment and unionization
fronts as critical democratic advancements. A. Phillip Randolph framed the fight for
organizing workers, higher wages, and better hours as essential to “the larger objective of
industrial and political democracy.”204 For Mary Foley Grossman, vice president of the
Philadelphia American Federation of Teachers, a strong public education system was
critical for protection against “economic rulers” that “distrust democracy” and sought to
“legalize and perpetuate their class oppression.”205 Lucy Randolph Mason, one of the
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CIO’s most active organizers in the south, pushed for cooperation between industry,
government and labor to protect unionization rights and achieve full employment since
“economic democracy and political democracy are inseparable--the one cannot be
realized without the other.”206 Sociologist Oliver Cox, who advocated a more openly
confrontational approach to capitalism, suggested that “the greater the development of
democracy, the greater limitations upon capitalist freedom.”207 Like Mason, Cox
interpreted the push for full employment as “simply another attempt of workers and their
leaders to push democracy another step forward.”208 For the economic democrats, the
push for unionization and full employment were central to rectifying key defects of
modern democracy.
Those pressing for economic democracy argued not just for centrality of the
economic structure as the the appropriate focal point for political contestation, but
forcefully asserted the danger of pursuing a political project aimed only at racial
incorporation into existing institutions. The economic democrats contended that the
arguments emerging from racial democrats incorrectly placed the blame for the status of
blacks on individual beliefs and racial prejudice rather than on the broader political
economy. This logic led racial democrats to a political program centered on “the
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achievement of civil rights within the status quo”209 and calls for interracial and
intercultural education programs aimed at eliminating the misconceptions of racial
difference that were viewed as the foundation of racial prejudice. For the economic
democrats like Cox, this was a fundamental misunderstanding that obscured the fact that
“the exploitative act comes first; the prejudice follows.”210 Former school administrator
E.E. Lewis noted that “raising the Negro to the white man’s present level would mean at
best the elimination of narrow margins,”211 a point echoed by Cox who argued that such a
politics sought “to eliminate only the racial aspects of the exploitative system.”212
Several authors pointed out that racial democracy was a class-inflected position
that was “essentially an appeal to the consciousness of the ruling class.”213 The sharpest
critiques on this front were frequently aimed at the NAACP. Ralph Bunche noted “[t]he
N.A.A.C.P. has elected to fight for civil liberties rather than for labor unity; it has never
reached the masses of Negroes, and remains strictly Negro middle-class, Negrointelligentsia, in its leadership and appeal.”214 Ernest Neal of the Tuskegee Institute
noted that the preoccupation with challenging segregation in universities, restaurants,
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hotels and public transportation was evidence of the class bias of the NAACP’s agenda,
since only those relatively well-off in the black community would be able to afford such
luxuries if segregation were defeated.215 Emmett Dorsey, the head of the Political
Science Department at Howard University, argued that the NAACP was incapable of
developing a broadly progressive “economic program because such a program must
necessarily stress labor solidarity and fundamental social relations reform,” a position
that was “incompatible with the Association’s middle class and thoroughly racial
philosophy.”216
Beyond simply not reflecting the concerns of the vast majority of poor blacks,
several articles in the JNE pointed out that the NAACP was actively hostile to the some
of the central efforts of the economic democrats. Ernest Rice McKinney, a journalist and
labor organizer who had help found a NAACP chapter at Oberlin while in college,
concluded that “[t]he day is rapidly passing and has almost passed in which such groups
as the N.A.A.C.P. and the National Negro Business League can play any progressive role
at all for the black worker.”217 As labor leader A. Phillip Randolph argued, efforts to
unionize black workers had “suffered greatly and been incalculably hindered” by black
leadership in the “old guard conservative group” that was “simply opposed to organized
labor for the same reason that Mellon or Morgan is opposed to it.”218
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These articles reveal the central tension between the economic and racial
democracy ideologies. The economic democrats’ belief that economic exploitation was
the foundation of black oppression meant that any broad political strategy aimed at
improving the position of blacks would include structural reforms to the existing
economic order. Importantly, there was significant disagreement as to what these reforms
would be. For many, this meant replacing capitalism with an alternative economic
system like socialism. Others thought that reforms could be made within a capitalist
system that would sufficiently address the problems of the working class. Despite these
differences, these views were united in identifying economic reforms as central to
improving the position of blacks. Such a commitment was not intrinsic to the racial
democracy position. The racial democrats belief that status of blacks was due to the
denial of equal civil rights and liberties as well as racial prejudice resulted in a political
commitment first and foremost to equalizing opportunities within the existing order.219
Although several racial democrats also supported the economic reforms advocated by the
economic democrats, many others openly opposed them.

Racial Democracy
The main alternative to economic democracy, and the vision that would ultimately
dominate black politics in the Post-War era, was the racial democracy vision. Mainline
civil rights organizations, such as the NAACP and the NUL, as well as many prominent
black professionals and businessmen were the most prominent proponents of this
219
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position. Less radical than the economic democracy ideology, the racial democracy
framework identified the failure to extend political and civil rights to blacks as the
fundamental flaw of American democracy and the most pressing political grievance. The
racial democracy ideology proved much more capable of adapting to and accommodating
the changing political context as the populist fever of the New Deal era gave way to a
more conservative economic and international political outlook in the postwar era.
The political program of this group was primarily based on fair access and
incorporation into the existing social and economic structures of white America.
Although the articulation of goals occasionally differed between individuals and
organizations, racial democrats were united by a belief that the fundamental problems
facing blacks in the United States could ultimately be traced back to the color line. The
critiques offered of the social and economic institutions of the U.S were primarily based
on the fact that they unfairly excluded blacks. This differed from the economic
democracy framework, which tended to point the unfair treatment of blacks as a symptom
of institutions that were fundamentally unfair for all Americans. Adopting the racial
democracy framework resulted in a politics that took race as the primary analytical tool
when determining the justness of societal arrangements. Given that these groups broadly
rejected the notion of biological racial difference or inferiority, any disparity that
correlated with race was prima facie evidence of an unjust societal arrangement requiring
redress. Programmatically, racial democracy ideology privileged securing individual
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equality of opportunity within the existing political and economic order, and as such the
elimination of segregation was central to this political project.
The pages of the JNE provide a good example of the racial democracy
framework. Dillard professor of History Lawrence Reddick offers an emblematic
summary of the political end goals of racial democrats, arguing:
he (the negro) wants the elimination of the ‘race’ differential from the
social order. He wants to be treated “like everybody else.” …. for the
Negro, as Negro, the end-purpose of his “struggle” is to wipe out every
distinction on the basis of “color.” This is the long-time goal.220
The desire to “be treated like everybody else” was a common refrain and underlined that
the primary goal was incorporation into, rather than transformation of, the existing social
and economic institutions. Like those in the economic democracy bloc, racial democrats
were concerned about the economic condition of blacks, but they had a different notion of
economic equality. Founder and longtime editor of the JNE Charles H. Thompson
articulated the problem facing blacks as “Negro workers ... being denied economic
equality--equal opportunity for employment and promotion without regard to race.”221
The notion of “equal opportunity” was fundamental to the racial democracy
position and was often used as means of distinguishing it from the more radical calls for
economic redistribution and institutional restructuring emanating from economic
democrats. A.D. Beittel, the president of Talladega College, made this distinction quite
clear, arguing, “[t]he American ideal does not demand that all be reduced to a dead level
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of mediocrity, but it does insist on a fundamental equality of opportunity.”222 The former
vice-president and provost of the University of California Monroe Deustch echoed Beittel
in a speech marking the opening of the NAACP at the university, claiming:
That is the word “Equality of opportunity;” all anyone of us has right to
ask is “a fair chance,” and that means the open door to education, the
opportunity to do the work for which he is fitted, such promotion as his
abilities warrant (not limited by any form of discrimination) ... In the race
of life you have a right to toe the same mark as all others. You ask nothing
more - no one of us can ask more.223
The racial democracy framework did not reject economic differentiation or disparity, but
it strongly objected to the arbitrary barriers, like segregation or discrimination, that rigged
the game in favor of one group over another. In fact, in attacking discrimination based
on race, racial democrats often actively supported discrimination on the basis of what it
perceived to be non-arbitrary dimension, like academic merit. For example, F.D.
Patterson, director of the Phelps-Stokes Fund and the the president of the United Negro
Fund, called for high academic standards for entrance to college, arguing that “[t]he
aristocracy of such institutions must be an aristocracy not of wealth but of talent.”224 The
notion of “equality of opportunity” was critical in delimiting the political program of
racial democracy. The focus on ensuring that whites and blacks were given a fair and
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equal shot meant that disparities that did not correlate neatly along race lines faded to the
back of the political agenda.
This ordering of political grievances was evident in one of the biggest differences
between the racial and economic democracy position; their diverging view on the
importance of material differences between individuals. For the economic democrats the
existence of broad economic inequality, regardless of racial distribution, was evidence of
a fundamental problem. The same was not true of the racial democrats, indeed many
strenuously objected to the overarching emphasis some of their colleagues placed on
material differences. Howard Hale Long, who held a Ph.D in psychology from Harvard
and served as an associate superintendent of the Washington, D.C public school system
from 1925 through 1948, claimed:
If we succeed in diverting some of the excess emphasis upon the material
aspects of the Negro’s struggle for survival to the subtler problem of the
enduring and determining psycho-physical sets towards himself and the
world about him, our efforts will have been more than repaid.225
This view appears in part attributable to the fact that many in the racial democracy camp
were fundamentally less radical on the economic front than their economic counterparts,
a distinction that would be sharpened by the 1940s.
Long’s early call to shift focus to the non-material was typical of racial
democracy ideology, and many scholars and organizations turned towards investigations
of the psychological and cultural effects of segregation and discrimination. Psychologists
played a particularly important role in the examination of these non-economic effects,
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and psychology studies began to appear with regularity appear in the JNE by the early
1940s. Several studies focused on the racial attitudes of school children, attempting to
trace the age when children were first able to identify race,226 the beginning racial
preference,227 and the awareness of racial hierarchy.228 These studies tended to stress the
emotional and psychological awareness of inferior status. In a speech given before the
the Association of Colleges and and Secondary Schools for Negros, A.D. Beittel of
Talladega College succinctly articulated the findings from psychology, stating,
“Emotional problems are generated for the growing individual in segregated group in the
process of adjustment and accommodation in a bifurcated society.”229 Beittel also noted
the emerging dominance of this view among social scientists, citing a recent survey that
found, “Ninety per cent of the total number of social scientists replying believe that
enforced segregation has detrimental psychological effects on the segregated groups.”230
These studies tended to fit well with the racial democracy framework because they could
be easily disconnected from a strict focus on the material differences of the races. This
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appealed to a stratum of upper-class and upwardly mobile blacks for whom economic
concerns were not necessarily paramount.231
These findings led racial democrats to place special emphasis on education and
attitudes, especially that targeted towards youth. The turn towards intercultural education
and intergroup relations was popular in the 1940s, particularly after Gunnar Myrdal
endorsed the strategy.232 This movement was based on the understanding that inaccurate
beliefs and uncorrected racial stereotypes led to racial prejudice and discrimination,
which ultimately propped up segregation. Intercultural education, according to school
teacher and frequent JNE contributor Rose Zeligs, was “the instruction in knowledge,
interest, respect and mutual appreciation of different cultures” with the goal to “make
children conscious of the process by which they get and keep their prejudices, and to
eliminate weird and grotesque concepts and stereotypes.”233 This educational strategy
found broad support from several teachers, religious, philanthropic, and civil rights
organizations.234
As the report from the Second National Conference on Intergroup Relations
noted, this was an agenda that called for an “approach free from dependence upon
231See

Neal, “Two Negro Problems”.

232

Myrdal, An American Dilemma. See also Oliver Cox’s critique of this point by Myrdal in Cox, “An
American Dilemma,” 142.
233

Rose Zeligs, “Children Explain Their Intergroup Attitudes,” The Journal of Negro Education 22, no. 4
(1953): 534; Hartley, “Psychological Investigations”; Clark and Clark, “Emotional Factors”; Rose Zeligs,
“Growth in Intergroup Attitudes During Brotherhood Week,” The Journal of Negro Education 19, no. 1
(1950): 94–102; Helen E. Amerman, “Perspective for Evaluating Intergroup Relations in a Public School
System,” The Journal of Negro Education 26, no. 2 (1957): 108–20.
234

Layle Lane, “Report of the Committee on Cultural Minorities of the American Federation of Teachers,”
The Journal of Negro Education 14, no. 1 (1945): 109–12; Zeligs, “Growth in Intergroup Attitudes”;
Leander L. Boykin, “The Vocational Education and Guidance of Negro Youth in a Changing Social Order,”
The Journal of Negro Education 17, no. 1 (1948): 42–49.

!116

cliches,” such as a class analysis. The focus was instead on developing “knowledge of
the dynamics of intergroup relations and conflicts...not explained by any one isolated
factor such as the economic.”235 The intercultural education program fit well with the
racial democracy framework, specifying the ultimate “ends to be achieved--complete and
unqualified integration of all minorities into the total American community.”236 For
proponents of intercultural education, and the racial democracy framework more broadly,
achievement of integration did not require fundamental transformation of economic and
social structures. Integration could be achieved through education to eliminate prejudice.
As sociologist Mary Ellen Goodman argued in the JNE, “If we were to educate really
intensively and extensively for human relations, from beginning to end of school
experience, there might in two generations rather little awareness of race in out society
and few problems arising from it.”237 For Goodman and others, proper education could
reduce white prejudice, which would inevitably lead to an improvement in black societal
standing.
This understanding of the origins of the problems facing blacks, and prejudice in
particular, was the converse of that of the economic democracy framework. As Oliver
Cox argued, “[t]he exploitative act come first; the prejudice follows,” and prejudice
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“belief is an empty, harmless, illusion, like beliefs in werewolves or fairies, without the
exploitative interest with which it is impregnated.”238 Sociologist William Brown was
particularly critical of approaches like intercultural education, arguing that race prejudice:
is not going to be appreciably weakened by preachments or by mere
assaults upon the stupid misconceptions current among whites about
Negroes. Such approaches and programs attack the symptoms and
manifestations of race prejudice, rather than its associated factors. Any
realistic program will take into account the economic foundations of race
prejudice.239
It was this economic interpretation of racial prejudice that led economic democrats like
CIO board member Willard Townsend to advocate for a political program aimed at full
employment, since it would both advance the material interest of blacks and lead “to the
removal of the white worker’s fear of him as an economic rival.”240 For Cox and others
in the economic democracy vein, this focus on prejudice and belief was a dangerous
political move because it fed the mysticism that beliefs were “prime movers,” which
turned attention away from the intense political fight needed to improve the status of
blacks, which was the only way to effectively address prejudice.241 And indeed,
Goodman did argue that one of the virtues of intercultural education as a political
program was that it “supports the constructive and problem-solving rather than the
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combat orientation toward society.”242 This was consistent with the general approach of
the racial democracy agenda, which sought inclusion in, rather than radical change to,
existing societal institutions.
In addition to a focus on education, the political outlook and goals of the racial
democrats led them to place a particular emphasis on the black family and culture. This
concentration was driven by the belief that in addition to white prejudice, the particular
shortcomings of black family and culture were central mechanisms in keeping blacks in a
subordinate position. In An American Dilemma, Myrdal explained the connection
between prejudice and culture through the theory of “the vicious circle.” Myrdal claimed
a “dynamic causation,” arguing:
on the one hand, the Negroes’ plane of living is kept down by
discrimination from the side of the whites while, on the other hand, the
whites’ reason for discrimination is partly dependent upon the .... Negroes’
poverty, ignorance, superstition, slum dwellings, health deficiencies, dirty
appearance, disorderly conduct, bad odor and criminality.243
According Myrdal and other racial democrats, any effective political program would
address both prejudice and low standards in the black community.244
For the racial democrats, interventions like intercultural education could begin to
attack white prejudice, but getting a handle on the problems in the black community
would require a focus on the black home and broader culture. In a JNE article entitled
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“The Social Psychology and Youth,” Herman G. Canady, chair of the Psychology
Department at West Virginia Collegiate Institute, explained the importance of home life
and culture for black youth:
from the home he learns those basic habits and attitudes that largely
determine the direction of his whole social development. Here, many of
his characteristics are acquired before he is 5 years old (some would say
before he is two years old). By the time the culture of his family is so
firmly fixed and deeply fixed in his habit patters than he never completely
escapes it.245
This understanding was particularly important given that many in the racial democracy
camp focused on the deviant nature of the black family and black culture as a partial
explanation for poor position of black in the United States. Sociologist E. Franklin
Frazier argued that “[f]amily disorganization probably has been the most important social
problem that has retarded the development of the Negro since his emancipation,”246
claiming that because it “has failed in its function as a socializing agency, it has
handicapped the children in their relations to the institutions in the community.”247
Howard Professor of Education Marion T. Wright noted that the family was an important
site in the development of the “stigma of inferiority” from segregation and
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discrimination, as adults transmitted destructive attitudes and disorganization to their
children, which ultimately “further handicapped ... personality development.”248
Any broad political agenda that hoped to fully integrate blacks into American
society would thus have to address perceived deficiencies in the black family that harmed
black children and spurred white prejudice. Racial democrats advocated for programs
geared towards educating and changing black behavior.249 These programs were often
specifically geared to lower class blacks, whose family “sub-culture” was considered
particularly problematic.250 Indeed, several authors were careful to distinguish that many
of the behavioral problems that resulted in low standards of living for blacks and
stimulated white prejudice were specific to lower-class black sub-culture.251 The classinflected nature of these programs was sometimes quite explicit. For example, Canady’s
conclusion for improving the situation of blacks ultimately suggested that “[w]hen lowstatus people become more like middle- and upper-class people, they can compete on
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more nearly equal terms for the good things America has to offer.”252 Howard Hale Long
agreed, claiming that a central uplift project for the black community was the attempt “to
reduce all all striking derogatory, cultural differences from the dominant culture.”253 And
since Canady contended that “a psychologically good home or a highly stimulating
situation can be set up at any economic level,” this was a political program that stressed
primarily attitudinal changes over structural ones.254
Like the call to address white prejudice through education, the tendency of the
racial democracy advocates to focus on the standards and behavior of the black family or
black culture was roundly criticized by those in the economic democracy camp. The
most central critique from this angle was directed at the failure to examine the economic
foundations of the supposed poor standards and home life of blacks. Cox summarized
what many in the economic democracy camp saw as a fundamental flaw in racial
ideology vision, noting, “both race prejudice and Negro standards are consistently
dependent variables. They are both produced by the calculated economic interests of the
Southern oligarchy. Both prejudice and the Negro’s status are dependent functions of the
latter interest.”255 For Cox, the “deficiencies” of black life and culture and racial
prejudice were not the result of a mutually reinforcing web of ‘dynamic causation, rather,
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both fundamentally the result of exploitative economic interests. Myrdal was typical of
many in the racial democracy camp in his reaction to the economic democracy position,
specifically criticizing scholars and activists who attempted to reduce the problem of
blacks to a basic economic factor, calling this approach “unrealistic and narrow.”256
In addition to white prejudice and black culture, racial democrats also looked
towards the underdeveloped skills of the black workforce as an explanatory factor for the
social and economic position of blacks. Although prejudice may keep some employers
from hiring black workers, some argued another reason for the marginal employment
opportunities for blacks stemmed from fact that whites were typically better skilled.
Thus, disparities in the labor market could exist through the rational action of the
employer. As prominent NUL leader T. Arnold Hill argued, “Competition for jobs
permits the employer to make a selection of his workers, and he will select the most
efficient ones.”257 The problem of skill disparity between whites and blacks was seen as
particularly problematic in the wake of rapid technological change. Charles Johnson,
editor of the NUL’s journal Opportunity, stressed the importance of training for the skills
required in a changing economy. He claimed, “A problem facing this race today is one of
mastering the techniques imposed by technological changes. It is in this world that the
Negro must live by competition with others who are geared to the tempo of the new
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age.”258 This perspective led to a concentration on improving the skills of black
employees as a means of racial advancement.
The fact that blacks generally brought fewer skills to the labor market was a key
explanation offered by racial democrats for disparate outcomes. As Columbia professor
Robert Smuts put it:
Those who have been actively engaged in attempting to breakdown
employment discrimination in the North know that it is often harder to
find a Negro who is fully qualified for a job requiring skill and training
than it is to find employers who are willing to employ qualified
Negroes.259
Indeed, many racial democrats viewed poor skills of blacks as a greater barrier in the
work place than racial prejudice. Hill noted that there was “some evidence that indicates
a preference for proficiency that overrides race prejudice.”260 Johnson asserted that
“Negro youth should assure themselves of that superior competence which in many cases
outweighs purely racial advantage.”261 This belief naturally led to a focus on education
as the best means of improving the skills of the black workforce. Some observed this
problem was in part a result of the existing educational system, and the failure of Negro
colleges and secondary schools to give sufficient emphasis and prominence to training”
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in skills required for good paying jobs.262 Since blacks had to live in competition whites
in the labor market, and since a highly skilled and efficient worker could potentially
overcome the hurdle of racial discrimination, the curricular and broader educational
strategy of the racial democrats focused on improving the skills preparation of black
students to enter into a labor market that increasingly demanded highly skilled
workers.263
The call for concentrating on preparing black children for eventual job
competition with whites fit nicely into the racial democracy framework. The major goal
of racial democracy camp was incorporation into the existing institutional structure. This
group was essentially comfortable with the free market economy and the inequitable
distribution of goods to some extent, so long as the inequity was not the result of some
arbitrary factor like race.264 While acknowledging that racial discrimination and
segregation were problems, the focus on training highly skilled workers as a way to
potentially overcome even these barriers was essentially an affirmation of the potential
fairness of the market in distributing jobs and wages.
Several authors attempted to appeal to economic self-interest of whites in arguing
that discrimination, segregation and providing poor education failed to take full
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advantage of the potential of the black labor force, amounting to a tremendous “waste of
human resources... for the nation as a whole”.265 This was a fundamental difference with
those advocating an economic democracy approach, many of whom explicitly critiqued
the exploitative nature of the market. For the economic democrats, the distribution of
employment and wages were fundamentally the result of a political contestation between
labor and management rather than the just reward for an individual’s marketable skills.
Apart from the focus on racial prejudice, racial democrats were generally loathe place the
blame for black unemployment and poor wages on the operation of the broader labor
market, looking instead to strategies to increase the competitiveness of blacks as a means
of uplift.
Like the economic democrats, the racial democrats argued for their political
agenda as a move towards perfecting democracy. Claiming that the social sciences had
shown that intellectual capabilities were normally distributed in the human population
and did not correlate with race, W. Hardin Hughes argued in the JNE that, “Equality, not
of achievement as measured materially but of opportunity, is a basic principle of
democracy.”266 Myrdal quoted Donald Young, the future president of the American
Sociological Association, to the same effect in An American Dilemma. Young argued,
“Democracy is an empty word unless it means the free recognition of ability, native and
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acquired, whether it be found in rich or poor, alien or native, black man or white.”267
According to Myrdal, democracy in America required:
free competition, which in this sphere of social stratification represents the
combination of the two basic norms: ‘equality’ and ‘liberty.’ And it is
prepared to accept the outcome of competition - if it is really free - though
there be some inequality. This demand is the essence of American
economic and social liberalism. Behind it is the theory that lack of free
competition results in social inefficiency.268
A foundational problem with segregation and discrimination for the racial democracy
viewpoint was that it resulted in “drastic restrictions of free competition in the various
spheres of life.”269 For the racial democrats, inequality that resulted from unfair
competition was a violation of the democratic ideal.
Given this articulation of the problems facing American democracy and black
Americans specifically, many in the racial democracy camp equated democracy with a
capitalist economic system. In a 1941 JNE article, Charles Johnson proclaimed:
Political democracy has been associated with the economic system of
capitalism and the repudiation of free capitalism, when it has occurred, has
been accompanied by the repudiation of democracy as we know it. Our
present national concern for the preservation of democracy is bound up in
considerable measure with our concern for the preservation of our
economic system, which is the basis of our present living standards and
our hopes for the future.270
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Although the virtues of capitalist economy and its essential connection to democracy
were increasingly stressed as the Cold War intensified, the ideological outlines of the
racial democracy position were present well before the onset of the Cold War.271 While
the economic democrats viewed the economic system as perpetuating an undemocratic
concentration of wealth and power, racial democrats were most concerned with the fact
that the concentration of wealth were exclusively reserved for white citizens. Whereas
economic democrats called for class solidarity to press for common political interests,
racial democrats like Howard Hale Long asserted, “[t]he Negro group must maintain a
diversity of interests. Only sterility is likely to result from too much solidarity. Let
Negros be found in the ranks of all social and economic movements.”272 Ultimately, for
racial democrats, until all citizens were guaranteed equal access to the social and
economic opportunities offered by the free market, the United States had failed to live up
to its democratic ideals.
Educational Program of Racial Democracy
Education held a special place in the political program of racial democracy.
Racial democrats argued that black children had long suffered from inferior education.
This inequality of educational opportunity was seen as the foundation for a whole host of
subsequent racially disparate outcomes. Furthermore, racial democrats were committed
271
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to the belief that racial stereotypes and prejudice could be attacked with a proper
educational program, particularly if these efforts began early. The understanding of the
potential for education to broadly improve the material, political and interpersonal
situation of blacks underlined the racial democracy vision of the purpose of education.
This particular vision of the purpose of education in turn drove the racial democrats to
advocate for a specific set of educational programs and pedagogical approaches to
achieve their objectives. Ultimately this resulted in a strong commitment among racial
democrats for intercultural education, adjustment education, federal support, and the use
of standardized testing.
The Strength of Education
The centrality of education to the racial democracy project was driven by the
belief that education was pivotal for racial incorporation. Education could be used to
address the two problems that were central to the racial democracy political project:
racial prejudice and discrimination, and the resulting inferior social, economic and
political position this placed blacks in relation to their white counterparts. The
emergence of the intercultural or interracial education movement was an attempt to attack
the attitudes that the racial democrats believed supported racial discrimination. Although
white attitudes were the primary target, intercultural education was also viewed as a
means of addressing the low self esteem of black youths due their own exposure to these
stereotypes. Through providing information that rectified negative stereotypes about
blacks, those advocating for intercultural education hoped to correct and eventually
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eliminate beliefs that they thought held up the regime of racial discrimination and
segregation.
Addressing the beliefs of whites and attempting to build understanding across
racial lines was part of a longterm educational strategy that sought racial incorporation,
but the racial democrats thought that education could also help blacks more immediately.
Desegregation of public schools was a major goal. George Redd, head of the Department
of Education at Fisk University, argued that segregated education was particularly
problematic because black schools were chronically underfunded and understaffed. This
placed black students “at a disadvantage in competing with members of the white race for
social and economic gains, when these are based on matching certain skills.”273 Schools
were the sites where individuals learned the skills necessary to gain employment in a
changing economy, and ultimately held the key to upward mobility.274 Racial democrats
contended that the equitable provision of these skills through a desegregated and equal
education would help ensure the elimination of racial disparities more broadly.
Furthermore, the improvement in status and material condition that education
promised blacks could also help undermine white prejudice. As Myrdal argued, “the
ordinary white man’s actual observation of average Negroes in his present inferior status
make most of his beliefs natural and reasonable to him.”275 Racial democrats believed
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that the best strategy to immediately improve the status of blacks was through equalizing
opportunity.276 In addition to bettering the economic position of blacks, racial democrats
turned to education to address some of the behavioral, or ‘cultural’, differences between
blacks and whites. They believed that the long history of slavery and segregation had
created an uneducated population characterized by a cultural “backwardness” that posed
a major barrier to social inclusion if not addressed.277
Given the faith that racial democrats placed in education as a means of incorporation,
education would play a central role in their political agenda. Alain Locke captured this
sentiment, claiming, “Education is rightly construed as providing not only the soundest
guarantees and safeguards of a democratic state, but its main vehicle for the equalization
of opportunity for all.”278
It is important to note how substantially the racial democrats goal of incorporation
differed from the goal of the economic democrats. Racial democrats were fundamentally
comfortable with economic inequality, as long as it was not based on some arbitrary
factor like race. Inequitable distribution on the basis of what they believed to be a nonarbitrary basis, like academic merit or skill, was compatible with (in fact, actively
supported by) a racial democratic framework. Equitable education in a free market
276
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economy, then, promised not only the overall raising of black material conditions, but
also promised that the distribution of material rewards would go to those that most
deserved them. Economic democrats were committed to either the radical redistribution
of wealth (regardless of “merit”) and moving away from a market economy.
Consequentially, education was of much less programmatic importance in the broader
political strategy of the economic democrats.
The Purpose of Education
For the racial democrats, the larger political goals coupled with faith in the myriad
abilities of education to address the problems of blacks drove their particular
understanding of the purpose of public education. Racial democrats coalesced around an
understanding of education’s purpose that emphasized its ability to ease the fair
incorporation of blacks into the broader social and economic institutions that had largely
been reserved for white Americans. They developed a vision of education that focused
on its ability to challenge what they saw as the fundamental flaw of American society, the
arbitrary exclusion of blacks from opportunities and access on the basis of skin color.
The purpose of education they articulated therefore asserted that education should
challenge this exclusion by equally providing the skills necessary to succeed later in life
while also attacking the racist beliefs that were foundational to the continuation of
discrimination.
Significantly, this understanding drove the particular pedagogy that racial
democrats advocated. In the classroom, racial democrats advocated for an educational
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program that centered on interracial education to undermine prejudice, adjustment
education to ensure that the students were equipped with the skills necessary to succeed
in the labor market, and eventually a muscular testing requirement to ensure the equitable
provision of education. Racial democrats argued that the federal government should
greatly increase its involvement in the education realm, and devote ample resources to the
achievement of this educational program.

Interracial Education
In 1944, the JNE devoted its entire annual yearbook to “Education for Racial
Understanding,” an educational strategy that was gaining traction among racial liberals.
Around the same time, the Bureau for Intercultural Education began to publish a series of
manuals and short books that sought to guide public school teachers in best practices.
Founded in 1934, the New York City based Bureau was formed to provide teachers with
intercultural education resources.279 By the 1940s, with several nationally prominent
educators on the board of directors and with a climate that was increasingly amenable to
intercultural education programs, the bureau began to publish a series that focused more
specifically on race. Entitled Problems of Race and Culture in American Education, the
series reflected many of the discussions present in the JNE and there was substantial
crossover between the two. Hortense Powdermaker and Ina Corrine Brown, both
contributors to the JNE, wrote books for the series and the several authors that were
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active in the JNE served on the board or as advisors to the bureau, including William
Kilpatrick, Alain Locke, Allison Davis, Theodore Brameld, and Charles Johnson.280
Although the moniker was different, the educational ideology behind calls for
“education for racial understanding” was essentially used interchangeably with the more
familiar “interracial” or “intercultural” education.281 Central to the interracial education
movement was the belief that racial tensions and prejudiced stemmed primarily from
fundamental misunderstandings between the races. Through particular educational
programs, interracial education advocates hoped to attack the racial ignorance that they
believed led to the harmful racial stereotypes that buttressed prejudice and segregation.
In his introduction to the JNE yearbook, Martin Jenkins, professor of education at
Howard University, provided a comprehensive outline of the contours and purpose of
interracial education program, and why such a program was seen as necessary.
Identifying the primary problem facing blacks as the denial of the “right to equal
opportunity for participation in the economic, political and social organization” of the
United States, Jenkins noted that the purpose of the yearbook was to investigate how
education could bridge the divide between the ideal of equality of opportunity and the
reality of widespread prejudice and segregation.282 Arguing that “education, the
280
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deliberate use of words and symbols, can be effective in modifying racial attitudes,” he
pushed for a program of interracial education, which he understood as, “any organized
and consciously designed program which has as its primary aim the improvement (i.e.
changing in a favorable direction) of attitudes concerning subordinate racial groups in our
society.”283 A well designed interracial education program could be a particularly
effective tool in improving racial relations, and for Jenkins, “the most desirable programs
are those which have as their goal the unqualified assimilation of Negroes into American
life.”284 The promise that interracial education could eventually undermine prejudice and
pave the way for full racial incorporation into American life meant that it had particular
appeal to racial democrats.
The concept of interracial education extended beyond the formal primary and
secondary classroom. The JNE yearbook carried articles that examined existing
programs and their potential for changing attitudes of adults, focusing especially on those
in religious organizations,285 interracial organization,286 black organizations,287
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philanthropic foundations,288 labor organizations,289 the mass media,290 and government
agencies.291 While it was recognized that these efforts that targeted the racial attitudes of
adults were worthwhile, it was broadly understood that interracial education could be
especially effective for children. As Alaine Locke noted, “It is not too utopian, however,
to assume that as we correct the deficiencies of the social education aspect of formal
education there will remain much less to be done (and undone) by informal adult
educative efforts.”292 Racial democrats understood that public primary and secondary
school were critical sites if interracial education efforts were to succeed.
The JNE featured several articles that described the particulars of what an
interracial education strategy would include. Anthropologist Hortense Powdermaker
offered specific advice for how to attack race prejudice in the classroom. First and
foremost in Powdermaker’s program (and central to most interracial education programs)
was the “wide-spread popularization of the scientific facts of race and the anthropological
concept that difference does not necessarily connote superiority.”293 The elimination of
the idea of biological racial difference, particularly in terms of intelligence, was a central
288
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part of the interracial education movement.294 This meant exposing students to research
that demonstrated that there were no innate differences between races.
Apart from challenging the notion of inherent racial difference, interracial
education advocates pushed for changes the curriculum to include discussion of the
positive contributions of minorities. In his 1944 JNE yearbook article, Roy Wilkins
noted that the majority of textbooks either completely ignored the role of minorities or
actively promoted ideas of white racial superiority. Wilkins argued, “The textbook
treatment of the Negro cries aloud for revision, and we will make little progress in
education for racial understanding until the average boy and girl stops absorbing this
poison from the first grade through high school.”295 For Wilkins and others, this was
particularly problematic for black children, as the lack of exposure to “great men” of the
ultimately meant, “they cannot function in a democracy without the self-respect which
comes from a knowledge of the intrinsic worth of their own people.”296 The calls for
changed textbooks or special attention to the contributions and achievements of
294
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minorities were also present in the manuals produced by the Intercultural Bureau for
Intercultural Education.297 This concern is indicative of the fact that interracial education
advocates were focused on both white prejudice and the psychological damage that such
prejudice posed to black students.298
In her manual Probing Our Prejudice, published the same year as her article for
the JNE yearbook, Powdermaker offered several other activities that could be useful in
exposing the problems of prejudice, including assigning students to give a variety of
reports focusing on race in other countries, the historical use of prejudice against
religious and racial groups, the prejudice of the Nazi regime, all with the aim of
“exploding the myth of racial superiority.”299 Powdermaker and other interracial
education advocates called for the broad incorporation of social scientific research into
school curricula and attention the achievements of minorities in the hopes that this would
begin to break down the misguided and irrational idea of racial superiority.300
In addition to the factual focus, interracial education advocates sought to tap into
emotional responses of students to break down racial stereotypes. In the first manual
published in the Intercultural Education Bureau’s Problems of Race and Culture in
297
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American Education series, William Vickery and Stewart Cole advised that “teachers
should plan experiences for their pupils which will affect their emotional reactions
toward those of a different race.”301 The authors suggested a variety of techniques that
might be useful in achieving the desired reactions, including hearing speakers of different
races, exposing students to art and music of minority groups, and field trips to minority
neighborhoods.302 Such activities were premised on the hope that they would “enable
youngsters of the dominant group to identify themselves more humanely with their
classmates.”303 For the vast majority of interracial education advocates, this also
naturally meant a commitment to racial integration in the classroom, as direct exposure to
students of different races was especially powerful in helping make emotional
connections across race lines. In fact, as historian Leah Gordon has noted, the rise in the
focus on racial prejudice as problem correlated with the disappearance of critiques of
integration from the pages of the JNE.304
Interracial educational advocates also advocated for the use of attitudinal tests to
determine the existing prejudices of the students. One of the most popular of these tests,
known as the Social Distance Scale, asked students to self-report their willingness to
interact with members of different races and cultures in a variety of different contexts
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including friendship, the workplace, in the neighborhood, and marriage.305 Powdermaker
claimed that this test could be useful in forcing students to confront their own prejudices
and suggested that teachers host “truth parties” in the classroom where students would
tell the class their prejudices and how they thought they had acquired them.306 In a
reflection of the ultimate aims of this kind of interracial education, Vickery and Cole
argued that these attitude tests were particularly useful tools in evaluating the success of a
particular interracial program. The authors suggested that the test should be administered
both before and after students had been exposed to a particular interracial education
program, arguing that movement towards less prejudiced responses indicated success.307
For the vast majority of interracial education advocates, attitudinal shifts were the end
goal.
Importantly, in conjunction with factual and emotional strategies, interracial
education experts were vocal about the need to make use of “American values,”
especially a commitment to equality of opportunity, to stress the inconsistency between
racial prejudice and the “American Creed.”308 Powdermaker noted “[t]he inconsistencies
between the prejudiced attitudes to Negroes and our values should be made very clear.”309
She pushed for teachers to have students focus on the tension between the Bill of Rights,
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the Declaration of Independence, and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment and the
current treatment of minorities in the US.310 Vickery and Cole stressed the need for “a
unit on the ideals of equal opportunity in education”311 with particular attention to how
denial of equal opportunity “threatens American democracy by keeping part of the
population ignorant, unequipped for work, and incapable of self-improvement.”312 In Ina
Corinne Brown’s manual for the Bureau of Intercultural Education, Race Relations in a
Democracy, Brown was careful to point out the pivotal place of education for economic,
political and civic equality, arguing that “equality of educational opportunity underlies all
the others.”313
Consistent with the racial democracy position, the interracial education advocates
were careful to suggest that value of equality of educational opportunity was important
because it helped ensure that academic merit or talent rather than race would would be
the critical factor in social position. Vickery and Cole suggested teaching students this as
early as kindergarten, noting that teachers should stress “How everybody is rewarded
according to his ability, talent, and good manners - no special favors accorded to the
socially elite or to any particular racial, religious, nationality, or socio-economic
group.”314 Powdermaker echoed this sentiment, praising the ability of equality of

310

Ibid. See also Powdermaker and Storen, Probing Our Prejudices, 70.

311

Vickery and Cole, Intercultural Education in American Schools, 99.

312

Ibid., 103.

313

Brown, Race Relations in a Democracy, 163.

314

Vickery and Cole, Intercultural Education in American Schools, 87.

!141

opportunity to create a society in which “[a] man could get rich through his own ability
and effort and rise from the class into which he had been born.”315
Like the broader racial democracy position, the dominant version of interracial education
articulated in the 1940s was consistent with idea of social and economic inequality as
long as such inequality was based on a “neutral” category like academic talent rather than
an arbitrary category like race, ethnicity or nationality.

Economic Democracy and Interracial Education
The calls for interracial education programs did not exclusively come from racial
democrats. Several authors in the economic democracy camp attempted to articulate a
version of interracial education in the pages of the JNE. In his article in the 1944
yearbook, J. Max Bond, an administrator at the Tuskegee Institute, argued for the
importance of education for the elimination of racial misunderstanding. However, Bond
was careful to connect the existence of this racial misunderstanding to the economic
forces of capitalism. He suggested that the most promising form of interracial education
could be found in the educational programs of labor movement.316 Criticizing “our
highly individualized, competitive, capitalistic society,”317 Bond asserted that the labor
movement’s promotion of education “center[ed] around job and wage discriminations,
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housing, health, collective bargaining, and more recently against race hate” offered the
best example of interracial education that would most likely lead to concrete
improvement in the lives of black workers.318 John A. Davis echoed this view in his
examination of interracial education programs in organized labor which stressed “union
and worker solidarity” as the most important aspect of any interracial education
program.319
Finally, Caroline Ware, a history professor and former New Dealer, offered the
clearest outline of what an interracial education program that originated from a
commitment to economic democracy might look like. Ware argued:
In particular, students should realize how crucially their position is bound
up with general economic conditions, and should recognize a special
responsibility to be informed on economic matters, and a special stake in
working for measures that involve economic expansion an full
employment. Moreover, since the mass labor unions offer the milieu in
which the greatest amount of interracial contact and collaboration is taking
place, and since Negro and white workers are building common
institutions, common experiences, and a common society in meeting their
common economic problems, special attention should be given to
providing Negro students with an understanding of labor organization.320
In addition to the focus on educating blacks on the importance of the economic forces
that were responsible for their subordinate position, Ware also pushed for a corollary
programs aimed at low-income whites stressing worker solidarity as well as programs
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aimed at the wealthy informing them of “the extent to which their own lives are
dependent upon what happens to others.”321
Crucially, for Ware, Bond, and Davis, education for racial understanding that
stressed the economic foundations of racial oppression could be a useful tool in the
broader political struggle. These authors were careful to point out the need for interracial
education to focus on the political and economic dimensions behind race prejudice and
discrimination, a tendency largely missing from racial democracy framework. This
commitment reflects the difference in the broader political aims of the racial and
economic democrats. For the economic democrats, who were committed to the view that
prejudice and discrimination were the result of the economic forces of capitalism, it was
imperative that any educational program make this link clear. Furthermore, for economic
democrats the educational program was secondary to the economic programs like full
employment. Economic democrats generally viewed the educational approach as
insufficient in the absence of success on these broader fronts.322
For the racial democrats, the fundamental problem facing blacks was not the
capitalist economy, but an unfair exclusion from free competition within the marketplace.
Therefore, the interracial education program pursued by racial democrats stressed
teaching children that there was no difference in the intellectual capability of whites and
blacks. The hope was that this would lead to the conclusion of the “irrationality” of
321
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racial prejudice and its inconsistency with the American ideal of equality of opportunity.
For racial democrats, education was perhaps the most central means of improving the
situation of minorities, and interracial education in particular was portrayed as an
essentially apolitical correcting of misinformation. Charles Johnson drove this point
home in the closing article of the JNE yearbook on education for racial education,
claiming that “the problems to be dissolved are neither ethical nor political, but
sociological and psychiatric.”323 An educational program that broke down white
prejudice ultimately held the most promise for fair incorporation of minorities into what
racial democrats interpreted was an otherwise inherently fair and democratic economic
order.324

Cultural Backwardness and Social Adjustment Through Education325
Although interracial education offered a solution to the racial democrats concern
with the attitudinal prejudices, it did not represent the full extent of the educational
program advocated by racial democrats. While the irrationality of white prejudice was a
substantial barrier to be overcome, racial democrats were also deeply concerned with
323
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cultural and skill differences between whites and blacks that they understood as at least
partially responsible for white prejudice.326 In fact, many racial democrats suggested that
the cultural backwardness and poor job skills that characterized the black population were
capable of keeping blacks in an inferior position even in the absence of racial
prejudice.327 Like the problem of prejudice, racial democrats looked to the education
system to address these potential problems, advancing educational programs that focused
on changing the cultural practices and skill level of blacks to help them adjust to the
existing institutions and societal expectations.
As the idea of biological race difference became increasingly discredited within
the social sciences, inquiries turned to questions of how best to account for the drastically
different position of whites and blacks in society. One of the points of entry into this
question was to examine differences in familial structure and social behavior more
broadly. The differences that social scientists appeared to find regarding family structure
and behavior was of particular interest to the racial democrats because of the political end
goal of incorporation left little room for large differences that correlated with race.
Furthermore, the majority of studies examining the ‘black family’ sought to explain why
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they differed from whites, normalizing the ‘white family’ structure as ideal.328 This led
many to call for the assimilation or acculturation of blacks into the supposed dominant
family structures. As Charles Johnson argued, the “manifestations of cultural
backwardness, though correctable, are nevertheless strong barriers against acceptability
in the common American society.”329 Given the ultimate political aim of equitable
incorporation into the existing society, the ‘cultural backwardness’ of blacks represented
a problem that needed to be overcome.
The JNE reflected this concern with the behavior of the black family as early as
the 1930s. E. Franklin Frazier, in a 1939 JNE piece entitled The Present Status of the
Negro Family in the United States, sought to place the black family structure in historical
context. Frazier outlined the particular deviations that distinguished the black family,
such as “loose sexual morals,” “widespread illegitimacy,” “maternal in organization,”
ultimately producing children who were illiterate, had problems with impulse control and
were prone to juvenile delinquency.330 Frazier suggested that the origins of this family
organization could be traced back to the forced casualness of black relationships under
slavery. Frazier argued that the lack of strong family traditions coupled with the inferior
social and economic position meant that most blacks never developed the family
328
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structures of whites. However, critically for Frazier, some black families, namely those
that had their own land or had “assimilated the culture of whites,” had been able to
develop a family structure that more closely approximated that of whites.331 For Frazier:
In the competitive life of America, the success of the Negro in achieving a
new and more intelligent adaptation to American civilization will depend
upon his incorporation into the economic organization at large, upon his
own cultural resources, and finally upon the extent to which he is able to
incorporate in his own family traditions and heritage the patterns of
behavior requisite for survival.332
With the end goal of incorporation in mind, Frazier advocated for the elimination
of racial barriers to economic success and cultural adjustment of the black family.
In the same year, anthropologist Allison Davis, similarly looked to what he
took to be the problematic nature of the black family. 333 Noting the “American
Negro family, as sociologists have constantly pointed out, is relatively ineffective
in training the Negro person to take on the normal sexual and familial behavior of
American society,” Davis argued that this had substantial negative consequences
for the “social adjustment” of blacks in United States.334 Davis identified many of
the same disparities between black and white families as Frazier, noting black
families were more likely to “have illegitimate children,” “desert their mates,” be
characterized by parental abuse, eventually producing children that easily gave
into impulse, were aggressive, truant, delinquent and “retarded in school
331
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achievement.”335 Davis noted that although many might be tempted to point to a
biological source for the differences between family structure, there was a clear
explanation for the presence of the disparity. Davis argued that the main problem
of systematic discrimination against blacks was that it confined blacks
disproportionately to the lower class. Davis wrote:
the importance of the Negro-white positional system is great...It
operates so as to fix upon the overwhelming majority of Negro
families the social and economic traits and goals of lower-class
people in America. When the details of this process, and its effect
upon the habit structures of the Negroes subjected to it are
understood, the origin of the atypical behavior of relatively large
numbers of Negro as compared to white adolescents becomes
clear.336
For Davis, it was not black culture that was aberrant, it was lower-class culture.
Davis, citing Frazier among others, pointed to the “major differences of behavior
within the Negro group, according to economic level” as evidence of class-based
nature of the deviant behaviors.337 Ultimately, the reason that black families
appeared to suffer from so many maladies was due to the fact that the caste
system had driven blacks “into lower economic, occupational and educational
levels, and thereby fixing upon them the social and educational traits of the lower
class in America.” 338
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The solution, according to Davis, was to raise more black families into the
middle class. Davis suggested that this would involve the gradual elimination of
the racial “caste system,” but he focused more attention on the “remedial work
with individuals, in which we direct them towards new class-goals and show them
the techniques for reaching these goals.”339 This was an ideal arena for education,
which would be tasked with making lower-class black students “understand that
the social rewards of higher status are satisfying enough to justify hard work and
renunciation on their part to change their behavior.”340 Much like Frazier, a major
part of Davis’ ultimate proscription was changing the behavior of blacks to more
closely mirror that of middle-class whites.
The idea that blacks should seek “assimilation” or “acculturation” into the
dominant cultural patterns motivated a wide array of educational programs aimed
at facilitating this transition. Some these suggested programs focused on practical
skills that were believed to be particular problem areas for blacks. Maudelle
Bousfield, the first black principal of a Chicago public school, pointed to the high
rates of morbidity and mortality among black, and suggested that general health
and hygiene should be a central focus of education for black students. Bousfield
pushed for educating on the need for proper “food, sleep, fresh air, personal
hygiene; cleanliness of the home and toilets” in school, with the goal that students
339
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would “carry-over from the school to the home” these desirable habits.341
Schools could be avenue through which black families began to learn best
practices that could help reduce some of the disparities between blacks and
whites.
Far more common than educational programs focused on changing
practical habits were suggestions for educational programs that sought to adjust
the psychological outlook and ‘personality’ of black students. Many educators
hoped to make black students more successful in life through developing certain
‘personality’ traits that were believed to be characteristic of successful white and
middle class students, and necessary for advancing socially and economically.
For T. Arnold Hill, this meant education should seek to “develop initiative,
aggressiveness, confidence” in order for black students to eventually match their
white counterparts in the workplace.342 Bousfield stressed that if the black
student was “ever to take his place as a responsible American citizen, he must
learn to realize that thrift and frugality must be practiced in all things.”343
In 1944, Gunnar Myrdal, following in the footsteps of Frazier and Davis,
pointed out that the “low standards of efficiency, reliability, ambition, and morals
actually displayed by the average Negro” were in part due to the fact that racism
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and segregation had prevented blacks from adopting white cultural norms.344
According to Myrdal, this had led blacks in the United States to develop a
“distorted” culture characterized by several “forms of social pathology” and
“unwholesomeness,” including unstable families, underemphasis on education,
high crime rates and “personality difficulties.”345 Myrdal devoted an entire
chapter the personality problems produced by, and characteristic of, black culture,
including: a “tendency to be aggressive,”346 generally likely to be “more indolent,
less punctual, less careful, and generally less efficient as a functioning member of
society” compared to whites,347 overly superstitious, a “love of the gaudy, the
bizarre, the ostentatious,”348 “sexual looseness” and “weak family bonds,”349 more
prone to criminal activity,350 and generally “unfixed moral standards.”351 Like
Davis, Myrdal is careful to point out that these characteristics were largely
confined to the lower class, arguing that many of the the general disparities
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between whites and blacks could be traced to “the fact that the proportion of
lower class Negroes is so much greater.”352
Like Davis and Frazier, Myrdal’s suggestion for dealing with the aberrant
behavioral differences that caused the myriad “personality difficulties” was to
change the culture. Myrdal argued, “it is to the advantage of American Negroes
as individuals and as a group to become assimilated into American culture, to
acquire the traits held in esteem by the dominant white Americans.”353 For
Myrdal, education was the way in which could be accomplished. His strong
advocacy of increasing the general educational level of blacks was based on his
belief that “Education means an assimilation white American culture.”354
Ultimately, Myrdal envisioned an education system that would reduce the cultural
and personality differences between whites and blacks, by helping rid blacks of
cultural differences that were partially responsible for keeping blacks politically
and economically subordinate. As Historian Alice O’Connor notes, this move
essentially positioned “Negro” culture as a culture of poverty, only escapable
through adopting white cultural norms.355
Myrdal’s report had a large impact in the pages of the JNE, receiving
regular mention in a wide variety of articles long after it had been published, and
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the problems of the “black personality” and cultural difference were a frequent
topic of concern. The academic turn to focus on the damaged ‘black personality’
was driven by many of the same forces that encouraged a focus on white
prejudice, namely the growth in funding and increased prestige of social
psychological approaches in the social sciences.356 Several articles in the JNE in
1950s reflected the increasing concern with problematic “black personality” and
attempted to offer specific educational solutions. Walter Daniel, a professor of
education at Howard, argued that “[e]ducation should develop a personality that
can cope with the problems with which it is confronted and can advance social
progress.” He pushed for schools to develop “frustration-tolerance” in their black
students.357 Daniel suggested this would encourage “the delaying gratification”
and help build “restraint” and “will power” necessary for the success of black
students.358 Although Daniel acknowledged that “frustration-tolerance” would be
particularly helpful given the barriers that black students face, it also would
address the problem of black “impulse control” identified by Myrdal, Frazier, and
Davis.
Several authors emphasized on the importance of building the self-esteem
of black students. After conducting an series of experiment in which they
attempted to show a preference for white skin among black and white children,
356
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psychologists Kenneth and Mamie Clark suggested that their results pointed to,
“the need for a definite mental hygiene and educational program that would
relieve children of the tremendous burden of feelings of inadequacy and
inferiority which seem to become integrated into the very stricture of personality
as it develops.”359 Regina Goff, an education specialist serving the Florida State
Department of Education, struck a similar chord as the Clarks, noting that the
problems of black identity made it “apparent that the Negro child need an
enriched program of training which places more emphasis on building of attitudes
toward himself, attitudes of worth of self, respect for self, and confidence.”360
Professor Lawrence Nicholson of Stowe Teachers College in St. Louis, expressed
a similar concern in his article outlining the Urban League’s position on the need
for “adjustment of Negro youth,” and stressed the importance of an educational
program centered on “ministering to the psychological needs of Negro youth for
higher level of aspiration.” 361 These suggestions were all driven by the belief that
the damaged “black personality” would limit the ability of black students
assimilate white cultural norms that were necessary in order to achieve fair
incorporation into the existing order. The common solution offered by these JNE
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articles was an educational intervention focused on changing lower class “black
personality” and culture.

Skills Adjustment
Concern with the skill level that black workers brought to the workplace garnered
the attention of racial democrats from the start of the JNE’s existence. The existence of a
skill gap between white and black workers was particularly troubling to this group
because it had the potential to relegate blacks to inferior economic positions even in the
absence of discrimination on the part of the employer. Therefore, any political project
that sought to eliminate racial prejudice would also need to focus on ensuring that blacks
were similarly situated when competing with whites. Racial democrats turned to the
education system as a means of eliminating important skill gaps between whites and
blacks.
Several authors pointed to the skills differential as a particularly powerful
explanation for the inferior economic and social position of blacks. Some scholars
argued that the poor preparation of blacks often meant that employers and professions
that were open to hiring black workers were unable to given the lack of appropriately
skilled black workers.362 Furthermore, as T. Arnold Hill argued, a rational employer
would always select a more skilled employee over a less skilled one, which meant that
even in a labor market devoid of racial discrimination, the skill differential between
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whites and blacks would mean widespread economic advantage for white workers.363
Some authors, like F.D. Patterson, the director of the the philanthropic Phelps-Stokes
fund defined racial income disparities entirely in terms of skill differential. Patterson
argued:
In 1952 Negroes earned 52 percent as much in salaries and wages as
whites. Some 40 per cent of all Negro families had incomes of less than
$2,000 whereas only 16.5 per cent of whites had incomes of less than
$2,000; 10 percent of Negro families earned more than $5,000 a year as
compared to 35 percent of white families. These discrepancies in earnings
reflect the fact that one-half of the Negro male population is unskilled.
Only one-sixth of the white population is so classified, yet the white group
represents 90 percent of the total population. It is evident, therefore, that
the Negro college must continue for a long time to come to hold the door
of educational opportunity open to many Negro youth.364
This formulation explicitly placed the responsibility racial disparity in wages and jobs
squarely on the inferior skills that black workers brought to the marketplace. The
solution offered by Patterson and others to these racial disparities was to look to the
education system to upgrade the skills of black workers. This represents a significant
difference from the economic democrats position, which pointed to the structure of the
labor market, the lack of government commitment to full employment and the
exploitation of labor as the key explanation for these racial disparities.
It was particularly important for racial democrats, who were committed to the
idea of fair incorporation into the existing economic structure, that blacks bring the same
skill level to the labor market in order to ensure fair competition between white and black
363
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workers. Additionally, several authors suggested that the need for a focus on enhancing
the skills of black workers was reinforced by the shifting demands of a labor market in
the midst of a technological transformation. Ernest Neal from the Tuskegee Institute,
noted the particular importance of the changing economy for black workers. He argued
“in the future Negroes cannot look for security in agriculture nor the unskilled jobs in
industry. Mechanization of agriculture and industry is making cheap unskilled labor
unessential in our economy. This means that the traditional function of the Negro is
gradually passing out of existence; and if he is to survive, he must survive as a
competitor.”365
Racial democrats, firmly committed to the idea of the biological similarity of
different racial groups, explained the skill difference between whites in blacks in part by
pointing to an inequitable education system. The racial democrats argued that equal
educational opportunity was a requirement of democracy, would help with cultural
assimilation of blacks, and would be an economic boon to the country. Professor of
education Leander Boykin argued that “[i]nequality of educational opportunity,” was
“limiting Negro youth’s choice of jobs.”366 For Walter Daniel, another professor of
education at Howard University, the clear solution for the skill differential between
whites and blacks was “[i]ncreasing educational opportunities so that they will be equally
advisable to all individuals in accordance with their needs, interests and abilities.”367 For
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the racial democrats, the provision of equal educational opportunity was necessary to the
fulfillment of the democratic ideal as it ensured economic reward and differentiation
based on one’s abilities rather than race.368
The importance of a focus on equalizing educational opportunities was magnified
by the belief that not only would blacks be disadvantaged in the marketplace by a skill
differential, but this lack of skill would ultimately feed into and justify white prejudice.
As several scholars had noted, the lack of income for many black families, in part driven
by skill differences between the races, was associated with deviant family morals and
culture that was a critical part of the ‘vicious circle.’369 Many of the authors concerned
about the cultural backwardness of blacks supported skill upgrading as part of program
that would eventually help blacks assimilate into more appropriate cultural norms.
Additionally, racial democrats noted that providing equitable education made
economic sense, as the failure to educate capable black students and workers represented
a significant waste of human resources. In An American Dilemma, Myrdal argued that,
“if the American economy and economic policy are not going to stagnate, Negroes are
going to work in new occupations within the next generation. What is needed is an
education which makes the Negro child adaptable to an movable in the American culture
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at large.”370 Myrdal’s argument captures the central role that education would play in
addressing the skill differential between whites and blacks. The solution proposed by
racial democrats to the unfair competition between whites and blacks in the labor market
was to use the education system to raise the skill level of black students in order that they
might compete with with white students to meet the demands of the labor market. The
result of putting blacks on equal footing in competition for jobs would be the fulfillment
of democratic ideals, the incorporation of blacks into middle and upper class culture, and
an economic windfall for the nation. Education could be used to adjust the individual to
meet the demands of the existing economic and social structures.
The concern with the skill differential and the belief that equitable educational
opportunity was a central to the goal of racial incorporation led racial democrats to
articulate particular educational programs to address this problem. The desire to prepare
black students to compete on equal footing with their white counterparts led several racial
democrats to seek to tie the education system closer to the demands of the labor market.
For example, Boykin called for the development of a new curriculum and argued that
“[t]he new curriculum should be aimed at preparation for life. From this we must
conclude that vocational education is implied.”371 Vocational education was seen as a
particularly effective way of preparing individuals to enter the labor market.
Significantly, racial democrats argued that any vocational education program must take
into account the particular problems that facing blacks. For Maudelle Bousfield, if “one
370
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of the objectives of education is to prepare for efficient service in a chosen vocation, then
the education of Negros must be directed towards vocations in which there seems to be
reasonable hope of either immediate or remote employment.”372
While Bousfield stressed the importance that vocational education prepare blacks
for the jobs that were actually open to them, Charles Johnson argued that schools needed
to prepare students for the changing demands of the labor market given rapid
technological change. Johnson agued that these technological changes meant, “On the
elementary level it seems essential, along with the simple tools of learning such as are
provided in the familiar three “R’s,” that rigid discipline be instilled in the skillful
coordination of the mind, hand, and eye.”373 Johnson’s desire that black students learn
“highly developed and undifferentiated technical aptitude,” was driven by belief that such
skills would be required in the changing market place as well as his conviction that the
possession of such skill by black workers would outweigh racial prejudice.374 Myrdal
pressed for a similar approach to educating black students, arguing “He needs to be able
to read, write, and reckon, and to be lifted so high above illiteracy that he actually
participates in modern American society. Before all, he needs not to be specialized, but
to be changeable, ‘educable.’”375 These authors pushed a pedagogy that was particularly
responsive to the demands of the economy, focused on job preparation, and ultimately
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was driven by the desire to put black students in a position to compete fairly with white
students in the labor market.
The goal of preparing black students for the demands of the labor market
represented a stance that sought to adjust individuals to the existing economic structure.
For racial democrats, this educational focus offered significant promise of individual and
group uplift.376 This position, like those that sought to use education to adjust cultural
backwardness or damaged personality, was ultimately concerned with fair incorporation
of blacks into existing social and economic institutions.377 This was a clear point of
difference with the economic democrats, who advocated for a political and educational
program focused primarily on challenging these structures which they identified as
inherently problematic. The adjustment education program of racial democrats were
driven by the belief that skill and cultural difference was significantly responsible for the
inferior position of blacks in the United States, and that any chance of incorporation for
blacks would require adjustment on these fronts.

Racial Democrats and Standardized Testing
The commitment racial incorporation that led racial democrats to advocate for the
educational adjustment of black students to the demands of “white cultural norms” and
the labor market also led many to support standardized tests as pedagogical tool. Tests of
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intelligence and achievement were embraced by racial democrats as effective means of
finding racial leaders and talent, and eventually as a means of evaluating and shaping
elementary and secondary pedagogy. While many progressive educators questioned the
pedagogical value of the use of any sort of standardized test, racial democrats seized on
racial disparities in standardized tests scores as an indication of an unfair and ineffective
education system. Given the racial democratic end goal of ensuring whites and blacks
were fairly able to compete for resources, the ability to reduce racial gaps in test scores
became an increasingly important means of evaluating the success of educational
programs for racial democrats.
Early discussions of test scores in the JNE often centered on the value and
interpretation of IQ tests, particularly in regards to their usefulness in sorting out the most
intelligent students for special educational attention. Although there was a common
endorsement of the view that racial comparisons of IQ tests were problematic given that
the differences were merely reflection of environmental factors or the chosen metrics of
comparison, many authors argued that such tests could still be useful in guiding
programmatic approaches to black education. In a 1935 editorial entitled, “Investing in
Negro Brains,” the JNE editorial staff praised the discovery of a girl in Chicago with an
IQ of 200 as evidence that high intelligence was distributed across racial categories.
While this fact was to be celebrated, the editors lamented the fact that there was not a
closer connection between “very superior” intelligence and positions of black
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leadership.378 The editors of the JNE were concerned that the failure to identify these
“very superior” intellects and train them for positions of racial leadership, called into
question “whether we are making the best use of our higher educational facilities on the
one hand, and whether we are retarding the progress of the race and nation on the other,
by expending our energy and machinery on raw material of only average quality when
‘very superior’ quality is available.”379 The concern about wasted intelligence and
incompetent black leadership drove the editors to argue, that “[t]here is no good reason
why the graduating class of every high school in the country could not be canvassed this
June, and the ‘very superior’ students unearthed.”380 Charles Thompson and the rest of
the editorial staff argued that the implementation of such a national testing would allow
for the discovery and targeting of community and educational resources to those students
with ‘very superior’ intellects.
Daniel P. Clarke, a school psychologist for the New York State Training School
for Boys, echoed this position in a 1941 JNE article. Clarke asserted for the need for all
schools to employ psychologists and “trained psychometrists” in order to discover,
through testing, superior children that required special education. Clarke agued that
“Modern techniques of education, developed by psychologists, enable estimation (with
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remarkable accuracy) of the potentialities for leadership possessed by the child of seven
years; we can even get a fair notion of the pre-school child’s abilities and prognose his
developmental limitations.”381 Like Thompson, Clarke positioned the use of testing to
sort out the most intelligent children for special education as necessary for “our salvation
as a race,”382 noting it would be impossible to “attain racial sufficiency if we fail to
exploit fully our reserves of human resources.”383 For Thompson and Clarke, the tests
emerging from the field of psychology had the potential to be an unbiased means of
sorting out the most promising and deserving candidates for positions of black leadership.
Once these tests determined which black students had “very superior” intellect, these
authors suggested that they should receive substantial monetary support from the black
community in their educational endeavors.384
While Thompson and Clarke were interested in the ability of a nationally
standardized test to efficiently sort the deserving from the undeserving, others were more
focused on the pedagogical potential of such tools. Kenneth B. M. Crooks, a professor of
biology at Hampton University, suggested in 1939 that while standardized tests could be
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useful in selecting the most fit, they also could be essential tools to “improve our
educational processes in the grades and secondary schools.”385 Crooks, argued that a
battery of studies had shown that certain standardized tests were valid indicators of
mental achievement, and consistently revealed, “that our schools are now doing poor
work in the fundamental tool subjects, reading, writing, and arithmetic.”386 Accepting
the standardized tests as a legitimate tool of evaluation, Crooks claimed that standardized
college “entrance tests will help the secondary schools by informing them how well their
products have made the changes they were trying to bring about. In other words, the
curricula of the schools can be guided and the success of schools and teachers can be
measured.”387 Crooks argued that test scores could be used for evaluating the
performance of educational institutions in addition to sorting individual students. For
Crooks, the poor performance of black students on standardized tests suggested the need
for changes to the public elementary and secondary education system.
Crooks articulated a vision of education as a process of perfecting the teaching
methods and strategies to bring about desired changes in students, the success of which
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would be measured by standardized tests.388 Crooks called for a centralized educational
body to agree on the common ends of education, and suggested that the rest of the
educational process would “be a simple matter to develop means to these ends, and to
devise tests to check the prospective pupils’ progress in these specific realities.”389
Instead of traditional “subjective” teacher grade evaluations of students, Crooks argued
for a “battery of comprehensive, objective tests administered at definite periods by
examiners, not influenced by local personalities or prejudices, the pupils and the teachers
would have some definite goals at which to aim.”390 The tests would provide students
and teachers a clear metric of success or failure, and would drive the search for the most
effective way of improving student scores on these tests. The educational goal to be
aimed for was rising test scores.
Although calls for widespread testing existed before the World War II, the passage
of the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act and the nation’s first ever peacetime draft
brought with it a massive expansion of the use of standardized tests as sorting
mechanism. Although there was no educational or intelligence standard for service in
1940 when the Selective Service first began providing men for the armed forces,
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technological advances in the “art of war” sparked concerns about the need for “men who
had responsibly basic education and intelligence with requisite aptitude and skill.”391 By
1941, driven by a concern that the large number of illiterate service members, the
Selective Service established an educational requirement for induction. Beginning on
May 15th, 1941, selectees were required to “have the capacity of reading and writing the
English language as commonly prescribed for fourth grade in grammar school.”392 This
new standard was abandoned after a little over a year when it became clear that it was
leading to large number of rejections and deferrals. More than 143,000 men were
rejected on educational grounds in the first four months of new standard.393 After a few
tweaks, in mid-1943 the Selective Service’s standard of “acceptability was changed by
both Army and Navy from literacy to intelligence and a new testing procedure based
upon intelligence.”394 Despite the fact that the shift to the intelligence test standard was
motivated by the belief that many of the men “rejected for military service on literacy
grounds …. had sufficient native intelligence to satisfy military needs,” rejections for
failure to meet the new minimum intelligence standard actually increased.395 The extent

391

Selective Service System, Special Monograph No. 10: Special Groups, vol. 1 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1953): 143.
392

Ibid., 145.

393

Ibid.

394

Ibid., 147. This was the first time that the armed forces had used an intelligence test as a means of
screening who would be accepted for service. The Army General Classification Test and its progenitors
had been administered after an individual had been inducted, and was used to largely to assign recruits to
particular military jobs.
395

Ibid., 151. See also, Martin D. Jenkins et al., “The Black and White of Rejections for Military Service: A
Study of Rejections of Selective Service Registrants, by Race, on Account of Educational and Mental
Deficiencies” (Montgomery, Alabama: The American Teachers Association, August 1944); 4.

!168

of the problem was captured by the dire warnings of a 1944 Selective Service Report that
claimed:
Educational deficiency, or a failure to pass Army intelligence tests
primarily because of educational deficiency, has deprived our armed
forces of more physically fit men than have the operations of the enemy.
Total American war casualties as of the last official announcement were
201,454; total rejected for failure to pass Army intelligence tests primarily
because of educational deficiency who have no other disqualifying defect
have been about 240,000.396
The rejection of hundreds of thousands of potential soldiers for failure to pass basic
intelligence and aptitude tests called attention the failures of the education system, and it
was clear that the level of educational deficiency exposed by the Army’s testing regime
posed a risk to the Nation in times of peace as well as war.397
While the exclusion of hundreds of thousands of men on educational grounds was
troubling nationally, it was particularly problematic for blacks. Concern about the high
level of educational and mental rejections led the American Teachers Association (ATA),
a national professional organization of teachers of black students, to investigate the
educational and racial implications of the Selective Service’s educational standard for
induction.398 The principle investigators were frequent JNE contributors Howard Hale
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Long and Martin Jenkins and JNE editor Charles Thompson.399 The resulting report,
“The Black and White of Rejections for Military Service: A Study of Rejections of
Selective Service Registrants, by Race, on Account of Educational and Mental
Deficiencies” found that educational deficiency was by far the single greatest reason for
rejection of blacks for military service.400 Under the fourth grade literacy standard, the
rejection rate for educational deficiency of blacks was almost eleven times that of
whites.401 Although the racial disparity was reduced with the implementation of the
intelligence test standard, the differences remained stark with blacks having an
educational deficiency rejection rate six to seven times higher than that of whites and
accounting for slightly over half of all such rejections.402
The huge disparities in rejections provided a powerful opening for racial
democrats to criticize the disparate educational system as a major problem for the nation.
The ATA report found that the high and racially disparate rejection rate posed dire
problems to the nation, including a smaller and less efficient “reservoir of manpower for
the armed forces,” an increased draft on well-educated population groups and “an
increased burden being placed on those state and communities which have provided good
399
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schools.”403 Through examining educational rejections on a state by state basis, the
report provided convincing evidence that the disparate rejection rates were due to
environmental and institutional factors, as the rejection rates for southern whites was
higher than the rejection rate of blacks in several Northern States.404 Furthermore, the
authors found a significant relationship between per capita educational expenditures and
rejections for low test intelligence, with those states spending less experiencing a much
higher rejection rate.405 The authors suggested that the fact that the per pupil expenditure
for black students was substantially lower than the white per pupil expenditure was a
major explanatory factor in the performance on intelligence tests. They ultimately
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concluded that responsibility for the racially disparate educational deficiency rejection
rates could be found “in large measure at least, in the adequacy of the schools.”406
The broad surveys of intelligence conducted by the Selective Service System gave
a portrait of an educational system in disarray, and placed hard numbers on the
consequences of educational failure.407 Concern about the problems in education system
extended beyond the immediate wartime crisis, as studies of educational military
rejections noted that “good schools do pay; and poor schools are a liability, no less in
peace than in war.”408 Indeed this line of argument about the danger of poor schools was
picked up by many black scholars in the JNE, who increasingly relied on disparities on
intelligence or achievement test scores as evidence of failing schools.409 For racial
democrats, who viewed equality of educational opportunity as essential for racial
incorporation, the testing disparities were particularly problematic. Using the data from
the ATA report, George Redd, Professor and Head of the Education Department at Fisk
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University, argued that the educational disparities revealed by these tests were distressing
because it indicated that the “Negro is placed …. at a disadvantage in competing with
members of the white race for social and economic gains, when these are based on
matching certain skills.”410 Increasingly, poor performance on standardized intelligence
and achievement tests were used to indict the performance of schools. For racial
democrats, the problematic educational system revealed by low and disparate test scores
fed racial inequality and represented a national threat to manpower.
By the 1950s, several groups took concrete steps to encourage the use of
standardized tests as a means of identifying potential leaders as well as guiding
educational goals and evaluating schools serving black students.411 One such effort was
the Southern Project of the National Scholarship Service and Fund for Negro Students
(NSSFNS). Between 1953 and 1955, the NSSFNS, a non-profit organization with
substantial financial backing from the Ford Foundation and with technical support from
the College Entrance Examination Board and the Educational Testing Service, pursued a
“South-wide talent search.” It sought to “uncover able, college qualified Negro high
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school seniors and help them find and reach their college objectives.”412 The Southern
Project sent workers into 45 of the largest southern cities visiting a total of 78 black high
schools in search of talent. After asking the principals and counsellors to identify the top
10% of students, these students were given scholastic aptitude tests to determine the
likelihood of success in college.413 In total, the Southern Project tested 3,178 high school
students, of which 55% achieved the minimum score that the NSSFNS believed would
indicate likelihood of college success.414 Those students who met the NSSFNS’s
threshold received individualized advising on the how to apply for colleges and
scholarships. The Southern Project pointed to the acceptance of 523 students, and the
receipt of over $215,000 in scholarships (including almost $48,000 from the NSSFNS
itself) as evidence of the program’s success.415
In addition to helping certain black students enter college, the Southern Project's
“[c]ollateral objectives were to experiment with the techniques and methods of talent
searching.”416 The director of the Southern Project was quick to emphasize the value of
the first widespread use of testing among black students as a means of talent searching.
Noting that the Southern Project’s use of scholastic aptitude tests as a means of talent
searching came at “a most opportune time, when discussions about similar programs on a
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national scale are under way,” the Project’s final report argued that the “methods and
techniques employed in the Project, probably the only one so far of its kind, can be useful
in pointing the way for a national talent searching project.”417 The timing was indeed
fortuitous, as approximately $40,000,000 in new corporate and foundation scholarships
became available to students seeking higher education.418 In a 1957 report entitled,
“Blueprint for Talent Searching, America’s Hidden Manpower,” Richard Plaut, the
director of the Southern Project and the Executive Vice-Chairman of the NSSFNS,
praised the talent searching function of these new scholarship funds and stressed the need
for continued focus on minority students.419 Arguing that “[t]rained human intelligence is
our most valuable resource” and that “[w]e are failing to discover and develop this most
valuable resource,” Plaut pushed for significant financial and intellectual investment in
discovering talent among blacks, which he argued promised the “highest yield for
potential ability” given their disparate college attendance.420 Plaut called for early and
extensive use of intelligence and achievement testing in order to identify promising
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students, who could then be targeted for special attention and scholarships.421 In an echo
of the earlier calls of Thompson and Clarke, Plaut pushed for the widespread adoption of
testing as a means of efficiently sorting the manpower resources of the nation.
As the NSSFNS was extolling the virtues of testing as a means of identifying
talent, other organizations sought to harness the pedagogical potential of standardized
tests. Most notably, the Phelps-Stokes Fund, a philanthropic non-profit organization with
a longstanding commitment to improving education and race relations, in 1955 began a
five year program called the Project of the Improvement of Instruction in Secondary
Schools to address what they deemed the most immediate need of black students.
Writing in the JNE, project director Aaron Brown noted that that justification for the
assessment that this was the most pressing need was due to constant reports that black
students consistently scored lower on standardized tests and were entering college
unprepared.422 The primary goal of the project was to “raise the level of academic
achievement of students in participating secondary schools to a point more in line with

421 Although

Plaut noted that the lower scores of disadvantaged students were not particularly useful in
predicting college success, he still advocated for such tests as the best means of identifying talent, arguing,
“We do know that tests of verbal and quantitative aptitude and school achievement are among the best
predictors of scholastic attainment in high school and college. For these reasons such tests are suggested
for use in identifying talented pupils”(Ibid., 34).
422 Aaron

Brown, “The Phelps-Stokes Fund and Its Projects,” The Journal of Negro Education 25, no. 4
(1956): 456–62. The article cites an unnamed college professor who claimed “At our university a group of
tests is given to the high school students and on practically any standard test 80% of the students is below
the national norm” (Ibid., 456). The article also cites the NSSFNS report on their Southern Project in
which 50-60% of top black students were able to achieve minimum qualifying scores (for a prognosis of
college success) on aptitude tests (Ibid., 457).

!176

national norms.”423 Evidence of success would come in the form of elimination of racial
gaps in standardized test scores.424
The testing regime was one of the most prominent features of the Southern
Project, with frequent JNE contributor Howard Hale Long signing on to design this
aspect of the program425 The NSSFNS focused on southern states and sought
cooperation from state superintendents of education and college presidents. Throughout
its five year history, the Southern Project had a broad reach, with participation from
10,000 high school students, 500 high school teachers, 175 college and university
teachers, and 50 administrators.426 High schools and colleges agreed to a multi-year
program of intensive in-service training of teachers by college professors, with particular
attention to improving instructional technique and “assisting the schools in developing
sound evaluative techniques.”427 Participating high schools were required to administer
four standardized exams each year to every entering freshman and graduating student.428
This evaluation requirement was accompanied with encouraging extensive use of
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“objective tests” by individual teachers as a means of evaluating pupil achievement and
the effectiveness of teaching method.429 For many teachers and students, this was their
first exposure to standardized tests.430 In the final report on the Southern Project, director
Aaron Brown pointed to “[u]tilization of sound evaluation techniques and reliable
instruments” as one of the greatest accomplishments, noting that “this area has been one
of the most encouraging outcomes because the growth has been both rapid and
substantial.”431
In evaluating the success of the Southern Project, the final report relied heavily on
the effects of its programs on the standardized test scores of black students. The report
touted significantly higher scores by graduating students in 1959 at the end of the project
when compared to the scores of those that had graduated in 1956. By 1959, students who
had participated in the program scored in higher in the national percentile than had
students in 1956, meaning a reduction in the racial achievement gap.432 Given that
“constant evaluation” was seen as key to improving educational instruction and
outcomes, the project widely disseminated these scores, sending each participating
schools reports of the performance scores of individual students, as well as their
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comparative ranking among all schools in the project.433 The final report used test scores
to identify underperforming schools and to suggest academic areas in need of
improvement.434
By the 1950s the appeal of standardized tests to racial democrats was well in
place. Racial democrats were firmly committed to fair incorporation into existing
economic and social structures, which they believed required equitable educational
opportunity. The goal was that merit, rather than race should ultimately determine one’s
standing. The overarching concern with establishing an equitable outcomes for those of
equal merit meant that standardized testing fit quite well with the broader political
program of racial democrats. The “objective” metrics of comparison, like standardized
intelligence or achievement tests, could help ensure that advancement in education and
individual standing resulted from merit. For racial democrats, the gaping racial
disparities in test scores provided clear evidence of a lack of equitable educational
opportunity.435 The evidence of disparities contributed to calls for an “educational
reconstruction” that was “based on valid evidence successfully translated into
practice.”436 Racial democrats argued that standardized tests could be used not only to
determine the meritorious, but could also point the way towards better educational
433
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practice. As the tests became a way to judge the worth of the individual as well as the
performance of schools and teachers, Crooks vision of a system in which “entrance tests
… become tied up with the aims of education,” increasingly represented the racial
democratic position.437 Testing in education became a means by which the goal of fair
racial incorporation could be evaluated and eventually realized.
While the use of standardized tests in education was a natural fit with the racial
democratic position, they were largely antithetical to the educational program of
economic democrats. Economic democrats had long been critics of standardized tests as
a tool, arguing that they tended to foster excessive individualism and competitiveness.
Calls for talent searching and discovery of “superior intellects” indicated that a
significant part of the aim of education for racial democrats involved sorting students on
the basis of intellectual capacity and preparation for future leadership. As the final report
on the Phelps-Stokes fund indicated, the tests were designed so that “desirably, the
distribution of pupils’ achievement test scores should become more variable as pupils
progress from grade to grade,” and “the function of the school is to develop individual
potentialities, rather than group conformity.”438 The role of tests, and by extension, the
role of the public school, was designed to find variation and reward the high scorers.
This vision ran counter to the solidaristic approach envisioned by economic democrats,
who tended to advocate for an educational program primarily focused on fostering
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cooperation and class solidarity.439 The extent of opposition to standardized tests among
economic democrats is evident in a 1938 JNE article by Philadelphia AFT Vice President
Mary Foley Grossman. Grossman argued forcefully against the use of standardized tests
for sorting and evaluation, claiming “[t]he use of the I.Q. as an instrument of pressuring
children into groups with limited and undesirable curricula is an abuse of their
democratic privileges,” and noting that such tests tended to dangerously restrict the
curriculum, which “suits the purpose of industry to mold belt-line minds in belt-line
bodies.”440 The introduction of standardized tests was largely incompatible with the
broader educational aims of Mary Foley Grossman and other economic democrats.

Conclusion
The fundamental cleavage between economic democrats and racial democrats was
over the whether improving the situation of blacks in the United States also required
substantial changes to the economic landscape. The differences on this central issue
drove the development of educational perspectives and programs that were substantially
different between the two groups. Economic democrats viewed racial subordination in
the United States as fundamentally resulting from exploitative economic arrangements.
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This group viewed the primary task of education as educating students about these
problematic social arrangements and providing tools and strategies, such as worker
organization, to address these problems. Importantly, because they viewed the problems
facing blacks in the United States as fundamentally economic in nature, the economic
democrats placed significantly less faith in the ability of education to address the poor
condition of black citizens. Instead, far more emphasis was placed on the importance of
economic policies such as full employment, redistributive foundation, unionization, and
democracy in the workplace as the primary means through which the problems facing
black citizens. Given the much more limited faith in power of education, unsurprising,
the educational programs of the economic democrats were not nearly as substantial as
that of the racial democrats. However, the differences in the educational approaches of
the two groups are clear from the strident critiques economic democrats like Oliver Cox
levied at the educational politics and ideology of racial democrats.
The ultimate political goal of the racial democrats was fair incorporation into
existing social end economic structures, and they viewed the education system as a
particularly effective way of achieving this goal. Significantly, racial democrats did not
identify economic exploitation or the significant inequalities as the most problematic
aspect the existing economy in the United States. Instead, the racial democrats pointed to
the fact that racial categories meant that opportunities for success in the existing
economic landscape were distributed unfairly. It was this perspective that caused them to
view education as a particularly potent vehicle to effectively ensure that opportunities
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were based on merit, rather than racial categories. This perspective also suggested a host
of educational best practices, including interracial education to combat psychological
prejudice, skills education to help black students effectively compete against white
students in the labor market, and racial comparison of standardized test results to evaluate
whether true equality of opportunity existed.
Fundamentally, the racial democratic perspective was not critical of significant
economic inequality, rather it was critical of economic inequality that was ineffectively
distributed. This was quite close to the ideological perspective of the social efficiency
progressives, and not surprisingly, the educational proposals of the two groups have
substantial overlap. Similarly, the critique of the economic order that served as the
foundation for the economic democrats placed them in ideological alignment with the
social reconstructionist wing of the progressive education movement. Although the
educational program of economic democrats was not nearly as extensive as that of the
social reconstructionists, both groups advocated for a pedagogy that focused on broad
social problems as well as providing students tools to help address these problems.
The economic democracy perspective was in many ways the dominant (but not
exclusive) perspective in the pages of the JNE throughout the 1930s and into the early
1940s. By the mid-1940s, this had begun to change, as the racial democracy framework
came to increasing monopolize the discussion of black politics and education. Chapter 4
turns to examination of the political developments that drastically limited the ability of
the economic democrats and social reconstructionists to advocate for a politics and
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educational perspective that centered on a critique of the existing economic order. As
these voices were marginalized throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the ideas and policies of
the racial democrats and social efficiency progressives increasingly dominated the
educational landscape.
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Chapter Four
Communism, Courts, and Context: Political Developments in the 1940s and 1950s
and the Death of the Educational Left
Scholars seeking to understand political developments in the second half of the
twentieth century have often overlooked the significance of the 1940s and 1950s.
Occasionally referred to as an “Age of Consensus,” the time period between the end of
World War II and the 1960s has been described as affluent, homogenous, bland, and
conformist. However, as historian Thomas Sugrue has noted, a more apt description of
this time period is one of intense conflict between groups with very different political
visions. The common interpretation of these years as an “Age of Consensus” flows from
the fact that one side - a resurgent business community that joined with anti-communist
liberals from both political parties - was the overwhelming victor in the conflict between
visions. The lopsided victory of one coalition over the other masks the fierce battles of
the time period, which Sugrue ultimately describes as “an era of brutality, of attempts to
silence dissent.”441
The silencing of dissent in during the 1940s and 1950s had significant effects on
the ideas and coalitions during this time period, particularly on the left. The changing
international and domestic political context of this era greatly weakened the ability of
individuals on the left to effectively advance policies and arguments that were openly
critical of existing economic arrangements and made organizing coalitions around such
an agenda nearly impossible. Thus, the 1940s-1950s represent not only a time period of
441
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fierce contestation but also one of limitation of alternatives. While scholars such as
Daniel T. Rodgers and Daniel Stedman Jones have pointed to the 1970s as a critical
moment for the emergence of a neoliberalism that would come to dominate the late
twentieth and early twenty-first century, the story is incomplete without understanding
the ideological contraction of the left that occurred in years following World War II.442
The 1940s and 1950s did much to set the ideological stage for the later neoliberal turn in
American politics, as a resurgent form of business friendly liberalism moved to curtail
challenges from the left, destroying coalitions and individuals on the way.
Critically, this curtailment of the left had important consequences for education.
As the American left was hobbled by a changing international context, a resurgent
business community, shifting court doctrines, and outright repression - the postwar
environment greatly advantaged educational coalitions and ideas that could accommodate
the changing political landscape. This political context greatly advantaged racial
democrats and scientific efficiency progressives, who were able to articulate a policy
agenda for education that was largely divorced from radical critiques of American
political and economic structures. In the 1940s and 1950s, the dominant education
coalition on the left switched from those that pursued fundamental social transformation
to those that pushed for incorporation into existing structures as the primary goal of
education. This chapter takes aim at outlining the political context and developments of
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the 1940s and 1950s that greatly limited the left, and the consequences of this change for
the ideological visions and coalitions of education.

The Changing International Context
One of the most significant developments ultimately shaping the ideological and
coalitional landscape was the rapidly shifting international context of the 1940s and
1950s.
Events including the rise of Nazism, the entrance of the United States into World War II,
and the onset of the Cold War provided a peculiar mix of opportunity and peril for the
individuals and policies of the American left. The exigencies of the international situation
during this era open up avenues for effective pressure on certain fronts, such as the
attainment of civil rights, even as it all but shut the door on radical economic critiques.
Ultimately, international events greatly privileged a programatic approach from the left
centered on making existing institutional arrangements more fair, rather than wholesale
transformation of the economic order.
International Relations before World War II
The dramatic break with the ideological tenor of the 1930s and early 1940s
highlights the developments of the immediate postwar decades. During this earlier time
period, the ideological center of gravity for left politics was organized around critiques of
the exploitative nature of the American economic order. Among black political circles, a
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group of young black intellectuals including Ralph Bunche, Abram Harris, Richard
Wright, and E. Franklin Frazier advocated for a reorientation of black political activity
along class lines and away from the racialist thinking of the NAACP and NUL.
Conferences like the Second Amenia conference in 1933 and the 1935 “The Position of
the Negro in Our National Economic Crisis” conference at Howard University that led to
the formation of the National Negro Congress (NNC), sought to give organizational
strength to a political program focused on uniting black and white laborers in the hopes
of taking on the economic exploitation that flowed from the capitalist economic order.
Indeed, in the late 1930s, the NNC had broad appeal and was frequently at the center of
debates and black political activism.443 The American Student Union and the League of
American Writers were also formed in 1935, and had members from a similarly broad
mix of leftist perspectives, including a substantial communists contingent.444 These
organizations and others formed a broad coalition of Popular Front organizations that
rallied around shared goals of economic justice, unionization and class solidarity, antiracism, and anti-fascism.445
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One of the first international events that began to expose cracks in the left was the
1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that established an official policy of nonaggression
between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. This agreement was a sharp change from
the previous communist stance of open hostility and active resistance of fascism. The
pact put the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) in the position of shifting stances from one
of cooperation with a broad coalition, including the Roosevelt administration, in resisting
the spread of fascism to advocating for isolation almost overnight. Doxey Wilkerson, a
member of the Communist Party and a frequent contributor to The Journal of Negro
Education (JNE), was emblematic of this switch. In a 1941 article, Wilkerson urged
against involvement in a conflict of “rival imperialisms” and argued that “the government
of this newer America has placed our nation ‘beside’ Britain, again to prosecute an
imperialist war under the guise of a great ‘moral’ crusade.”446
This new position was roundly criticized by many within the Popular Front. This
resulted in substantial fracturing among organizations and individuals of the left. Ralph
Bunche, who had tolerated the significant involvement of communists in the National
Negro Congress, was particularly critical. In a 1940 JNE article, Bunche criticized the
new position of the communists as “sophistry of the cheapest variety,” noting that the
Party had urged support of the fight against fascism in Spain less than a year prior, “but
then came the Communist shift from the Popular Front line, the Soviet-Nazi pact, and
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now Russia and the Communists are on the other side.”447 Bunche suggested that this
rapid switch was a clear indication of the CPUSA’s true commitments, arguing “the
Negro interest for the Communists is tied to uncertain and constantly shifting foreign
policy of the Soviet Union.”448 This moment was also pivotal for labor leader and
president of the NNC A. Phillip Randolph, who halted his pragmatic cooperation with the
Communist Party after the 1939 Pact. In fact, both Bunche and Randolph ceased their
relationship with the NNC in 1940 after it followed the communist line and switched
from strong support of Roosevelt and antifascism to a noninterventionist.449 This
complete break with CPUSA was significant given that the Communist Party had been
the been one of the earliest organizations to support racial equality and one of its most
dedicated proponents.450
The Soviet-Nazi Pact was not the only international event that had contributed to
the fracturing of the left in the late 1930s. Other prominent intellectuals on the left
became increasingly critical of the Soviet Union in the wake of the Great Purge, a
widespread program of political repression and elimination of political opposition from
1936 through 1938. Despite earlier work that had largely lauded the Soviet Union, leftist
scholars including Social Frontier contributors George Counts, John Dewey, William H.
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Kilpatrick and Sidney Hooks became openly critical of the Soviet Union after the purges.
Indeed, Dewey and Hook formed the Committee for Cultural Freedom in 1939, which
committed itself to fighting the “totalitarianism” of Soviet Russia in addition to that of
Germany and Italy.451 After hearing about the Soviet-Nazi pact, George Counts, whose
relationship with the CPUSA had already soured due to the purges, joined an anticommunist faction of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). With the support of
Dewey, Counts was elected president of the AFT in 1939, and steadily limited the
influence of communists within the union, including Doxey Wilkerson and Mary
Grossman.452 The AFT was not alone in seeking to counteract the influence of
communists in the wake of the 1939 pact. A number of liberal groups and other unions
passed so called “Communazi” resolutions aimed at excluding supporters of
“totalitarianism,” either from the right or the left, from membership.453 The fact that
communists were the dominant organized group in the Popular Front meant that this
backlash left it weakened, and several groups, including the American Student Union and
451
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League of American Writers, disbanded in the early 1940s.454 The renunciation of
communism and the effort to sever communists from participation in the Popular Front in
the late 1930s represented a significant fracturing of the left, and it was largely
precipitated by international events.
The CPUSA was forced to change its position once again after Germany invaded
Soviet territory in June of 1941. The party abandoned its isolationist stance and pushed
for engagement in the conflict. In a 1942 article appearing in the JNE just months after
he had strenuously objected to joining what he called an imperialist war, Doxey
Wilkerson urged full cooperation in the war effort, citing the necessity to “crush the
fascist aggressors with their state-sponsored ideologies of race hate and persecution.”455
For many, the whiplash engendered by this second about-face on the issue of
international politics further called into question the priorities of the CPUSA. Beyond
issues of consistency, the fact that party members called for the subordination of protests,
or in some cases “no-strike pledges,” in order to prevent obstructing the war effort led
many to conclude that the communists ultimately were loyal only to Moscow. Like the
Party’s earlier switch, the interventionist stance led to significant loss of membership,
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including some prominent members such as Richard Wright and his wife, who objected
to the Party's new pro-War advocacy.456
Despite the further loss of members, the communists’ re-embrace of the Roosevelt
administration’s foreign policy did moderate the most vigorous efforts at policing the left,
particularly after the United States officially joined the War in late 1941. The fact that
Soviet Russia and the United States were now allies in the fight against the Axis powers
lessened the pressure to purge communists from organizations on the left, and reopened a
space for Popular Front activity. Robert Korstadt and Nelson Lichtenstein have shown
how the entrance of the United States in WWII created the space for the communists and
their allies in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) to make substantial gains in
unionization and labor power in unlikely places, with particularly strong gains for black
workers.457 Michael Kazin captures the the unique potential, and temporality, of this
opening, noting, “as long as the war continued, a communist could be both a sinner
patriot and a follower of Stalin, without tripping over the contradiction.”458
United States’ Entrance into World War II
Individuals and groups looking to press a progressive agenda, particularly those
concerned with improving the condition of black citizens, viewed the movement of the
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United States away from its isolationist stance during 1941 with cautious optimism. As
historian Guion Johnson noted in her 1941 article for the JNE, “the ultimate gains from
war have in the long run usually outweighed the initial losses” for racial minorities
throughout American history.459 Johnson argued that wars had historically meant “a
relaxation in the ordinary controls … and the minority may actually achieve a few longtime goals,” as international crisis facilitated “rapid shifts in ideologies.”460 More
specifically to the situation in 1941, Johnson noted that the United States’s engagement in
WWII had the potential to be an economic boon for black workers as the productive
demands of war would greatly increase the need for workers.461
Beyond the economic advances promised by increased government expenditure in
the war industries, the particular nature of the WWII conflict provided particularly
powerful openings for advancing black political demands. As the United States entered
WWII in the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, black
intellectuals and political organizations increasingly pointed out the hypocrisy of the
United States fighting for democratic ideals abroad while supporting the continued
subjugation of black citizens. In a 1942 commencement address, Charles Thompson, the
editor of the JNE, drove this point home, noting that the “paradoxical situation of out
country at home to save the world for democracy, denying a substantial part of its
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population at home a full share of democracy for which it was fighting abroad.”462 Lewis
K. McMillan, professor of history at Wilberforce University, accused the United States of
“shedding ‘crocodile tears’ for the oppressed people of the earth” given the treatment of
blacks domestically.463 The fact that the United States frequently framed engagement in
the war as protecting and advancing the cause of democracy provided a particularly
powerful ideological weapon for those critical of its domestic treatment of black citizens.
The specific racial ideology of the enemy provided an additional opening to those
pushing for racial reforms in the United States. The Nazi use of Herrenvolk ideology,
which translated as master folk or race, underlined the racial hygiene and eugenic policies
of the Nazis including restrictive marriage and sexual relations policies, compulsory
sterilization of non-Aryans, and ultimately mass murder of Jews and other groups
considered inferior. Herrenvolk ideology also provided the justification excluding nonAryans from the full benefits of citizenship. This proved an uncomfortable fact in the
United States given the early connection between the American eugenics movement and
Nazi Germany and the existence of similarly racially restrictive laws in the Jim Crow
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south.464 Pointing out similarities between Nazi and American racial ideology,
philanthropist Anson Phelps Stokes argued, “we all condemn the Herrenvolk idea as both
unscientific and unChristian, but in the final analysis the ‘white supremacy’ doctrine held
by large groups of people in the South, and some in the North, is closely akin to it in
theory.”465 Martin Jenkins, a professor of education at Howard University, claimed that
“the present war, based as it is in part at least, on differing racial ideologies, has made
race a paramount issue throughout the world.”466 This fact meant the the war provided
an opportunity to attack “white supremacy” on the home front, as Stokes argued:
the war, by raising the Herrenvolk issue in the case of Germany, has driven
home to us in the United States that we are subject to attack on the
grounds of inconsistency and insincerity if we… make any requirements
for voting or office-holding that do not treat white men and colored men
exactly on the same objective basis.467
As in the case of arguments pointing out the hypocrisy of fighting for democracy abroad
while denying it citizens domestically, the embrace of racial supremacy by the Nazis
provided an opening to attack racial supremacy ideology and practice in the United
States.
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The charges of hypocrisy and inconsistency on the issue of race carried particular
significance given the broad geographical scope of World War II. The United States was
allied with many nations that were not predominantly white. Several articles pointed out
that the racial practices of the the Untied States were a substantial weakness in the War
effort, particularly in the Asian and African theaters. Charles Thompson claimed:
the maintenance of our traditional pattern of race relations in the
prosecution of this war is giving aid and comfort the enemy by furnishing
them with evidence to convince the darker people of Asia that America
cannot be trusted when she says that she is fighting to preserve
democracy.468
Similarly, Martin Jenkins pointed out that American “treatment of its darker racial groups
is a source of embarrassment to the nation,” and that the “counter-propaganda of the Axis
nations has not failed to make good use of this weak position of our country to the
detriment of our total war effort.”469 The racial practices of the United States also
strained relations with allied nations with large or predominantly non-white
populations.470 The hypocrisies represented more than a moral failing on the domestic
front, they had the potential to damage the efforts of the United States internationally.
The attention progressives brought to the subject of inconsistency and hypocrisy
was more than a simple venting of spleen. Intellectuals recognized the unique
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opportunity that these contradictions provided to extract political concessions. As
Charles Johnson, the editor of the National Urban League’s journal Opportunity, noted in
a 1941 article about the international political context, “the temper of the times has made
possible formal reassertions of the full citizenship rights of the Negro minority.”471 A
variety of black political organizations such as the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters
and other black labor organizations, the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, the National Urban League, and the National Negro Congress, took
advantage of the particular openings provided by the international context. These groups
successfully secured long held policy goals in early 1940s, including a nondiscriminatory
clause in the Selective Service Act, greater opportunities for advancement of black
military officers, greater representation in skilled trades and trade unions.472 Perhaps the
most significant achievement was the creation of the Fair Employment Practices
Committee (FEPC) in 1941. The threat of massive protest action spearheaded by A.
Phillip Randolph’s Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters led to the creation of the FEPC
via executive order, the first executive order directly concerning African Americans since
the Emancipation Proclamation.473 In securing these victories, black political
organizations pursued a strategy of “forcing from reluctant majority extensions of social,
economic, and political gains during wartime, when bargaining power is highest,”
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ensuring that “full capital is made of defections in the American way of life.”474 The
international context proved effective helping to advance the domestic agenda of these
groups, as they pushed for a “Double Victory” at home and abroad. The success of this
strategy led Anson Stokes to remark, “the progress of the Negro in the United States
during the war years has been of epoch-making significance.”475
Postwar International Context and Civil Rights
The Second World War provided particular openings for advancing priorities of
the left and had temporarily papered over the divisions in the left that had begun to show
between 1939 and 1941. When the war ended in 1945, the international scene was
quickly reconfigured and dramatically changed the prospects of the American left. The
rising conflict with the Soviet Union allowed black political organizations to continue to
make arguments emphasizing that improving the treatment of racial minorities and
increasing the protection of civil rights made strategic sense in a globalized conflict
involving millions of non-white individuals. These arguments were particularly effective
and did lead to meaningful progress on this front. Progress was coupled with a
significant limiting of the scope of issues that the left was able to effectively press during
this time period. Advancements in civil rights occurred simultaneously with the
widespread purging of the left from left-leaning organizations as the Popular Front
collapsed. Individuals on the left were suppressed of by various levels of government,
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leading to the abandonment of anti-imperialism and economic transformation as central
tenets of a left politics.
As the United States entered into a new struggle for the hearts and minds of
countries that were predominantly not white, the treatment of the non-white citizens
within the United States became particularly important to the nation’s international
agenda. This new reality was quickly grasped by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who
in a 1946 letter to the FEPC, wrote:
the existence of discrimination against minority groups in this country has
an adverse effect upon our relations with other countries. We are
reminded over and over by some foreign newspapers and spokesmen, that
our treatment of various minorities leaves much to be desired….We will
have better international relations when these reasons for suspicion and
resentment have been removed.476
This international reality was part of the impetus for President Truman’s decision to
establish the President’s Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR) in 1946 to investigate the
status of civil rights. The PCCR’s 1947 report, To Secure These Rights: The Report of the
President’s Committee on Civil Rights, pointed repeatedly to the international rationale
for taking action to improve the protection of civil rights for racial minorities. The PCCR
argued that “our civil rights record has growing international implications,” and noted
that “throughout the Pacific, Latin America, Africa, the Near, Middle, and Far East, the
treatment which our Negroes receive is taken as a reflection of our attitudes toward all
dark-skinned peoples.”477 Beyond the desire to portray a good portrait to the international
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community, the fact that Soviet Union was publicly committed to racial equality and
frequently publicized the United States’s domestic racial trouble provided another
important international incentive for action to protect minority rights. The PCCR argued
that “[t]hose with competing philosophies have stressed -- and are shamelessly distorting
-- our shortcomings” in civil rights, and had “tried to create hostility toward us among
specific nations, races, and religious groups” and “tried to prove our democracy an empty
fraud, and our nation a consistent oppressor of underprivileged people.”478 The PCCR
report noted that this strategy had succeeded in some circumstances, and suggested acting
on protecting civil rights in order to deprive the Soviet Union of this weapon.
This opening for advancing civil rights protections was quickly seized by many
on the left who adapted the arguments they had made during World War II to reflect the
new international situation. Black political organizations and political leaders were quick
to adapt claims that domestic racism and racial inequality undermined American moral
authority and international interests. The NAACP began connecting the fight against
communism with the fight against racial subordination almost immediately, with
prominent members including Roy Wilkins making this case in Crisis.479 In 1947, the
NAACP took the dramatic step of submitting a petition to the recently created United
Nations Commission on Human Rights asking for redress for violation of human rights
by the United States government. The petition, entitled An Appeal to the World: A
Statement on the Denial of Human Rights to Minorities in the Case of Citizens of Negro
478
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Descent in the United States of America and an Appeal to the United Nations for Redress,
was submitted to the U.N. by W.E.B. Du Bois, who also authored the petition’s
introduction.480 In the petition, Du Bois outlined the instances of violations of human
rights and the basic tenets of democracy faced by blacks in the U.S. Du Bois
continuously pointed to the economic foundation of racial subordination and accused the
United States federal government of “continuously cast[ing] its influence with imperial
aggression,” arguing that “[i]t has become through private investment part of the
imperialistic bloc which is controlling the colonies of the world.”481 Du Bois continued
his radical critique, noting “It is not Russia that threatens United States so much as
Mississippi; not Stalin and Molotov but Bilbo and Rankin.”482
The petition was particularly embarrassing to the United States, and Eleanor
Roosevelt in particular, who served as both a delegate to the United Nations and as a
board member of the NAACP. Roosevelt and the rest of the United States delegation
refused to bring up the petition; however, the Soviet Union gladly proposed that the
charges be investigated. Despite the Truman administration’s refusal to address the
petition, it enjoyed significant domestic support as Du Bois had secured the endorsement
of a number of professional organizations and religious groups in addition to leftist
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support.483 Despite international support and domestic support within the U.S., the U.N.
general assembly ultimately rejected the proposal to investigate, and no further action
was taken on the petition.484 The submission of An Appeal to the World was the zenith of
the NAACP’s radicalism on the international stage, and the last time the organization was
formally anti-imperialist.
The NAACP and mainstream black political leaders adapted Du Bois’s radical
argument to reflect a closer alignment with the formal international interests of the United
States as the contours of the Cold War changed. The transition of China to communism
in 1949 and the subsequent Korean War shifted the focus of the Cold War to Asia in the
early 1950s. In a 1951 JNE article sociologist St. Clair Drake noted that in Asia, the
“Communist movement attempts to define the situation as one in which ‘white imperialist
powers’ are decimating ‘oppressed Colored peoples.’”485 St. Clair Drake argued that the
communists pursued a strategy of “publicizing its own repudiation of racism and all
theories of biological determinism,” while it simultaneously “exposes, attacks, and
ridicules any evidences of racism among the ‘free nations.’”486 Several articles in the
JNE exposed the effectiveness of this strategy, pointing out that the treatment of racial
minorities was one of the most encountered questions by Americans traveling abroad,
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even in allied countries.487 Psychologist Howard Hale Long argued that the treatment of
blacks meant that the “USSR has several advantages over the West in its approach to the
Asians,” most notably the fact that “she had decisively abolished race prejudice and
ostensibly at least accepted the Asians on equality.”488 While both St. Clair Drake and
Long maintained that the claims emanating from the Soviet Union were sensationalized
and overstated, they did both suggest that the United States should combat this
international problem through expanding civil rights protections for minorities
domestically. Recent court decisions and the newfound willingness of federal Justice
Department officials to point to international relations in civil rights cases led both of
these authors to point to the federal judiciary and the civil rights strategy of the NAACP
as potentially holding the most promise for advancing black interests.489
Organization around the opening provided by the international context proved
effective in advancing some long-held goals of black political organizations. In 1948,
President Truman began to press for the protection of civil rights for racial minorities. In
a special message to Congress, Truman advocated for legislative action to strengthen civil
rights protections in order to “strengthen our democracy and improve the welfare of our
people.” Arguing that all deserved “equal protection under the law,” Truman asked
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Congress to send him legislation that included a Civil Rights Division in the Department
of Justice, federal protection against lynching, protection of the right to vote, and
prohibition of discrimination in employment and transportation. Truman was clearly
motivated substantially by the international context, and ended his Congressional appeal
by noting, “If we wish to inspire the peoples of the world whose freedom is in jeopardy,
if we wish to restore hope to those who have already lost their civil liberties, if we wish
to fulfill the promise that is ours, we must correct the remaining imperfections in our
practice of democracy.”490 Congress largely ignored his message, but Truman did take
action to achieve some of the recommendations of the President’s Committee On Civil
Rights. On July 26th, 1948, President Truman issued Executive Orders 9980 and 9981,
which ordered the desegregation of the federal workforce and the armed services.491
Truman’s actions were just one example of how international context provided substantial
impetus for action on civil rights domestically.492 Indeed, scholars like Mary Dudziak
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and Gerald Horne have argued that progress in desegregation throughout the late 1940s
and 1950s was to a substantial degree a Cold War imperative.493
Although the nascent Cold War provided opportunities to press for certain policy
goals of the left, most notably in the protection of civil rights, it quickly proved to be a
substantially limiting force for the left more broadly. The election of 1948 was a critical
moment in curbing the influence of the left, particularly in black politics. Henry Wallace,
the former Vice President and Secretary of Commerce who Truman had fired largely over
strong disagreement in the direction of foreign policy regarding the Soviet Union,
mounted a challenge to Truman from the left, running as the Progressive Party’s
candidate. Wallace’s platform warned that the “American way of life is in danger,” and
that “the root cause of the crisis is Big Business control of our economy and
government.”494 The platform coupled domestic policies of “full equality for the Negro
people” and strong anti-discrimination legislation, a publicly planned economy and
public ownership of critical industries and housing, a strengthening of labor unions, a
guaranteed living wage, full employment with an international agenda committed to
disarmament and peaceful relations with the Soviet Union.495 Wallace and the
Progressive Party had the potential to broadly appeal to black voters, indeed, a 1947 poll
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of the NAACP national office found that roughly 70 percent of NAACP staffers intended
to support Wallace over Truman in the 1948 election.496
The NAACP and Post-War International Relations
The support of Wallace vexed Walter White, then President of the NAACP.
White, who was of the opinion that the most effective means of advocating for the
organization was through lobbying those in the inner circle of power, was concerned with
maintaining his relationship and access within the Truman administration.497 White had
long been suspicious of, and in some instances outright hostile towards, the left, and was
a staunch supporter of Truman in the 1948 election. White used the platform of NAACP
president to actively campaign both for Truman and against Wallace across the nation,
and he also warned prominent Wallace supporters in the NAACP, including Du Bois,
against advocating for Wallace.498
The 1948 campaign proved to be a moment where important divisions
crystallized. Through strong support of President Truman and the Democratic Party,
Walter White tied the NAACP tightly to anti-communism, abandoned earlier antiimperial foreign policy advocacy, and began severing ties with the black left. Truman
ultimately garnered two thirds of the black vote, which in the close election provided him
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his margin of victory in several states.499 The effect of the election on black politics was
significant. Truman’s campaign was premised on both modest racial reforms and a
staunch anti-communism internationally and domestically. Both during the campaign
and after Truman’s victory, White moved the NAACP decisively to the right in order to
maintain its relationship with the Truman administration. One of the costs of maintaining
this access was the repudiation of the organization’s earlier anti-imperial stance embodied
in the An Appeal to the World petition. Despite the denouncement of the “imperial
aggression” of the United States throughout the world in the 1947 petition, by 1948
White had led the NAACP to an open embrace of the United States’s efforts to halt the
spread of global communism.500
The extent to which the NAACP had moved on the issue of foreign policy was
evident in 1951 in the organization’s response to a petition submitted to the United
Nations by the Civil Rights Congress (CRC). The CRC, founded in 1946 as a merger of
the NNC and two other Popular Front groups, submitted a petition to the UN General
Assembly accusing the United States of the newly defined international crime of
genocide. The petition, entitled We Charge Genocide: The Historic Petition to the
United Nations for Relief from a Crime of the United States Government Against the
Negro People, claimed that “the oppressed Negro citizens of the United States … suffer
from genocide as the result of the consistent, conscious, unified policies of every branch
499
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of government.”501 The petition argued that the experience of blacks in the United States
was at its heart tied to the structure of economic relations in the nation. Claiming that
“the object of this genocide … is the perpetuation of economic and political power by the
few through the destruction of political protest by the many,” the petition concluded that
“the foundation of the genocide of which we complain is economic.”502 The petition also
asserted that the foreign policy of the United States was motivated by the same economic
forces, stating “[j]ellied gasoline in Korea and the lyncher’s faggot at home are connected
… The tie binding both is economic profit and political control.”503 The incendiary
charges were roundly condemned by United States government officials, who quickly
mobilized prominent black leaders to denounce the petition.
The State Department reached out to Walter White and asked him to publicly
repudiate the petition. Although the criticisms of the United States were more extreme
than in An Appeal to the World, and the criticism of capitalism much more explicit in the
CRC’s petition, the two petitions had much in common. Much of the data and specific
events that the CRC petition had used in We Charge Genocide had been taken directly
from An Appeal to the World. This proved to be an uncomfortable reality when Walter
White attempted to initially discredit the CRC’s petition through challenging the facts it
presented, a position he backed off of only after Roy Wilkins pointed out that “many of
the citations in that book are from the records and other publications of the NAACP.
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How can we ‘blast’ a book that uses our records as source material?”504 White ultimately
instead released a statement at the behest of the State Department charging that the
petition failed to take into account the “phenomenal gains” in civil rights and reducing
bigotry that characterized the United States in the most recent decade and accused the
CRC of using black “grievances as a pawn in the world struggle for political
domination.”505
White recognized the value of his statement to the State Department, given that
the “experience and prestige” of the NAACP meant that his statement regarding the
treatment of blacks in the United States would be “accepted as truth by the noncommunist people of the world.”506 White followed his official statement with a column
for the Saturday Literary Review entitled “Time for a Progress Report,” in which he
pointed to fifteen specific areas that constituted a “solid body of achievement” in
bettering the lives of racial minorities throughout the 1940s.507
White was not alone in denouncing the CRC petition, as the federal government
had moved to incorporate several black leaders into its international relations apparatus.
Indeed, the incorporation of some of these individuals may have contributed to their
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shifting positions on foreign policy, or at least modified their willingness to be as openly
critical. This appears to be particularly true for Ralph Bunche, whose strident critiques of
the foreign policy of the United States and the NAACP subsided significantly around the
same time he was hired by the Office of Strategic Services.508
The increasingly prominent roles occupied by black individuals such as Edith
Sampson as an alternate delegate to the U.N. assembly, Ralph Bunche as an analyst and
U.N. diplomat, and Edward Dudley as the ambassador to Liberia, as well as the more
temporary advisory roles given to Charles Johnson and R.P Weaver, provided the United
States government with high-profile surrogates to combat criticisms of its racial record.509
The State Department reached out to Bunche, as well as Phelps-Stokes Fund director
Channing Tobias, to help push back against the charges in the petition.510 Edith Sampson
was asked to tour Scandinavian countries to limit any damage from the petition, during
which she echoed White’s rosy portrayal of the state of race relations in the United States.
Sampson claimed that concerns about Jim Crow were overblown, that blacks did not face
any barriers to voting, and that the black people she knew drove Cadillacs and lived in
$100,000 houses.511 The well-organized effort to combat the claims of the CRC petition,
many of which were substantially similar to those the NAACP had made just a few years
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earlier, indicates the extent to which the NAACP and other prominent black intellectuals
had shifted their views to align with Cold War anti-communism in international affairs.
The embrace of the anti-communism and an interventionist foreign policy by the
NAACP was accompanied by a silencing of those voices of dissent within the
organization. Perhaps the most notable instance of this silencing was W.E.B. Du Bois’s
unceremonious dismissal from the organization in 1948. Du Bois vehemently disagreed
with the increasingly close relationship between the NAACP and the Truman
administration, and the muting of criticism of Truman’s interventionism that this
relationship required. This disagreement over the NAACP's position on foreign policy
appears to have been decisive in his expulsion from the organization in 1948.512 The
NAACP became increasingly openly critical of other prominent black leftists, including
Paul Robeson and William Patterson, the president of the CRC. Du Bois, Robeson, and
Patterson had all been critical of the NAACP’s embrace of Truman in the 1948 election,
and all three were signatories to the We Charge Genocide petition.513
Despite disagreements, there was some attempt by Patterson to cooperate on
common political goals with the NAACP. Patterson had reached out to White in 1949 in
an attempt to work together on the UN petition, but White refused and criticized the
communist nature of the CRC.514 The open refusal to associate with blacks on the left
was part of a broader effort to separate the NAACP from the Popular Front. At the
512

Janken, “From Colonial Liberation,” 1083.

513

Ibid., 1086; We Charge Genocide.

514

Gilbert Jonas, Freedom’s Sword: The NAACP and the Struggle Against Racism in America, 1909-1969
(New York: Routledge, 2004), 144; Anderson 2003, 93.

!212

annual meeting of the NAACP in 1950, members passed a resolution authorizing the
national organization to take “necessary steps to eradicate Communist infiltration,”
including suspension or expulsion of any local branch that came under communist
influence.515 This official stance formalized what had been an unofficial policy since
1946 organized by Walter White, Roy Wilkins, Thurgood Marshall and others to combat
the influence of communists within the organization.516
The distancing of the NAACP and others from those on the left made them
particularly vulnerable to the repressive action increasingly employed by the United
States government. Paul Robeson had his passport revoked due to his criticism of the
United States’s foreign policy abroad.517 After submitting the We Charge Genocide
petition, Patterson was charged with contempt of Congress and had his passport
confiscated.518 In 1951, the 82-year-old Du Bois was charged with being “an agent of
foreign principle” for his foreign policy positions and work with the Peace Information
Center. Although all charges were eventually dismissed, Manning Marable notes that the
NAACP was particularly “conspicuous in it cowardice” in its refusal to offer any legal or
public support of the former prominent member.519 Despite the dismissal of all charges,
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the indictment did accomplish some of the objectives of the Truman administration, as
thousands of libraries removed copies of Du Bois’s work and he was increasingly
marginalized from organizations that wished to maintain mainstream appeal. Others on
the left were not so lucky, and many faced massive material consequences when they
were convicted of subversive activities because of their foreign policy views.520
Although it is certainly true that the NAACP was in part a victim of Cold War anticommunist hysteria, the more conservative politics of those at the top of the organization
meant that this hysteria also served as a useful tool to shape the politics of the
organization towards the more conservative politics of those at the top.521
By severing ties with the left, the NAACP and other mainstream organizations
eliminated those members who had been most committed to economic justice through
structural transformation. Indeed, this position had become increasingly untenable in
organizations strongly committed to anti-communism, as any criticism of the economic
organization of the US economy immediately cast suspicion on the loyalty of those
making the argument. The strident anti-communism of the United States led to the
downfall of the inclusion of strong economic and social equality guarantees as part of the
U.N. Charter on Human Rights, largely over concern from the United States that they
were a Soviet trojan horse. The NAACP and other mainstream black political
organizations that prioritized combating Jim Crow largely abandoned these economic
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commitments in an attempt to maintain legitimacy.522 By 1948, it was clear that the brief
opening provided by World War II to be both a communist and a patriot had closed. The
ouster of Du Bois, the purging of communists from the organization, the abandonment of
anti-imperialism and strong demands for economic justice was the price the NAACP
willingly paid for the promised support of modest civil rights advancements from Cold
War liberals.
As black political organizations were increasingly channeled into a civil rights
framework, commitments to organizing a coalition of interracial working-class people in
order to facilitate broad economic structural transformation to achieve economic justice
receded into the background. The new imperative of the international context
substantially benefitted those individuals and organizations who had long been skeptical
of the wisdom of closely associating black political demands with the left. Arguments
calling for fair racial incorporation into the existing institutional order were better able to
accommodate the changing international context, as their highest priorities could be
achieved within the existing institutional and economic landscape. Those pushing for
economic reorganization were marginalized, as calls for significant changes to the
economic system were increasingly deemed un-American.

The Domestic Constraints of the Second Red Scare
Just as the shifting international context shaped the strategic decisions of
organizations and individuals on the left, the brutally repressive domestic suppression of
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the left facilitated by this shifting context had extensive repercussions for postwar
politics. As the influence of the rehabilitated business community and Congressional
conservatives waxed in the postwar era, anti-communism served as a particularly
effective tool in attacking political opponents on the left. Stoked by a political coalition
that found communist witch hunts politically useful, political organizations were
increasingly pressured to prove their patriotism through severing all association with
anyone deemed too far Left or face Congressional investigation. During the era of the
Second Red Scare, unions and other organizations on the political left paid the price
demanded of them in order to maintain access to mainstream political discourse/
politicians, and purged hundreds of thousands of individuals from membership rolls.
Beyond weakening and destroying organizations, the attack on the left during the Second
Red Scare had dramatic consequences for the individuals, who experienced immense
pressure to renounce old positions, abandon social networks and friendships, or else
suffer marginalization, substantial fines, or jail time. The anti-communism that shaped
much of the domestic politics in the Post-War era proved devastating for the
organizations, individuals, and ideas of the left.
The Rise of Anti-Communism
Nine days after he outlined the new interventionist foreign policy approach of the
Truman Doctrine, President Truman indicated that the conflict with communism would
have a domestic component. On March 21st, 1947, the President signed Executive Order
9835 requiring a loyalty investigation of every individual entering the employment of any
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department or agency of the executive branch. The order also authorized the
investigation of any current employee and set up a Loyalty Review Board with the power
to fire anyone deemed not loyal. The order outlined disqualifying offenses for which
employees could be fired, including “membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic
association with” any organization “designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian,
fascist, communist, or subversive.”523 Although the executive order technically applied
to individuals across the political spectrum, the primary concern was with those on the
left.
The testimony of FBI director J. Edward Hoover before the the House UnAmerican Activities Committee (HUAC) on March 26th, 1947 underlined the fact that
the primary targets would be those on the political left. Hoover’s testimony focused
almost exclusively on domestic communism as one of the most serious threats facing the
nation, warning the committee that “[l]iterally hundreds of groups and organizations have
either been infiltrated or organized primarily to accomplish the purposes of promoting the
interests of the Soviet Union.”524 The FBI director proposed a number of tests that would
indicate the subversiveness of an organization, including whether an organization
criticized American and British foreign policy, whether an organization was endorsed by
a communist-controlled labor union, and whether an organization denounced “monopoly-
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capitalism.”525 Hoover identified the school system, labor unions, radio, and the motion
pictures industry as areas of special concern, where communists had already made
progress towards infiltration. The director also clarified unequivocally that communists
did not have a right to Government employment.526
The focus on communist infiltration drew particular interest from Congressional
conservatives. Republicans gained control of both the House and Senate after a dominant
performance in the 1946 elections, and quickly exercised the investigative powers gained
through control of Congressional committees.527 Congressman Richard Nixon (R-CA)
was present at the HUAC hearing, and expressed particular concern about communist
infiltration and reiterated the pressing need “to expose them, to drive them out of labor
unions, out of other institutions.”528 During Hoover’s testimony, Republican
Congressman Karl Mundt of South Dakota, who would become one of Senator Joseph
McCarthy’s (R-WI) staunchest allies, argued that it was “liberal and progressive” forces
that had the responsibility to be the most vigilant and outspoken, noting that “it is
necessary for them to take vigorous and active steps to expose and defeat the activities of
communists, and not simply to damn communism with faint praise, as some have done in
the past.”529 Hoover’s description of domestic communists as a “fifth column”530
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committed to “the destruction of free enterprise” provided a powerful line for
conservatives against those that failed to condemn the party and sympathizers in the most
strident terms.531 The committee, and its focus on the threat of domestic subversion,
would become well known to the public by the end of 1947 as it launched an
investigation of communist infiltration in the movie industry.532
A broad range of conservative groups, including the American Legion, the
Daughters of the American Revolution, the National Association of Manufacturers, and
the Chamber of Commerce found red-baiting to be a powerful means of silencing critics
and advancing their own political agendas.533 Calling into question an individual’s
loyalty became a particularly potent political weapon, especially as criteria that could
lead to termination of employment and the number of groups considered subversive
expanded in 1951 and 1953.534 The loyalty investigations soon spread to the state level,
and by the early 1950s over thirty states had their own policies that called for loss of
employment for membership in subversive organizations, over twenty required public
servants to sign loyalty oaths, and thirteen had created their own version of HUAC.535 As
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the hysteria increased, accusations of disloyalty became a devastatingly effective means
of combating individuals, ideas, or policies that might be considered remotely critical of
capitalism or American foreign policy.

The Political and Policy Effects of the Second Red Scare
In her account of the loyalty investigations, historian Landon Storrs demonstrates
the considerable consequences for civil servants targeted for investigation. To be accused
of subversive activity often meant one was subjected to years of repeated loyalty
investigations, imposing a staggering economic and psychological price on the accused.
Storrs shows how the prevalence of loyalty investigations and their cynical use by
conservatives and business interests, forced prominent left-leaning civil servants to
distance themselves from strong critiques of economic inequality and capitalism or face
unemployment. These loyalty investigations had a significant impact on the direction of
post-War social policy, as important individuals were forced to abandon left policies.
Policies such as national health insurance, anti-militarism, strong consumer protections, a
comprehensive social welfare system, public control of power, and public housing were
marginalized as these individuals moved towards more the political center and business
friendly positions in an attempt to shore up their anti-subversive credentials.536 The
effects of loyalty investigations in non-government organizations mirrored the effects of
loyalty investigations in the civil service, as friendships, networks and coalitions frayed
and disappeared under the immense pressure. The loyalty investigations, and their
536
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remarkably effective use by opponents of New Deal-style social and economic programs,
contributed significantly to the defeat of more democratic policy alternatives and helped
forge a Post-War consensus that was substantially more conservative.537
The attempt to roll back the social policies of the New Deal, and to prevent
passage of similar legislation, motivated a campaign by corporate leaders and probusiness groups to attempt “to shape a national consensus that was conducive to
unfettered corporate expansion and economic growth.”538 Historian Wendy Wall’s work
follows the invention of the phrase “The American Way,” and the associated politics that
came to be a particularly powerful force in the 1940s and 1950s. This ideology frowned
on labor militancy and class conflict as un-American, idolized individual liberty and
tolerance, and positioned high productivity and mass consumption as central to the
preservation of democracy and the economy.539 Importantly, while this emerging
ideology was in part an attempt to head off New Deal type social welfare programs, the
high value it placed on tolerance and consensus did provide an opening for minority
groups to seek incorporation into existing structures. In fact, as Wall notes, by the 1950s
race and “intergroup relations [had] become a good ‘cause’ for conservatives to be liberal
about. It [was] not basically threatening to their own economic agenda.”540 However, the
opening provided was limited, as this ideology could easily be appropriated for purposes
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like legal and political equality of black individual, while forcefully shutting the door on
other claims - most importantly, demands for economic equality or economic
transformation.541
The Second Red Scare facilitated the rise of this new pro-growth and pro-business
political coalition. The loyalty investigations of prominent left-leaning policymakers in
the federal civil service pushed individuals to abandon previous advocacy of expansive
government in economic planning and redistribution. Under the threat of loyalty
investigation, important individuals like Leon Keyserling, the head of the Council of
Economic Advisors (CEA) under President Truman, began to advocate for focusing on
growth and increasing production rather than redistribution in the early 1950s. This new
“guns and butter” strategy positioned economic growth, in large part through increased
military spending to combat communism, rather than redistribution of wealth as the top
economic priority of Cold War liberals. As Keyerseling and his wife were investigated,
he adopted increasingly pro-business rhetoric and policy proposals, at least in part to fend
off charges that he was insufficiently loyal.542 The Keyerselings were certainly not the
only individuals that felt this pressure. Historian Landon Storrs has argued that the Right
frequently used accusation of disloyalty to “block policy initiatives that impinged on
business prerogatives at home and abroad.”543
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The Left and Political Suppression
As J. Edgar Hoover and Richard Nixon’s public comments on communist
influence and infiltration on unions foreshadowed, the Second Red Scare had particularly
powerful effects on the membership and programmatic agenda of Unions in the post-War
era.544 The passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 significantly undermined the power
of the labor movement in the United States. The legislation contained several provisions
that made it much more difficult for labor unions to maintain and expand membership.
The limitation on the right to strike, limitations on the use of the boycott, and a provision
allowing states to ban “closed shops” all substantially weakened the political position of
labor in the Post-War era.545 Passed as the anti-communist hysteria was reaching a fever
pitch the legislation contained a provision, Section 9(h), that required all trade union
officials to sign affidavits proclaiming that they were neither members nor supporters of
the Communist Party.546 The industrial unions of the CIO were by far the largest
organizations that had continued to maintain the rough outlines of Popular Front-style
cooperation with communists. The passage of the Taft-Hartley Act and the reemergence
of HUAC the same year made this cooperation increasingly untenable. In 1948, the
President of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (UE) was arrested after he
refused to cooperate with HUAC in an investigation of another Popular Front
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organization. The UE, and ten other union affiliates of the CIO representing roughly one
million members were expelled from the CIO between 1949 and 1950 over their refusal
to sign the anti-communist affidavits required by the Taft-Hartley Act.547 The Resolution
on Expulsion of the UE stated emphatically “[t]here is no place in the CIO for any
organization whose leaders … would betray the American workers into totalitarian
bondage.”548
This massive purging of left-oriented unions and members had serious
consequences for the political agenda of the labor movement. The active removal and
exclusion of communists and other leftists from the labor movement limited the
connection unions had to other core leftist-movement of the Post-World War II years.
The CIO members that were also members of the Communist Party were often the most
committed and effective organizers when it came to combating racial prejudice and racial
exclusion. The elimination of communists and other leftists from the mainstream labor
movement resulted in a substantial decline in the priority that the AFL-CIO put on
fighting racial segregation.549 The retreat on race issues was just one example of the
programmatic consequences of severing ties with the left. As labor historian Nelson
Lichtenstein has noted, prior to their exclusion, communist union members had often
provided the “organic leadership” for many left-oriented movements the era, including
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opposition to Cold War, defense of civil liberties, and early feminism.550 The mass
removal of the communist members or sympathizers from the political mainstream
significantly limited the influence and connection the labor movement would have in the
dominant left politics that would emerge in the coming decades.551 Additionally, the
Second Red Scare and the broad purges foreclosed the possibility of a clear independence
from the Democratic Party and ultimately served to bind the leadership of the labor
movement tightly to the Democratic Party leadership.552
Beyond restricting the broad political vision and connection with other left
movements, the elimination of the radical left from the labor movement and the
increasingly defensive posture forced by unfriendly legislation and resurgent business
influence led to consequential changes in the political demands of unions. The passage of
the Taft-Hartley Act forced labor leaders to shift focus from advocating for universal
government social welfare programs to a stance that prioritized collective bargaining.
This was largely a reaction to an unfavorable political climate in which union leaders
made the strategic decision to prioritize the maintenance of member loyalty and the
protection of existing unions over active expansion and organization of new members.
Political Scientist Marie Gottschalk argues that the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act and
the political context of the postwar era created an alliance of labor and employers around
job-based health and pension benefits that limited labor’s active advocacy for universal
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benefit programs.553 The purging of the left flank of the labor movement was important
to this reprioritization, as this was precisely the part of the labor movement that was most
likely to organize around broad social issues like universal social welfare programs.554
Ultimately, the fracturing of Popular Front-style cooperation between labor unions and
the radical left forced by a changing political context resulted in a labor movement with a
narrowed focus on collective bargaining, fewer connections with the other left
movements, and a close embrace of the Democratic Party. In a sharp reversal of the
trends of the previous decades, the percent of the workforce belonging to union began its
lengthy decline in 1953.555
The broad targeting of organizations based on political association had
devastating, and in some cases, fatal consequences for many organizations on the left that
were unwilling or unable to effectively distance themselves from past or present
association with now questionable political views. Groups such as the Emergency Civil
Liberties Committee, which had been formed by civil rights activists unhappy with the
unwillingness of the ACLU to defend accused communists, and the National Lawyers
Guild who actively opposed anti-communist repression, were actively targeted and
marginalized for combating McCarthyism.556 By the late 1950s, a number of groups
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advocating for interracial working-class organization and anti-imperialism, including the
American Labor Party, the Council on African Affairs, the National Negro Labor Council,
and the Civil Rights Congress, had disbanded due in large part due to suppression by the
federal government. In addition to infiltration, surveillance, and harassment, many leftleaning groups (including all those listed above) were added to the Attorney General’s list
of subversive organizations by 1953. The act of adding an organization to this list was
essentially a death blow, as individuals seeking employment with the federal government
were required to sign a statement certifying that they had no past or present connection
with any of the listed organizations.557
The disappearance of these organizations represented a substantial loss to the
ideas and coalitions of the left. Without the intellectual and financial resources,
organizing around the political agenda like that advocated by the Popular Front became
infinitely more difficult. Furthermore, as historian Ellen Schrecker has argued,
McCarthyism’s main impact may well have been in what did no happen
rather than in what did—the social reforms that were never adopted, the
diplomatic initiatives that were not pursued, the workers who were not
organized into unions, the books that were not written, and the movies that
were not filmed.558
There is no way to account for the personal relationships, political allegiances, and new
organizations and coalitions that might have emerged in the absence of the widespread
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suppression of the political left. The repression of the left had an impact not only in the
coalitions and policies that disappeared from the political arena, but also in the absence of
organizational capacity to resist and push back against an increasingly conservative
national political agenda.
As the responses of the CIO and the NAACP indicate, government officials were
far from the only actors responsible for repression of the political left during the Second
Red Scare. Many groups that had tolerated or welcomed the participation of Communist
Party members in the early 1940s began targeting and purging these individuals by the
end of the decade. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) ousted communists and
sympathizers and actively supported federal suppression efforts.559 The American Bar
Association (ABA) passed resolutions against permitting communists from practicing
law and actively cooperated with federal officials to investigate members and begin
disbarment proceedings against those deemed subversive. In some cases, simply
representing individuals in anti-communist proceedings was enough to subject lawyers to
a barrage of negative consequences, including loss of income, clients and potential
disbarment.560
As employers increasingly adopted the same tactics as organizations like the ABA
and ACLU, communists and fellow travelers faced widespread firing and diminished
economic prospects across the labor market. The film and entertainment industry had
been the subject of high profile loyalty and subversive investigation by HUAC, and
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workers throughout the industry faced a career-ending blacklist, in some cases simply for
supporting procedural rights for accused subversives. Professional organizations like the
Screen Actors Guild, headed by Ronald Reagan, actively participated in the purging of
communists and required members to sign loyalty oaths.561 U.S. Steel, General Electric,
and a number of other employers publicly announced that any employee that exercised
their Fifth Amendment Right against self-incrimination while under investigation would
be dismissed.562 The anti-communist fervor spread to academia as left-wing professors
found their employment on increasingly unstable ground. When Congressional
investigators turned their attention to communism in Higher Education in 1953, the
Association of American Universities, whose members consisted of the presidents of
thirty-seven of the country’s most prominent universities, released a statement warning
professors that “invocation of the Fifth Amendment places upon a professor a heavy
burden of proof of his fitness to hold a teaching position and lays upon his university an
obligation to reexamine his qualifications for membership in its society.”563 Charles
Johnson, now the President of Fisk University and a still frequent JNE contributor,
dismissed two faculty members for taking the Fifth Amendment when called before
HUAC, despite widespread support for the two professors on campus.564 The American
Association of University Professors (AAUP) the main organization committed to
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defending academic freedom in higher education, largely stayed on the sidelines during
the height of the Second Red Scare and did nothing to combat the academic firings that
cost hundreds of professors their livelihoods.565
The changing domestic political context of the decade and half after World War II
dramatically circumscribed the terrain on which the left could operate in the United
States. Cold War liberals, like President Truman, questioned the loyalty of those on the
left, especially when they expressed opposition to his foreign policy. The loyalty
investigation machinery built by President Truman provided a convenient tool for
renascent business groups and conservative politicians committed to rolling back many of
the New Deal programs and to prevent the passage of similar generous social welfare
programs, as they cast individuals on the political left as a threat to national security,
particularly if they were critical of the economic system. Groups and individuals on the
left were affected, as many scrambled to reverse previous political positions, abandon
long standing relationships, and move decidedly towards the political center in a time
where being too far to the left carried the possibility of ending one’s career. Although
this shifting Post-War domestic political context was devastating for those on the left that
centered their politics on a critique of economic inequality and exploitation under the
existing economic system, it was substantially more friendly to a politics that could
articulate grievances in a manner that did not implicate capitalism. This provided a
decisive advantage to those on the left that were primarily concerned with fair
incorporation of racial minorities into the existing system.
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The Changing Court Doctrines
At the moment that the Cold War context was rapidly shrinking the political space
for left political organizations and individuals, changing federal court doctrines in the
1950s provided an advantage to those groups and individuals advancing a political
agenda that centered on fair incorporation and equal opportunity. While throughout the
1930s and early 1940s the Supreme Court had appeared open to a conception of civil
rights that provided strong protection for the rights of workers and labor, by the late
1940s this moment had largely passed. Shifting court doctrines had important
consequences for the types of legal arguments advanced by groups seeking redress particularly for those targeting Jim Crow. By the early 1950s, as the Cold War context
made cases emphasizing the rights of black laborers unappealing, the NAACP shifted its
focus to attacking the non-economic consequences of Jim Crow segregation. The
increasing openness of the Supreme Court to ruling segregation violated the 14
Fourteenth Amendment reinforced for many the wisdom of pursuing a political and legal
agenda centered on demonstrating the negative psychological effects of segregation and
discrimination. Although this approach proved quite successful in eliminating formal
barriers to black participation in existing institutions, it was particularly ill equipped to
address the deteriorating economic situation facing black Americans.

Labor and the Federal Courts
!231

The passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1935 is viewed by
some scholars as perhaps the most radical piece of legislation of the twentieth century.566
Passed amidst turmoil of the Great Depression and after a massive wave of strikes, and
the rise of the CIO, the NLRA formalized a number of workers rights. The NLRA
included sections clarifying the right of workers to organize, the right of workers to
choose their own representatives, promotion of collective bargaining between employees
and employers. The Act also created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to
oversee labor organization and prevent unfair labor practices. Senator Robert Wagner (D
- NY), the author of the NLRA, argued that the legislation was necessary to promote
industrial democracy, a democratic workplace in which employees had meaningful
participation in the deciding the conditions under which they worked. Wagner asserted
that NLRA was essential legislation, as “democracy cannot work unless it is honored in
the factory as well as the polling booth; men cannot be truly free in body and in spirit
unless their freedom extends into the places where they earn their daily bread.”567 This
articulation of democracy is squarely in line with the economic democracy ideology. The
NLRA’s promotion of industrial democracy, strong unions, and redistribution of power
from corporate leaders to workers had potentially radical implications.568 However, the
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extent of the NLRA’s radicalism would be worked out in federal courts in the late 1930s
and 1940s, a process which ultimately resulted in curtailing the revolutionary potential of
NLRA.
The passage of the NLRA provoked an immediate and sustained effort by
Republicans and business leaders to undermine the Act’s provisions. Unhappy with the
twin threat of loss of managerial prerogative and growing labor militarism, the business
community attempted to undermine the NLRA through refusing to follow the newly
established rules and devoting resources to illegal antiunion campaigns.569 The
intransigence from the business community ultimately resulted in the federal court
system having a decisive role in determining the boundaries of legitimate labor activity.
Some initial Supreme Court decisions gave the labor movement hope that the
Court would take an expansive interpretation of protections the NLRA granted to
workers. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Court handed down several decisions
favorable to labor, including the protection of the right of unionists to speak in public,
protection for union advertisements, and protection of the right of unions to picket.570
The Supreme Court also protected the NLRB’s independence, insulating its proceedings
from judicial interference and stalling tactics from employers. These early decisions
significantly undermined what had been some of the most common and effective means
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of employer attacks on unions.571 However, these early victories were interspersed
among other Court decisions that narrowed the rights of unions and workers, including
decisions that allowed employers to hire permanent replacement workers, outlawed of sitdown strikes, and required employees suing for wrongful termination to mitigate
damages while waiting for a ruling. By the 1940s, the Court was increasingly handing
down decisions that “progressively chipped away at labor’s rights under the Wagner
Act.”572
This trend accelerated after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, and in the
1950s, the Supreme Court substantially weakened the protest rights of labor. As the
Supreme Court limited, or failed to protect, the most effective union protest tactics, the
labor movement was put squarely on the defensive.573 After reaching 35% of the
workforce in 1953, union membership began a long and steady nationwide decline.574 As
organizing new workplaces and members became more difficult, the labor movement’s
activity and political agenda narrowed significantly. The Supreme Court’s decisions
discouraged unions from challenging economic exploitation and social injustice broadly,
and instead “encouraged responsible unions to accept the social order as a given and to
seek to defend and better the lot of their members only within its ground rules.”575
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Shifting Court doctrine, much like the purging of labor’s left flank, channeled union
activity towards bargaining over the wages and conditions of existing members rather
than expanding membership and broad challenges to existing economic structures.576
The decisions of the Supreme Court had a hand in foreclosing the radical potential
of the NLRA. During the 1940s and 1950s, the possibility of an expansive interpretation
of the NLRA and the rights of workers dimmed, as the Court ultimately “embraced those
aims most consistent with the assumptions of liberal capitalism and foreclosed those
potential paths of development most threatening to the established order.”577 The
Supreme Court’s labor decisions shifted the NLRA’s focus away from redistribution,
equal power, and industrial democracy, centering the NLRA instead on the goals of
industrial peace, collective bargaining as a means of heading off labor militarism, and a
much more limited redistribution of power in the workplace.578 As the Court narrowed
the protections of the NLRA and limited the boundaries of legitimate labor activity, it
shifted power in industrial relations back towards the employer, decisively undermining
the industrial democratic potential (and intent) of the NLRA.
The NAACP Legal Strategy at the Supreme Court
Much like the labor rights cases, Supreme Court decisions in the 1940s and 1950s
helped shift the political center of gravity for groups seeking legal redress for issues
relating to civil rights and racial inequality. This time period was one in which the legal
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understanding of civil rights was in flux. Despite contestation and debate in the early
1940s, a variety of factors, including the Supreme Court’s less sympathetic stance
towards labor rights, federal institutions more open to combating racial discrimination,
the class commitments of the NAACP, and the rising Second Red Scare all contributed to
an eventual postwar settlement on a conception of civil rights centered on seeking redress
from the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause for the intangible and
psychological and harms psychological harms imposed on black Americans by Jim Crow.
This settlement, most famously evident in the 1954 Brown v Board decision, greatly
strengthened the political hand of racial democrats who pressed for equal opportunity for
success in the existing institutional landscape.
As Risa Goluboff has shown, this outcome was certainly not inevitable.
Throughout the early 1940s, the Civil Rights Section (CRS) of the Justice Department
pursued a number of cases that focused first and foremost on the material consequences
of exploitation and discrimination for black laborers. In fact, “the attempts of black
workers to build on the labor and economic rights of the New Deal represented the most
politically promising civil rights issues of the 1940s.”579 The CRS successfully pursued a
number of cases on behalf of black workers, particularly agricultural workers in the
southern sharecropping economy, on the grounds that the certain work arrangements had
violated their Thirteenth Amendment right against involuntary servitude and peonage.
Pursuing relief for the economic claims of black workers allowed the CRS to navigate the
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thorny racial politics of the Democratic Party, since these cases were palatable to
Democratic administrations because they did not directly challenge segregation.580
Furthermore, as Goluboff has argued, relief for the economic consequences of racial
discrimination was actually the highest order grievance for most blacks fighting against
racial discrimination.581 The legal resource and precedents offered by these labor cases
suggested a particularly auspicious avenue for pursuing a conception of civil rights that
included labor freedom and economic rights in addition to racial equality.582
For a brief moment during World War II, the NAACP experimented with a legal
strategy that privileged the economic concerns of black workers, most notably in a
number of cases seeking salary equalization for black teachers teaching in segregated
schools.583 These cases did not attack the segregated nature of workplaces, but rather
sought to improve the material conditions of black workers within segregated
workplaces. However, the NAACP had never viewed the work-related problems as
constituting the primary harm of Jim Crow. The leaders of the organization had always
been much more willing to frame the problem of Jim Crow as one in which whites
singled out blacks for discriminatory treatment in access to government, hotels,
restaurants, theaters, and other social and cultural institutions because this was how they
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were most affected in their personal lives.584 The view emanating from the elites at the
helm of the NAACP was a class-inflected one, as most blacks tended to express more
concern about - and were more affected by - the material consequences of Jim Crow.585
This core commitment by the leaders of the NAACP, coupled with a postwar
international and domestic context that was less friendly to both the labor related cases
and the individuals advocating for a focus on the economic consequences of Jim Crow,
meant that the NAACP was quick to drop its brief flirtation with a labor-centric notion of
civil rights in the 1940s.586 By 1950, the organization had firmly committed to the goal
of overturning Plessy v. Ferguson and eliminating segregation as its top priority regardless of the consequences for black workers in segregated workplaces.
Significantly, the NAACP’s decision to focus on attacking segregation on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds was in part due to federal courts increasing receptivity to
these arguments. In a 1939 article discussing recent Court cases regarding segregation in
education including the 1938 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada decision which
effectively desegregated the University of Missouri Law School, professor of sociology
Henry McGuinn noted that, “an indirect effect on the Court’s decision was to strengthen
the determination of the N.A.A.C.P. to fight segregated educational opportunities.”587
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McGuinn argued that the Court’s increasing openness to Fourteenth Amendment
arguments against segregation “constitutes another reason why those who oppose the
inequality and inferiority which Jim Crow schools impose upon Negroes should rally to
oppose the spread of separate schools into the North and to wipe them out elsewhere.”588
The strategy used in the Gaines case challenging segregation in higher education on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds spurred a number of similar challenges in other states.
The increasing success of this legal argument reinforced the belief among many
civil rights activists that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection argument was the
best means of challenging racial subordination. In a 1947 JNE article, George Johnson,
the dean of Howard University’s Law School, and law student Jane Lewis argued that the
Supreme Court had never decisively settled the question of whether segregation of public
education institutions was constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Stating, “in
the opinion of the writers of this article, the United States Supreme Court has never
squarely held that a state ‘separate school’ law per se discharges a state’s obligation under
the Fourteenth Amendment,” the authors urged continued pursuit of this line of argument
and expressed hope that several cases then working their way through the courts might
find segregation unconstitutional on Fourteenth Amendment grounds.589 In a 1951 JNE
editorial, Charles Thompson, taking stock of mounting court victories, pointed out that
the successful “cases adjudicated thus far have been based upon the ‘equal protection
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clause’ of the Fourteenth Amendment.”590 Thompson argued the result of NAACP’s legal
strategy had meant that “the Court has whittled down Plessy v. Ferguson,” and he urged
civil rights organizations to continue to “take full advantage of this opportunity.”591 The
growing willingness of the courts to accept these arguments had a feedback effect on the
NAACP and others seeking to combat racial subordination. These groups increasingly
rallied behind challenging segregation on Fourteenth Amendment grounds and moved
away from labor related cases that had relied primarily on the Thirteenth Amendment.
The class-inflected nature of the NAACP legal strategy was increasingly apparent
in the cases and the arguments made by NAACP lawyers. The economic position of
individuals influenced the very cases that the NAACP chose to pursue, as the decisions of
the organization and the lawyers themselves were constrained by the need to appeal to the
wealthy and middle class blacks and liberal whites that funded their efforts. As NAACP
Legal Defense Fund lawyer Leroy Clark noted:
[t]here are two ‘clients’ the civil rights lawyer must satisfy: (1) the
immediate litigants (usually black), and (2) those liberals (usually white)
who make financial contributions. An apt criticism of the traditional civil
rights lawyer is that too often the litigation undertaken was modulated by
that which was ‘salable’ to the paying clientele who, in the radical view,
had interests threatened by true social change. Attorneys may not make
conscious decisions to refuse specific litigation because it is too
"controversial" and hard to translate to the public, but no organization
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dependent on a large number of contributors can ignore the fact that the
“appeal" of the program affects fund-raising.592

The fact that the organization was run by black elites, and depended on middle-class and
wealthy individuals for funding meant that many of the cases pursued by the NAACP
were at “the confluence of the personal, professional, class, and racial interests” of welloff blacks.593 Cases focusing on graduate and professional education, transportation,
voting, and the ability to purchase houses were particularly important to black elites.594
By the late 1940s, the NAACP and its lawyers in the Legal Defense Fund lined up
squarely behind a legal strategy committed to the fair incorporation of blacks into the
existing institutional landscape and class structure.
The NAACP’s campaign against racially restrictive housing covenants is an
excellent example of the class-inflected nature of the organization’s legal strategy. Many
cities throughout the United States allowed for racially restrictive housing covenants,
which were private agreements between white property owners not to sell or lease their
property to racial minorities. Ending the practice of these racially restrictive covenants
was one of the top priorities of the NAACP legal team in the 1940s, in no small part
because it was a practice that was particularly insulting to black elites who had the desire
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and resources to move out of racially segregated ghettoes. Thurgood Marshall headed the
team of the NAACP lawyers that successfully challenged the state enforcement of racial
covenants in the 1948 case Shelley v. Kraemer. Marshall and the NAACP had relied
heavily on the research of prominent black social scientists, most notably that of future
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Robert Weaver, sociologists Charles
Johnson and E. Franklin Frazier, and psychologist Herman Long. Relying on the work of
these social scientists in their petition to the Supreme Court, the NAACP lawyers argued
that the segregation of blacks into certain neighborhoods resulted in high-level crime,
juvenile delinquency, dependency, psychological and personality damage, mental
disorders, and social pathology among black individuals and families.595 Furthermore,
these social scientists argued that the damages to black individuals and poor conditions of
the neighborhoods and housing to which blacks were relegated ultimately supported the
racial prejudice of whites.596
As political scientist Preston Smith has shown, the NAACP’s victory in the courts
was followed immediately by attempts of black elites to manage the transition of blacks
into new neighborhoods through occupancy standards. These new occupancy standards,
supported by the American Council of Race Relations and Robert Weaver, were raceneutral rules and regulations attached to property that limited the ways in which the
property could be used, and were designed to limit the integration of nicer neighborhoods
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to those that had the economic resources and behavioral habits of the existing neighbors.
The turn to occupancy standards was an attempt by black elites to ensure that only the
right class of blacks were allowed into certain neighborhoods, and were an attempt to
find a market-friendly tool to eliminate racial segregation in the housing market while
maintaining the stark class segregation of neighborhoods. There was certainly criticism
of the NAACP from blacks who realized that the attack on racially restrictive covenants
would mostly benefit the wealthy. The turn to occupancy standards after the victory in the
Court was roundly criticized as an attempt to restrict access to housing for poor blacks.597
Ultimately, the NAACP’s legal strategy and victory in the Kraemer case
disproportionately reflected the class interests of wealthy and middle class blacks.
The 1948 Shelley v. Kraemer case also marked the first time that the federal
government intervened as an outside party on behalf of the civil rights groups seeking
redress for Fourteenth Amendment violation due to racial discrimination.598 The
increasing willingness of the federal government to intercede on behalf of racial
minorities before the Court was in no small part due to negative consequences that
continued racial discrimination had on the image of the United States abroad. The
amicus brief filed by the Office of the Solicitor General argued that government
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants was a “source of serious embarrassment to
agencies of the Federal Government,” and hindered “the conduct of foreign affairs.”599
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The brief included a statement from the Secretary of State warning that instances of racial
discrimination were widely publicized internationally, and cautioning that “we find it
next to impossible to formulate a satisfactory answer to out critics in other countries” and
that “the existence of discrimination against minority groups in the United States is a
handicap in our relations with other countries.”600 As previously discussed, the
international context provided an opening for the pursuit of a civil rights agenda that
privileged incorporation of racial minorities into the existing institutional landscape. By
the late 1940s, advocates for racial democracy had found powerful institutional support in
the NAACP, the Federal Government, and the Supreme Court.

Brown v. Board
Perhaps the most important indication of this new settlement in the legal arena
was the Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown v. Board decision. Education provided the
NAACP a particularly opportune area to pursue its top priority of overturning the Plessy
v. Ferguson (1896) precedent. In 1952, Thurgood Marshall outlined the plan of attack at
a conference at Howard University hosted by Charles Thompson, editor of the JNE. At
the conference, which took place as Brown v. Board was working it way through the
courts, Marshall made clear that the main thrust of the NAACP’s argument would rely on
an emerging social science literature that focused on the immaterial consequences of
segregation in primary and secondary schools. Instead of focusing on tangible
differences between black and white schools, such as physical facilities, number of
600
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teachers, or amount of funding, the NAACP’s legal strategy would focus on the evidence
that segregation caused “insecurity, self-hate” and “adverse effect[s] on personality
development” in black students.601 As historian Leah Gordon has shown, the postwar era
was a particularly opportune time for this change in legal strategy. Generous federal and
foundation funding for studies examining the psychological effects of prejudice and
segregation had facilitated a decisive shift in the ideological tenor of the social sciences,
and led to a proliferation of studies that identified prejudice and attitudes, rather than
labor exploitation and class struggle, as the source of racial oppression.602 It was these
studies that would form the heart of the NAACP’s argument in Brown v. Board.
The focus on the psychological harm of segregation was distinct from the strategy
that the NAACP had pursued in previous cases involving higher education and
professional schools. The NAACP had experienced some success in cases pursuing
integration in institutions of higher education through arguing that the separate
opportunities provided to white and black students were unequal, most notably in the
Sweatt v. Painter (1950) and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents (1950) cases.
However, as Marshall pointed out at the conference, it would be much more difficult to
win on this argument in primary and secondary education cases, as many states had made
an effort (often in response to, or in an attempt to head off, adverse court decisions) to
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equalize the tangible aspects of black and white schools.603 This fact made the turn to the
immaterial psychological harm that was the focus of many social scientists particularly
attractive to the NAACP lawyers, as it provided them a new avenue of arguing that
separate schools did not (and in fact, could not) provide equal educational opportunities.
The turn to a focus on the psychological effects of segregation was evident in the
oral arguments and briefs submitted by the NAACP in the Brown case. The NAACP
lawyers submitted an extensive appendix with their briefs, entitled “The Effects of
Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science Statement.” This
statement, which was represented as “a consensus of social scientists” and a “summary of
the best available scientific evidence relative to the effects of racial segregation” was
drafted and signed by a number of prominent social scientists, including psychologists
Kenneth and Mamie Clark, anthropologist Allison Davis, and sociologist Ira Reid.604 The
statement emphasized that segregation had the potential to “damage the personality of all
children”605 which could lead to myriad negative consequences including “anti-social and
delinquent behavior,” a “defeatist attitude,”606 and “feelings of inferiority and and doubts
about personal worth.”607 The focus on the immaterial and psychological harm of
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segregation featured heavily in Marshall's oral arguments before the Supreme Court as
well. Marshall's argument before the justices relied heavily on the claim that segregation
in education damaged the personality of children, and thus denied them equal status in
schooling. Marshall stated that “Negro children have road blocks put up in their mind as
a result of this segregation” and this “stamps [them] with a badge of inferiority.”608
Marshall also drew the justices attention to the testimony of Kenneth Clark, who had
examined Leah Carter and found evidence of psychological injury, and warned of the
potential for permanent injury to the mind if students were forced to stay in segregated
schools.609
The argument that segregation caused psychological damage to students was
persuasive, and was cited by the justices in their unanimous decision overturning the
separate but equal doctrine. Much as Marshall had predicted at the 1952 Howard
University conference outlining the NAACP's legal strategy, the justices emphasized that
efforts to equalize black and white schools “with respect to buildings, curricula,
qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other ‘tangible’ factors,” meant their decision
could not be based “on merely a comparison of these tangible factors.”610 Instead, the
608
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decision focused on the immaterial harm of segregation on children, arguing, “[t]o
separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority … that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely to ever be undone.”611 In justifying their decision, the Justices cited Kenneth
Clark, E. Franklin Frazier, and Gunnar Myrdal among others, arguing that new evidence
emanating from social scientists had decisively shown that segregation caused
psychological damage to children; “Whatever may have been the extent of psychological
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern
authority.”612
The Brown decision represented the victory of the NAACP legal vision that
focused on the non-material consequences of segregation. The decision also marked
doctrinal shift in the courts that established that government-backed segregation was
unconstitutional, even in absence of material inequality.613 Law professor Lani Guinier
has noted that through the Brown decision the Supreme Court converted the problems
facing blacks “into a problem of individual psychological dysfunction” and as merely “an
aberration in individuals who disregard relevant information, rely on stereotypes and act
thoughtlessly.”614 This left little room for legal recourse for the widespread material

611

Ibid., 494.

612

Ibid.

613

Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights, 240.

614

Lani Guinier, “From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and the
Interest-Divergence Dilemma,” The Journal of American History 91, no. 1 (2004): 116.

!248

consequences that Jim Crow had imposed on blacks. This was a significant change from
earlier conceptions of civil rights that focused on economic and labor rights.
The Brown decision galvanized support behind the continued push for a civil
rights platform centered on overcoming the specific harms identified by the Court in its
decision, the psychological injury imposed by segregation. In a 1955 JNE article,
Thurgood Marshall and Robert Carter, two of the NAACP lawyers who had argued the
Brown case before the Supreme Court, urged for the continuation of their program,
arguing, “it is important the strongest pressures against the continuation of segregation,
North or South, be continually and constantly manifested… as much as anything else,
this is the key to the elimination of discrimination in the United States.”615 The Brown
decision, and the many court victories before it, refocused the political agendas of a
number of groups and individuals combating racial subordination. The National Council
of Negro Women, a council comprised of over two dozen groups founded by New Dealer
and Works Progress Administration administrator Mary McLeod Bethune, announced
their new focus, saying “[f]ollowing the Supreme Court decision of May 17, 1954, the
Board of Directors of the National Council of Negro Women decided that the program
emphasis for the organization should embrace a program to further the implementation of
the decision.”616 The decision to shift focus was quickly followed by an invitation to
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Kenneth Clark to give the keynote speech at a national conference and the decision to
found a new Interracial Conference to promote interracial understanding.617
The Court victories of the NAACP lawyers received extensive and
overwhelmingly positive coverage in the JNE in the late 1940s and 1950. The articles
appearing in the JNE increasingly embraced the racial democracy framework and the
identification of psychological harm as the paramount harm of racial segregation. This
development is particularly significant given the fierce debates between the racial and
economic democrats in the 1930s and early 1940s. Indeed, many in the economic
democracy camp had made the point that attacking prejudice or segregation without also
attacking the exploitative economic system - which they viewed as the source of
prejudice - amounted to attacking the symptoms while leaving the cause intact. By the
mid-1950s this argument essentially disappeared from the pages of the JNE, as the Court
decision in Brown (and others) reaffirmed the pursuit of desegregation and anti-prejudice
as the paramount goal of black politics. The political agenda shifted accordingly, as
programs focused on interracial contact and education to combat prejudice and
discrimination and improve race relations began to dominate the political landscape.
The post-Brown legal consensus that enshrined psychological damage as the
primary consequence of segregation left little room for legal recourse for the material
consequences - including poor pay, lack of jobs, and lack of job stability - that were often
at the forefront of black complaints about the harms of Jim Crow.618 The consolidation of
617
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this legal and political consensus came at a particularly perilous economic time for black
workers. The 1930s and early 1940s had been a time of significant improvement in the
economic situation of black workers. There was a four-fold increase in the number of
blacks employed by the federal government between 1933 and 1946, and black union
membership exploded from 150,000 in 1935 to 1.25 million by the end of World War
II.619 Although their situation remained decidedly worse than their white counterparts,
black workers continued to make economic gains and considerably reduced the blackwhite income gap in the immediate post-War years.620
By the early 1950s, the economic prospects of black workers (and many white
workers as well) changed considerably. The fatal blow to the industrial democratic
potential of the NLRA dealt by the federal courts and Taft-Hartley legislation greatly
weakened the position of workers and the labor movement, leaving them unable to
effectively combat the destabilization of millions of jobs as companies turned to
automation and moved jobs to open shop states. As the labor movement was forced into
an increasingly defensive position in response to Court decisions and hostile legislation,
the percentage of the workforce that belonged to unions began to decline by 1953.621 At
roughly the same time, the economic fortunes for black workers began to shift, and the
gap between the wages of black workers and white workers actually increased from 1952

619

Marable, Race, Reform, and Rebellion, 13-14.

620

Ibid., 51-52.

621

Sugrue, “Reassessing the History of Postwar America,” 497.

!251

through the end of the decade.622 Indeed, although the late 1940s and the 1950s are often
regarded as a time of prosperity and affluence, this characterization misses the uneven
distribution of the economic gain. By the end of 1950s, over 22% of the population, and
55% of the black population, was living in poverty.623 As the courts facilitated the
disappearance of previous commitments to job guarantees, redistribution of power in the
workplace, and strong economic rights from the political and legal landscape, these
commitments were replaced by the pursuit of a legal and policy agenda centered on
attacking discrimination and prejudice. This new agenda offered considerably fewer
avenues for effective redress of immense economic problems facing black workers.

The Suppression of Individuals and Ideas of the Educational Left
The brutal domestic repression of the left was perhaps the most significant factor
in limiting the potential for an alternative vision of education. As individuals on the left
who had promoted a vision of education grounded in a critique of unfair economic
arrangement were increasingly targeted by Congressional investigations and
organizations from across the political spectrum in the 1940s, the space for this
alternative vision collapsed. The recovering economy and the strained relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union before, during, and immediately after
World War II provided a favorable political environment for opponents to undermine the
influence of the left through challenging their loyalty. This was by far the most effective
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way that social reconstructionism was attacked, and the severe and ever-present
suggestion of political subversion faced by the most prominent members of the
movement were critical to the movement’s eventual demise. Conservative organizations
like the NAM, the American Legion and the Daughters of the American Revolution
accused individuals like John Dewey, Harold Rugg, William Kilpatrick and George
Counts of holding subversive political ideas. These accusation frequently caught the
attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities, (HUAC), and official loyalty investigations were opened on several
of the most important social reconstructionists. The open ended investigations
represented a serious threat to the careers and influence of these individuals, and were a
particularly useful method for undermining the broader movement. A focus on a few of
the most prominent social reconstructionists subjected to these tactics illuminates the
devastating destructiveness of questioning the loyalty of political opponents in the era of
the Second Red Scare.
Red Baiting the Educational Left: John Dewey
John Dewey, the most prominent of the social reconstructionists, was an inviting
target. The FBI had a file on Dewey that dated back to 1930, apparently prompted by
Dewey’s association with the People’s Lobby, a watchdog organization that advocated
good government and public disclosure. Despite turning up nothing in their initial
search, the FBI kept Dewey’s file on hand, and reopened a much more serious
investigation in 1943. This time, the investigation was prompted by the FBI office in
!253

New York, who noted his membership in twenty-one potentially subversive
organizations. The aim of the investigation was to conclude whether Dewey should be
officially classified officially as a “sympathizer,” under the Custodial Detention Index, a
program used to identify potential subversive that might need to be incarcerated in case
of war. Dewey was cleared once again; however; his file remained open and was moved
to the “Subversive Control” section of the FBI.624
Although never officially charged, Dewey was frequently the subject of attacks by
conservative groups. Allen Zoll, perhaps the most infamous of the education red baiters
and the founder of the National Council for American Education (NCAE), whose sole
purpose was to root out progressive ideas and educators from the public school system,
took aim at Dewey directly in the late 1940s in one of his more popular pamphlets
entitled “Progressive Education Increases Delinquency.” Noting that, “the purpose of
education as conceived by John Dewey, George Counts, and their like,” amounted to little
more than a denial of “the necessity of every factor necessary for our survival as a free
people” had “robbed growing youth of the ability to think independently,” and
“blights...the moral standards by which alone a people may maintain a secure, free,
coherent society.”625 Dewey was also specifically targeted by the American Legion,
which published “Your Child is Their Target” in the American Legion Magazine which
accused Dewey and other progressive educators (the article also mentions George
624
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Counts, William Kilpatrick, and Harold Rugg) as a group of “pinkos, commies,
collectivists, and Marxists” that controlled public schools in the hopes of converting
children into Communists.626 Even Dewey’s death did not slow the criticisms or the
investigations.627 In 1957, five years after Dewey’s death, J. Edgar Hoover, the director of
the FBI, requested, “Let me have a summary on John Dewey, the educator who furthered
the idea of progressive education.”628

Red Baiting the Educational Left: Harold Rugg
The investigations and accusations of subversive sympathies made Dewey more
cautious in his writing and activities,629 however, the effects of these investigations on
Dewey paled in comparison to some of his colleagues. The consequences of red baiting
attacks on Harold Rugg are much more apparent. As educational historian Stephen
Foster has noted, “[v]irtually every organization associated with the red scare participated
in reflexive assaults on textbooks.”630 Rugg’s social studies textbook series was subject
to particularly heated criticism, with business groups playing a particularly influential
role in movement to ban Rugg’s textbooks. Perhaps no group was as influential in
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targeting Rugg’s work as the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). In 1941 the
NAM commissioned Ralph Robey to prepare a comprehensive list of textbooks with
extracted quotations in an attempt to “[d]etermine the attitude or point of view presented
by the respective authors with respect to the private enterprise system or the traditional
governmental system of the United States.”631 The report evaluated several of Rugg’s
textbook, and included excerpts that focused on Russia, unemployment, increasing
inequality, and economic planning.632 Although the report remained officially neutral, the
quotations were chosen in such a way to give the impression that Rugg’s textbook were
well outside the mainstream, and hostile to free enterprise. The reaction to report was
swift, with immediate calls for the banning of all of Rugg’s textbooks.633 Other business
groups soon piled on, with the publisher of Forbes Magazine stating he would personally
“insist that this anti-American educator’s text books be cast out,” and the American
Association of Advertisers joining the effort by asking all of its local affiliates to pressure
school boards to no longer buy Rugg’s textbooks.634
The accusations of subversiveness had an immediate and drastic effect on the use
of Rugg’s textbook in public schools across the country. The state of Georgia suspended
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all the use of all of Rugg’s textbooks in 1940 after a police officer affiliated with the
Governor’s home defense corps claimed he had found “communistic doctrines” in Rugg’s
books.635 In a remarkable case in the central Pennsylvania town of Sunburry, all of
Rugg’s textbooks mysteriously disappeared from the junior high school after the School
Board refused demands from the local chapter of the American Legion that they be
removed. The books were the only items missing from an apparent break-in over the
Christmas break. The case went unsolved, perhaps because the police chief called to
investigate the case was also the commander of the local council of the American
Legion.636 In a 1941 editorial, The Milwaukee Sentinel approvingly quoted the Robey
report and called for a ban, and provided a clear articulation of the reasoning behind
much of the attempts to ban of Rugg’s textbook. After noting that “public school children
are being ‘softened’ towards Soviet Russia by radical teachers and textbooks,” the
editorial issued a condemnation of the teaching of any sort of social vision that
challenged the status quo, stating “[o]nly one doctrine should be taught APPROVINGLY
in our schools--that is, AMERICANISM. All other systems but constitutional, free
democracy should be condemned unsparingly.”637
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Activity on the local level soon eventually culminated in attention from HUAC,
which held hearings in 1948 to consider a recommendation to officially ban all textbooks
written by Rugg and two other progressive educators.638 Although the committee
declined to ban Rugg’s books, the accusation of subversiveness was enough to effectively
eliminate the textbook from public schools. Over the course of the attacks on the
textbook’s content, circulation of Rugg’s textbook declined from 289,000 in 1938, to
21,000 in 1944, to essentially zero by the 1950s. After Rugg’s publisher discontinued
production his social studies series under pressure from outside groups, many schools
replaced it with series by Paul Hanna. Hanna had self-consciously crafted his series to
avoid serious engagement with the social and political issues of the day, and actively
attempted to limit the control that social studies teachers had over the parameters of the
curricula. The result was a dispassionate series that proved uncontroversial and popular
with schools throughout the 1940s and 1950s. The decline of Rugg’s textbook, and the
style of those that replaced it, was another damaging blow to the reputation and influence
of the social reconstructionists.639
The attack on his textbook was just one of the was one avenues used to undermine
Rugg and his educational positions in this era. Rugg was also investigated as a potential
subversive individual by the FBI. Rugg’s FBI file did not begin until 1942, and was
apparently created in reaction to the accusations of conservative groups that his textbooks
638
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contained material designed to indoctrinate students with subversive beliefs. Tellingly,
most of the material in the initial file was reprints of articles by conservative critics,
including articles from the NAM and the a business executive associated with the
American Legion. No action was taken, but the Bureau retained a file on Rugg. Another
investigation was started in 1951 in reaction to visit by Rugg to Ohio State University at
the invitation of graduate students in the Education school. The invitation triggered an
immediate outcry from community groups, and opposition from the board of trustees, the
American Legion, and the Governor of Ohio.640 Although Rugg did give a speech at the
University, the backlash caught the attention of the state level Ohio Un-American
Activities Committee and the FBI, which began investigating Rugg under a Security
Matter - C (Communist) classification.641 The 1951 investigation again found little basis
for these attacks and there was apparently no mention or objection to the contents of his
1951 speech at Ohio State University; however the file was filled with attacks on Rugg’s
writings from the 1930s and 1940s.642 These were largely local editorials and pamphlets
from conservative groups, including some from the DAR and the American Legion. The
1951 event began a period of sporadic investigation into Rugg’s subversiveness that
would last until his death in 1960.643 Of particular concern to the FBI during this period
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was his vocal criticism of loyalty investigation in education, and his defense of fired
teachers, a practice that Rugg had engaged in since his affiliation with The Social
Frontier.644 Despite never having been officially charged, and frequently being found
harmless by several investigations, Rugg faced was deemed a potential risk and faced
continuous investigation by the FBI for nearly twenty years.
Red Baiting the Educational Left: Mary Foley Grossman
The investigations proved particularly devastating for personal and professional
careers of many of the educators that had been strong advocates for a pedagogy centered
in investigating the inequalities of the existing social and economic landscape. In the late
1930s Mary Foley Grossman, the Philadelphia teacher and union leader, had been a
respected voice in the education and labor community. Grossman had testified before
Congress in 1937 as an educational expert, urging Congress to increase federal aid to
public education.645 In 1938, as president of nearly 4,000 organized teachers in
Pennsylvania, she led the successful effort to affiliate with the AFT, giving the AFT its
first presence in the state.646 Grossman was a prominent voice warning against the
dangers of reducing academic curriculum to “the 3 R’s,” encouraging greater education
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for workers so they could articulate against employers, and a strong proponent of teachers
unions and greater federal aid to public education.647
By 1939 Grossman had already drawn the attention of HUAC, due to both her
membership in the American League for Peace and Democracy and for her outspoken
opposition to attempts to weaken or overturn the Wagner Act.648 Grossman’s influence
was greatly limited by 1941 in the wake of accusations from Counts’ “right wing”
coalition (see below) that she held subversive political beliefs resulted in her being
pushed out of her leadership position in the national AFT and the revocation of the
charter of her local union. Although these accusations did not immediately threaten her
teaching job, when HUAC turned attention to subversive influences in public education,
Grossman was eventually suspended from her teaching position and interrogated by the
committee. In her 1954 testimony, the accusations that Counts’ coalition had used in the
1940 AFT campaign, as well as the suspension of the Philadelphia local’s charter were
central to the committee’s case against Grossman. Grossman invoked her Fifth
Amendment right against self incrimination as the committee asked her whether she had
ever been a communist or hosted communist meetings in her home, and questioned her
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about the political loyalties of her fellow union members.649 The accusations and
investigation of Grossman effectively destroyed any influence that she may have had
over education policy. The elimination of Grossman’s voice from the national scene
meant the loss of a prominent voice advocating for a pedagogy devoted to tackling social
injustice.
Red Baiting the Educational Left: Doxey Wilkerson
Doxey Wilkerson, a fellow AFT leader ousted in the 1940 elections, suffered a
similar fate as Mary Foley Grossman. Like Grossman, Wilkerson had been a prominent
national voice on education. After gaining his masters degree from the University of
Kansas, Wilkerson began his career as a professor of education at Virginia State
University, moving to Howard University in 1935. As his prominence grew with his
frequent contributions to the JNE throughout the 1930s, in 1937, President Franklin’s
newly appointed Advisory Committee on Education reached out to Wilkerson and hired
him as a researcher. Between 1937 and 1939, the Committee commissioned Wilkerson
for several studies outlining information on federal aid to vocational education, the role
of federal, state, and local governments in education, and the particular educational
challenges of black students. In 1939, the Advisory Committee combined Wilkerson’ s
reports into one volume, Special Problems of Negro Education, and printed and
distributed copies through the Government Printing Office.650 As a result of his work,
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Wilkerson was asked to serve on the National Advisory Committee of the Works Progress
Administration education program, and was eventually hired as an educational specialist
for the Office of Price Administration (OPA) in 1942 and 1943.
Wilkerson’s national profile as an educational expert was also boosted by his
service as a vice president for international affairs of the AFT from 1937-1940, and as a
representative of the American Teacher’ Association, a black teachers association with
over 4,000 members.651 By the late 1930s and early 1940s, Wilkerson was one of the
most prominent national black educational figures. Wilkerson publicly advocated for a
greater federal role in primary and secondary education, encouraged teachers to expose
students to the social injustices of the existing economy, and was firmly committed to the
principles of economic democracy.
Wilkerson’s actions and writings quickly drew the attention of the FBI,
conservative Congressmen, and liberals uncomfortable with his more radical stances. In
the late 1930s, as he made multiple appearances as an expert witness on education before
the Senate Committee on Labor and Education, Wilkerson’s name appeared in a HUAC
investigation of “Un-American Propaganda Activities” because of his connection with the
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International Labor Defense, a suspected communist front group.652 Wilkerson was
ousted from his position at the AFT along with Mary Foley Grossman, by George Counts’
right wing coalition. Following the very public ouster 1940 of Wilkerson and Grossman
from AFT after George Counts’ right wing coalition questioned the loyalties of Wilkerson
and his fellow national officers (see below), the FBI opened an investigation into
Wilkerson. By 1942, the Bureau had concluded that Wilkerson was a communist and
issued a report recommending that he no longer be employed by the Federal Government
despite the fact that at the time there was no official prohibition on communists serving
as federal employees. Although Wilkerson was not immediately terminated, he
ultimately resigned his position a year after the FBI report, at which point he publicly
announced his membership in the Communist Party.653
Despite no longer being employed by the federal government, Wilkerson
continued to draw the attention of Congressional investigations. Wilkerson’s name
showed up frequently in Congressional reports of suspected subversive organizations,
including the American League for Peace and Democracy, the Washington Committee for
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Democratic Action, and the Council on African Affairs.654 Importantly, after Wilkerson
announced that he was a communist, his case became a rallying cry for those looking to
rid the federal government of communists. In his 1947 testimony before HUAC, J. Edgar
Hoover mentioned Doxey Wilkerson’s case, and the failure of the OPA to terminate his
employment despite an FBI report warning of his communist affiliation, as a cautionary
tale.655 Hoover’s testimony resonated with Senator Joseph McCarthy, who began using
Wilkerson’ case as an example throughout the country of the important work done by the
FBI and HUAC.656
After 1943, any past association with Wilkerson had the potential to call an
individual’s political loyalty into question. In his 1950 Senate confirmation hearings to
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge William Henry Hastie was questioned about the
years in which he and Wilkerson were both on the faculty of Howard University and were
both members of the National Negro Congress.657 After President Eisenhower nominated
former Howard faculty member George Johnson to be a member of the Commission on
Civil Rights, Johnson faced similar questions in his Senate confirmation hearing about
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how well he knew, and how close he worked with, Doxey Wilkerson.658 Upon being
nominated to be a federal circuit court judge in 1962, Thurgood Marshall was questioned
over whether he knew or had a relationship with Wilkerson, and if there was any
connection between Wilkerson and the NAACP. Despite the fact that Marshall testified
that he did not know Wilkerson, the first fifty-four pages of the HUAC file on on
Wilkerson were read into the records of the Confirmation Hearing.659 Wilkerson also
came up when President Johnson’s requested an FBI background check on Abe Fortas for
his potential appointment to the Supreme Court in 1964. Fortas’ file includes the fact that
both Fortas and Wilkerson were members of the Washington Committee for Democratic
Action in the early 1940s, and cautioned that Fortas may have once attended a meeting
led by Wilkerson.660
In March of 1953, Wilkerson was subpoenaed to appear before a Senate
committee investigating subversive influence in the educational process. Wilkerson
invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as he was asked about his
involvement with the Communist Party during his time working for the OPA and WPA
and as a faculty member at Howard University.661 However, before invoking his Fifth
Amendment privilege, Wilkerson delivered a statement to Senator McCarthy outlining
658

Nomination of George M. Johnson, of California, to be a Member of the Commission on Civil Rights:
Hearing Held Before Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 86th Cong. 15-17 (1959)
(testimony of George M. Johnson).
659

Nomination of Thurgood Marshall: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, 87th Cong. 124-163 (1962) (statement of Thurgood Marshall, Nominee to be U.S.
Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit).
660

Abe Fortas, Special Inquiry, 11/9/1964 in “Abe Fortas Part 02 of 03,” FBI Records: The Vault, accessed
February 28, 2016, https://vault.fbi.gov/abe-fortas/Abe%20Fortas%20Part%2002%20of%2003.
661

Subversive Influence in the Educational Process, 637-643.

!266

his educational approach and excoriating the committee and its investigation for the
damaging effect it had on education in the country. The remarkable statement, worth
quoting at length, began:
I want to make it clear at the outset that I have nothing but contempt for
the efforts of this subcommittee to subvert academic freedom in the
schools and colleges of our country. I will not cooperate with this
subcommittee’s aim to reduce the people of our Nation to the intellectual
status of robots whose ideas on social and political questions are dictated
by certain congressional committees. My whole career as a student and
teacher has been one of trying to understand and interpret the history,
problems, and development of our society; and I have ever been ready to
proclaim what my studies revealed. This I will continue to do. For more
than 2 decades I have encouraged thousands of young people in my
classes to dig in deeply, to seek answers the basic questions of our time,
and follow with courage the convictions they reach. This, likewise, I will
continue to do.662
After reaffirming his commitment to a pedagogy centered on investigation of social
problems,
Wilkerson asked a number of rhetorical questions to highlight what he viewed as the
political motivations of the committee. Wilkerson suggested that the subpoena was
motivated by his opposition to “the drive to war and fascism which this subcommittee
seeks to abet,” his history of “investigating and exposing the abominable school
conditions to which Negro children are subjected in much of the country,” his public
advocacy for “the Socialist reorganization of our society.”663 Finally, Wilkerson hinted
that the motivation for his appearance was due to fact that “this subcommittee believes
that, by running me through its inquisitorial mill, it will thereby help intimidate other
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Negro leaders, other educators, other students into silence.”664 Despite the fact that the
committee learned little from Wilkerson’s March testimony, he was called before a
different Senate subcommittee investigating communist infiltration of Army civilian
workers six months later, where he again invoked his Fifth Amendment rights.665
Wilkerson eventually renounced his membership in the Communist Party in 1957,
and was hired as a professor of education at Bishop College, a black college in Marshall,
Texas. After a few quiet years at Bishop, Wilkerson participated in student-led protests
and demonstrations against segregation in Marshall in 1960. Before long, Wilkerson’s
identity and past association were reported by the press and widely publicized by those
critical of the demonstrations. Facing intense pressure from the press and donors, the
college president requested that Wilkerson resign, and when Wilkerson refused, he was
fired. Much like his earlier activities, the events at Marshall were recorded and
publicized by a Congressional subcommittee investigating subversive individuals.666
Over a period of twenty years, Wilkerson’s political beliefs had cost him his his semiregular column in the JNE, his leadership position in the AFT, and his ability to work as a
public employee. Additionally, Wilkerson became a threat to the personal and
professional lives of friends, allies, and organizations that he had interacted with.
Wilkerson’s former prominence and influence, along with his educational ideas, had been
effectively eliminated from the nation’s educational scene.
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Red Baiting the Educational Left: George S. Counts
Perhaps the clearest indication of the devastating effect that the changed political
context had on the prospects for a vision of education grounded in a critique of unfair
economic and social arrangements can be seen in changing views of George Counts.
Counts faced questions over his loyalty almost immediately in the wake of the first
publication of The Social Frontier. The journal dedicated an entire issue to the covering
the attacks on Counts and other educators from noted newspaper magnate and red baiter
William Hearst.667 The apparent initial popularity of the social reconstructionist
movement prompted heated attacks on Counts. For example, a call by National
Education Association (NEA) for higher taxation on the wealthy and the proclamation
emanating from the 1934 National Convention of School Superintendents that,
“educational workers of America must band themselves together now in a powerful union
to create tens of thousands of citizens groups to study critical economic and social
problems,” prompted prominent anti-New Deal educator William Wirt to charge Counts
with attempting to create an “ultra-radical sentiment among our people, which will force
the country over the precipice and into the abyss of Communism.”668 Counts was also
subject to continuous attacks from the conservative groups that seemingly specialized in
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this form of character assassination, the American Legion, the NCAE, the DAR and the
American Council of Churches.669
As these accusations put Counts on the defensive, they also drew the attention of
the FBI and HUAC. The FBI opened its investigation into Counts in 1942, largely due to
his affiliation with various suspected front organizations.670 Although the initial
investigation found that Counts expressed “pro-Russian sympathy,” it concluded that he
was likely not a communist.671 Counts continued to face accusations despite his
increasingly vocal opposition to the Soviet Russia and vigorous efforts to eliminate
communist influence from several organizations he was involved with by 1940. Much
like Ralph Bunche (and others), the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact appears to have greatly
upset Counts, and drove him to reconsider his previously sympathetic view of Soviet
Russia. By 1939, Counts had publicly denounced Stalin and soon turned his attention
towards driving communists out of Popular Front organizations. Perhaps most
significantly, he led a coalition in 1940 to challenge the leadership of the national
American Federation of Teachers (AFT), which he charged with being too close to the
Communist Party.
The leadership Counts sought to oust included Doxy Wilkerson, a professor of
education at Howard University, and Mary Foley Grossman, a middle-school teacher and
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union leader from Philadelphia. Both Grossman’s and Wilkerson’s view of the purpose
of education was in line with the social reconstructionist ideals of what Counts had
advocated in the early 1930s. Both had outlined their views in the JNE, where Wilkerson
also had a recurring column.672 Although Wilkerson's and Grossman’s educational
philosophy was closely aligned with Counts’, after 1939, Counts was no longer willing to
collaborate with individuals he considered too close to the Communist Party. He led a
coalition seeking to oust Wilkerson and Grossman, arguing that keeping the existing
leadership in charge would do irreparable harm to the AFT. Counts and his allies,
successfully defeated the existing leadership in the 1940 A.F.T. election and Counts took
over as President of the organization in 1941.673
One year after the election, Counts and the other newly elected officers moved to
revoke the charters of three of the largest and most active local unions on the grounds that
they were dominated by communists. Counts and the new executive council publicly
introduced the charges against locals 5 and 537 of New York City (one represented
elementary and secondary teachers, the other represented college teachers) as well as
local 192 of Philadelphia in a lengthy and detailed document entitled The Executive
Council’s Proposal to Save the AFT. Evidence against these locals included the fact that
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the union publication had been insufficiently critical of the “Stalin-Hitler pact”, and had
reported on the activities of pro-communist organizations such as the National Negro
Congress and the American League for Peace and Democracy. Mary Foley Grossman,
who was the president of the Philadelphia local, was one of the few individuals named in
the report. She was singled out for particularly harsh treatment in the document because
of her continued opposition to the newly elected national officers.674 This would prove
quite damaging for Grossman when she was called before HUAC in the 1950s. The
successful effort to revoke the charters of these locals, which by Counts’ own admission
were some of the most active, is a clear indication that by the early 1940s the changing
international context was already creating damaging fissures among left oriented
educators.675
In 1944 Counts led a similar effort to rid the American Labor Party (ALP), an
organization he had founded a decade earlier, of communist influence. In 1944, Counts,
who was then chairman of the ALP and its roughly 400,000 voters, was challenged by
Sidney Hillman, the president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. Counts ran a
campaign in which he accused Hillman making common cause with communists. During
the campaign, he warned that if he lost, he and his supporters would “not remain in the
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party and serve as a front for Communists.”676 After Hillman’s coalition won an
overwhelming victory, Counts and his allies left the party he had founded, and vowed to
form a splinter group without communists, and declared the “death of the A.L.P.”677
Counts’ efforts and public accusations would provide significant fodder for red-baiting
Congressmen in the near future.
For Counts, active participation in anti-communist efforts was not enough to clear
his name from suspicion of being a subversive person. Counts continued to be a person
of interest to Congressional committees investigating the influence of subversive
individuals in public employment and private organization. Counts’ name appeared in a
number of reports throughout the 1940s because of his past association with now suspect
organizations including the National Committee for Defense of Political Prisoners, the
Union for Democratic Action, the National Committee for Student Congress Against War,
the American Student Union, and the Consumers Union.678 Counts’ name and his book
Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order? were repeatedly invoked in Congressional
testimony by conservatives as a means of combatting federal funding for public education
and of smearing political opponents. For example, opponents of the Public School
Assistance Act of 1949 pointed to the subversive nature of Dare the Schools build a New
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Social Order? and Counts’ advocacy for greater federal funding of education as a means
of attacking the increased federal funding and involvement in public elementary and
secondary schools.679
The situation for Counts became more serious in 1951 when a former European
communist claimed Counts was a hidden “member at large” of the Communist Party.680
Another investigation was launched as a result of this information, it again failed to
conclude that Counts’ was a communist. However, this most recent accusation appeared
to put Count on the radar of the HUAC. Although the Committee apparently found no
new evidence, it still issued 19 citations against Counts for communist leanings in early
1952.681 Given that Counts was not employed in the Federal government, these citations
would not lead to his loss of employment, but it represented a serious threat to his
reputation, and potentially to any individual or organizations with which he interacted.
Counts took the latest charges quite seriously as evidenced by his drastic response
to the actions of the HUAC. Shortly after the citations were issued, Counts gave
speeches in March of 1952 at two universities in Pennsylvania where he renounced
communism and, more significantly, much of his social reconstructionist positions. Both
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speeches were apparently devoted to criticisms of the Soviet Union and communism,682
indicated by the title of his second speech, “The Soviet System of Thought Control.”683
In a moment that offered a stark contrast to his earlier writing, Counts excoriated the
Soviets for encouraging their populace to pursue the “the vision of an ideal society some
place just around corner.”684 Counts also used the speeches to outline a new social vision.
He claimed that America’s best course was to seek, “military strength first of all.”685 The
role for teachers was quite limited, but he did urge educators to teach students about
Russia in order to bolster their self-defense against the dangerous Soviet ideology. If
there was any doubt that Counts still subscribed to his earlier writings, he eliminated it in
the question and answer section of one of his Pennsylvania speeches. Asked specifically
about his position outlined in Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order that teachers
ought to lead the nation towards a collectivist social transformation, Counts replied, “I
once believed that, but I don’t anymore.”686
Counts’ recantation did little to satiate his critics, who still frequently protested
his speeches and questioned his political loyalties. Counts continued to move farther
away from his previous positions, eventually claiming in 1954 that “a Communist has no
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right to teach in the schools of a free society.”687 Although this movement away from
social reconstructionism did not quiet his critics, it did strain the relationships he had with
former progressive educators. Harold Rugg and Counts’ had an apparent falling out over
Counts’ subdued reaction to the dismissal on loyalty grounds of twenty-one teachers from
Brooklyn College. According to his widow, Rugg resented Counts for fanning the flames
of red-baiting, and their relationship never fully recovered.688
This type of damage to personal relationships was a common occurrence during
this era, as investigations of individuals resulted in the broader destruction of networks
and coalitions on the left.689 Beyond the hundreds of teachers that lost their positions
due to political their political beliefs, the suffocating atmosphere of the Second Red Scare
greatly limited what could taught in the classroom. Subjects that were central aspects of
a left vision of education such as trade unionism and capitalism became essentially off
limits.690 The active suppression of the individuals and ideas of the political left
dramatically shifted the center of gravity in terms of national educational vision.

Conclusion
Perhaps the height of the repression of economic democracy and social
reconstructionist visions of education, a HUAC investigation into subversive activity in
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education, coincided with the Supreme Court’s momentous decision in the Brown case.
These developments resulted in a political environment that proved to be particularly
amenable to the educational vision and particular pedagogical approaches advocated by
racial democrats and social efficiency progressives. As the Red Scare eliminated the
influence of economic democrats and social reconstructionists and the Courts
demonstrated increasing responsiveness to arguments relying on the non-material
inequities of segregation, the stage was set for the consolidation of a liberal
incorporationist educational vision centered on providing equal opportunity for success
within the existing economic system. The growth of educational movements advocating
for intercultural education, life adjustment education, and greater use of testing in the
1950s was clear indication that mainstream education ideas had shifted firmly away from
the vision of the economic democrats and social reconstructionists.
The Brown decision gave substantial support to an intercultural education
movement that framed racial subordination as primarily a problem psychology and
attitudes. As detailed in Chapter 3, the basis for the intercultural education movement
was the belief that racial tensions and prejudice stemmed primarily from fundamental
misunderstandings between, and misconceptions about, different races, in part due to the
lack of direct interaction of individuals of differing races. These prejudices resulted in
the lack of equal opportunities for success for individuals of different races. Advocates of
intercultural education had long pushed for integration and greater interaction between
students of a different races as a means of combatting racial prejudice, along with a
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curricular emphasis on the fundamental similarities of different races, particularly in
terms of intellectual ability.691 The arguments of the NAACP, and much of the basis for
the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, were fundamentally similar to those of
intercultural education advocates, relying heavily on the idea that segregation caused
feelings of inferiority in black students and contributed to the prejudice of white children.
Both the intercultural education movement, and the Brown decision downplayed the idea
of an economic dimension to racial prejudice or subordination, instead framing the issue
as primarily a non-material, attitudinal one.692 The ultimate goal was to break down
racial misunderstandings to encourage racial harmony, and to ensure that opportunity was
not distributed on the basis of an arbitrary category like race, but instead tied closer to a
meaningful category such intellectual merit.
The destruction of the personal lives and coalitions on the left also had an effect
on education policy. As it became increasingly difficult to openly advocate for a vision
of education centered on challenging exploitative economic arrangements and the social
injustice, a vision of education centered on fairly and effectively adjusting individuals to
succeed in the existing institutional landscape. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, racial
democrats and scientific efficiency progressives had long advocated for a form of
adjustment education for students that emphasized improving the skills, culture and
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behaviors that students brought to the labor market. Racial democrats argued that
adjustment education would prepare black students to compete on equal footing with
their white counterparts, ultimately leading to a economic distribution based on merit
rather than race. Similarly, adjustment education offered hope to the poor as well, as it
could provided the skills needed to earn a living in a changing labor market.
Importantly, this educational vision garnered the support of many conservatives who saw
the benefit of having the education system carry the burden of workforce training.693
With their voices marginalized, educators on the left were unable to effectively combat a
vision of education that sought to adjust the student to existing structures, rather than
challenge them.
Finally, the changing political context of the 1940s and 1950s proved to be a boon
for advocates of standardized testing in education. The use of intelligence and aptitude
tests by the military during World War II convince many of their potential usefulness for
the education system.694 Scientific efficiency progressives had long pushed for the use of
intelligence testing, achievement tests, and student tracking as the best means of
developing teaching methods and of aiding in assigning students to jobs that were most
appropriate for their skill set. This was essentially identical to the position of racial
democrats, who were proponents of testing as a means of identifying future race leaders
and of identifying effective (and ineffective) educational methods and teaching. In the
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aftermath of the Brown decision ending segregation in public education, racial democrats
were increasingly committed to testing as comparing the educational opportunities
between black and white students through comparing scores on achievement tests.695 The
use of standardized testing in education had been vigorously opposed by many on the
educational left, who believed that these tests promoted excessive individualism,
competitiveness, a narrowing of the curriculum and routinization that were antithetical to
their educational vision.696 As the changing political context weakened the strength of
these critiques, and the ability of individuals to make them, testing advocates faced less
opposition.
The consequences of the changing political context of the 1940s and 1950s for
educational ideology were profound. Shifting Supreme Court doctrines, the rising
Second Red Scare, and the increasingly hostile international engagements with the Soviet
Union all drastically reduced the political space for a vision of education that was critical
of the existing economic landscape. As developments in the 1940s and 1950s
marginalized those promoting economic democracy and social reconstruction, the
educational vision of racial democrats and scientific efficiency progressive increasingly
began to define the purpose and methods of education. This new order was committed to
695
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ensuring equality of educational opportunity as a means of ensuring fair and effective
incorporation into the existing market economy. As education was increasingly
positioned as social policy that could effectively combat racism, racial inequality, poverty
and effectively prepare individuals for the demands of the workforce, it became
increasingly attractive to policymakers looking for a means of addressing these social ills.
The stage was set for the consolidation of the liberal incorporationist educational order.
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Chapter Five
The Victory of Liberal Incorporationism: The Great Society and the Origin of
Punitive Education Policies

By the 1960s, the changing political context of the 1940s and 1950s helped
cement a liberal incorporationist understanding of the purpose of education firmly in the
minds of the education community. The contestation and changes in the dominant
understandings of the purpose of education were mirrored by a number of similar
developments in other policy areas, most notably broad economic and unemployment
policy. Significantly, by the mid-1940s, policymakers within the Democratic Party began
to abandon the New Deal commitment to full employment, economic redistribution
through progressive taxation, and public job guarantees.
The timing of the ideological victory by the liberal incorporationists would prove
auspicious as these policymakers increasingly looked for new policy avenues to address
the problems of unemployment, poverty, and racial inequality that could fit with a new
preference for economic stimulation through tax cuts. The liberal incorporationist
understanding positioned education policy as an effective means of addressing all three of
these pressing social issues without committing the Democratic Party to the massive
federal expenditures of a New Deal-type policy agenda. As the Democratic Party turned
its attention to education policy, it relied heavily on the liberal incorporationist ideology
and methods in crafting the programatic structure of the nascent federal education state.

!282

This chapter traces how the ideological developments and the dominant position
of a liberal incorporationist understanding of education were institutionalized into the
federal education state by Democrats in the 1960s. The chapter begins with a brief
overview of current scholarship on the development of federal education policy. It then
analyzes the demise of the commitment to full employment and public jobs within the
Democratic Party, and the rise of commercial Keynesian and human capital approaches to
economic growth within the Democratic Party. The chapter next outlines the ideological
understanding of poverty that provided the basis for the War on Poverty and positioned
education as a particularly effective policy area to address both poverty and racial
inequality. The liberal incorporationist understanding of the purpose of education was
able to easily accommodate itself to new ideological explanations of social problems such as human capital theory and culture of poverty theory - in large part because these
new theories also refocused attention and explanations of economic status on the
individual rather than the broader economic forces or labor market structures.
With the passage of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA),
these ideological perspectives helped institutionalize the liberal incorporationist order in
federal education policy. As a result, the ideological foundation and programmatic
structure of the federal education state that emerged with the passage of the ESEA was
one that incorporated an understanding of public education’s purpose as correcting
individual deficiencies in order to improve economic outcomes and reduce racial
disparities. This understanding resulted in the early adoption of punitive policies in
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federal education policy with immediate substantial consequences for black educational
workers, and continues to provide the basis for much of the punitive policies of the
modern education state.
Current Interpretations
Much of the recent literature on the elementary and secondary public education
system attempts to grapple with the apparent shift towards education focused on using
standardized test scores as an evaluative tool with which to hold schools, teachers, and
students accountable, increasingly though punitive means. Reforms to the 1965
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in the 1980s expanded its reach to all
children in Title I schools, not just the disadvantaged. Reforms of the 1990s and early
2000s brought new regulations that required states to drastically increase compliance and
sanction activities if they wished to continue receiving federal aid. The most recent
reauthorization of the ESEA, the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, requires that every
state come up with its own system of standards and system of measuring achievement of
these standards. As a means of holding schools accountable, the law requires that schools
that fail to meet benchmarks of achievement be subject to punitive sanctions. A
bipartisan coalition of federal policymakers has increasingly turned towards punitive
measures, ranging from forced firing of staff to reconstitution as privately run charter
schools, to hold schools accountable for their perceived performance failures.
Several researchers have commented on the inequitable distribution of negative
effects of such practices such as a narrowed curriculum, harsh academic and behavioral
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punishment for students, increased segregation, and the limited focus on the test scores of
a small population of “borderline” students.697 Others have praised the punitive
accountability approach, claiming it is the best approach for ensuring excellence and
equality in a troubled public schooling sector.698

While disagreement exists on the

appropriateness of a turn towards sanctions, there appears to be little disagreement that
this represents a significant departure from past practices. The current understanding of
the rise of punitive accountability education policies asserts an origin in the 1980s.
Several scholars have pointed to the ESEA as the pinnacle of the Great Society’s attempt
to attack inequality and poverty, with initial success rolled back by conservative
mobilization around the school choice and standards movement, and a renewed focus on
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‘excellence’ rather than ‘equity’ in education.699 Although identifying powerful truths
about the current trends in education policy, much of this literature fails to account for the
extent to which the current regime of punitive sanctions is consistent with the vision of
many liberal supporters of the original ESEA. Situating the ESEA in broader debates
about unemployment and poverty clarifies that as liberals achieved a victory in
institutionalizing a federal role in education, they did so on largely on liberal
incorporationist ideological terms.
The ideological commitments that the coalition of liberals relied on to justify the
expansion of federal authority in the realm of education ultimately contributed to a
deeply problematic interpretation of the purpose and problems of public education. The
ESEA institutionalized a federal role in education and laid the foundation for the rise of
punitive policies and the obsession with test scores and achievement gaps by positioning
education as poverty and unemployment policy. Despite the long-standing educational
findings of limited ability of schools or teachers to affect test scores, and a surge in recent
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scholarship that has questioned the connection between education and pay and
employment, this dynamic continues to dominate federal education policy.700
The origins of these current trends trace back to the educational politics and
policies of the 1960s. Although liberal incorporationists succeeded in institutionalizing a
federal role in elementary and secondary education policy during the Great Society, they
did so on terms that quickly led to punitive policies of sanctions and test-based
accountability. By the 1960s, Democrats had adopted a more limited economic
philosophy that precluded direct government programs aimed at job creation or income
supplements. This shift reinterpreted the problems of unemployment and poverty as of
individual deficiencies rather than of broader problems with the market economy. With
this development, education became the main policy by which Great Society liberals
would try to attack unemployment and poverty. The entrance of the federal government
into the elementary and secondary education policy realm was premised on this shift in
the economic policies of liberals.
The particular economic turn that justified federal investment in education was
crucial in shaping the policies that emerged. The emphasis on reporting and evaluation
and the concern about holding schools accountable for results was driven by the belief
that equitable distribution of education and achievement would go a substantial way
towards eliminating unemployment and poverty. The federal education state was
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engineered on a fundamentally liberal incorporationist foundation that assumed education
could solve the problem of poverty and unemployment through increasing the
achievement scores of individuals and closing the achievement gap between targeted
populations. Federal investment in education was coupled with an emphasis on reporting
and evaluation and the concern about holding schools accountable for results.
The Problem of Unemployment: From Full Employment to ESEA
The year 1965 saw not only the passage of the (ESEA) but also the
implementation of the first tax cuts as a form of Keynesian economic management policy.
Although the significance of the connection between these two policies may not be
immediately apparent, a brief account of the changing federal employment policy
illuminates the importance of the connection. The implementation of the 1965 tax cut
represented the consolidation of a form of commercial Keynesianism that cast
unemployment as a problem primarily of individual deficiencies in skills and education.
The victory of this brand of Keynesianism had important consequences not only for
employment policy, but helps explains the newfound interest at the federal level in a
sweeping education bill. An account of the rise of commercial Keynesianism and the
interpretation of unemployment that accompanied it is crucial in understanding the
federal turn toward education, the populations targeted, the types of programs pursued,
and the results expected from the ESEA.
The staggering events of the Great Depression opened the door to a
reconsideration of the strict balanced budget approach to economic management that
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presidents of both political parties had largely pursued. The closing of nearly 40% of the
nation’s banks as well as the unemployment of one out of every four workers ushered in
fevered period of legislative activity, including the expansion of social insurance with the
Social Security Act and a host of programs aimed at the problem of unemployment.701
However, this increased activity did not initially represent a commitment by President
Franklin Roosevelt to use government spending as a means of economic recovery.
Rather, he remained committed to a balanced budget and viewed the increased
expenditures as temporarily necessary to ease the worst effects of the Depression for the
unemployed and vulnerable.702 However the return of economic recession at the end of
1937 ultimately convinced Roosevelt to pursue spending as a tool of stabilization. The
1938 announcement of a plan to expand expenditures by $7 billion represented a decisive
step towards the use of fiscal policy as a means of economic recovery.703
The turn toward this type of economic management found an intellectual basis in
John Maynard Keynes’s 1936 book, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and
Money. Keynes provided guidelines for how aggressive fiscal policy could help prevent
economic recessions that radically differed from the conventional belief that general
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wage reduction was the best means of combatting economic depressions.704 Within
Keynes’s broad commitment to the maintenance of a market economy, his theory “offered
policy formulations which differed significantly in their ideological, political, and
economic potentials.”705 These varied policy recommendations, ranging from the
maintenance of low interest rates through central control to the more progressive option
of active use of government spending to augment private investment, meant that the
Keynesian label was potentially attractive to a broad swath of the ideological spectrum.
The Keynesian policies initially pursued by the federal government in the wake of
the recession of 1937 and 1938 stemmed from a progressive brand of Keynesianism
know as “secular stagnation.” According to the stagnationists, the slowing of population
growth and technological innovation coupled with the end of territorial expansion meant
that the United States had reached a stage of economic maturity in which stagnation was
a natural condition of a capitalist economy. The appropriate response to this fundamental
disability of the market economy was continued government investment to regenerate
growth.706 On the policy side this meant large programs of social spending and public
works funded by highly redistributive taxation that would decrease unemployment and
inject money into the economy when required.707 This was the course advocated by the
704
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leading stagnationist, Harvard economist Alvin Hansen, one of many stagnationists who
served in an advisory capacity to the Roosevelt administration in the 1940s.708 Hansen
was an advisor on the National Resources Planning Board, a site of institutional strength
for the stagnationists, and helped craft the administration’s 1944 endorsement of an
economic bill of rights, including the right to work.709 The introduction of the Full
Employment Bill of 1945 by liberal Senator James Murray (D-MT) was the high point of
stagnationist influence over economic and employment policy.
The Full Employment Bill of 1945 was based on the assumption that private
business would be unable to fulfill the required investment to stimulate full employment,
thus necessitating federal expenditure to bridge the gap. The bill sought to create a
permanent role for the federal government in regulating the economy, committing the
government to expenditures necessary to secure the right to work for all Americans
seeking employment. Importantly, the bill was based on the belief that unemployment
largely represented a fundamental weakness in the market economy rather than in
unemployed individuals. The attempt to build powerful planning agencies capable of
injecting large sums into the economy was seen as the most appropriate means of
ensuring that these individuals were not unfairly unemployed by forces beyond their
control.
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Despite passing by an overwhelming margin in the Senate, the Full Employment
Bill of 1945 was ultimately defeated in Congress by a coalition of business groups,
southern Democrats, and Republicans. Margaret Weir notes that the southern politicians
were afraid that the Full Employment Bill would mean an increase in federal oversight
over local farm labor and wage rates and ultimately threaten the racial caste system that
depended on the economic subordination of black Americans. The one-party nature of
southern politics meant southern Congressmen occupied disproportionately powerful
positions, particularly within the powerful committees of each chamber.
Congressman Carter Manasco (D-AL), the chair of the House Expenditures
Committee that handled the Full Employment Bill in the House of Representatives, was
pivotal in the bill’s defeat.710 Additionally, after passage in the Senate, various business
groups led by the Chamber of Commerce mobilized opposition to the bill by charging it
as a form of socialism that threatened free enterprise and “the American way of life.”711
Business opposition was also grounded in a broader strategy to curb organized labor’s
political power.712 This opposition resulted in the abandonment of the Senate bill, and the
passage of the alternative Employment Act of 1946. Written by conservative Mississippi
Democrat Will Whittington, the new act abandoned the idea of employment as a
government guaranteed right as well as a centralized planning agency committed to
federal spending a means of achieving full employment. In place of the national planning
710
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agency the bill established the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), which would prove
to be an important avenue for the advancement of a more conservative, business-friendly
version of Keynesianism in the executive branch. Criticized by Alvin Hansen as little
more than “window dressing,” the 1946 Employment Act was endorsed by the Chamber
of Commerce and passed by an overwhelming margin in the House and was unanimously
approved in the Senate.713
The defeat of the Full Employment Bill marked a turning point in the battle over
employment policy and over the direction of which style of Keynesian economic
management policies would be pursued. Robert Collins argues that facing the broad
acceptance and influence of Keynesianism among economists in wake of World War II
provision of “striking evidence of the effectiveness of government expenditure on a huge
scale,” many in the business community sought to work within the new consensus to
promote more business-friendly Keynesian policies.714 The defeat of the Full
Employment Bill marked a fortuitous moment for this move, as a rising number of
economists began to question the tenets of secular stagnationists in the wake of strong
demand for goods and labor in the postwar years.
Abandoning its previous attachment to a strictly balanced budget approach, the
business community coalesced around a particular version of Keynesianism that offered a
strikingly different interpretation of unemployment and policy prescriptions than the
secular stagnationists. Rejecting the view that unemployment represented a fundamental
713
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weakness of the market economy, the advocates of commercial Keynesianism instead
argued that, “the demand for labor periodically fluctuates, being sometimes excessive and
inflationary and at other times deficient.”715 Explaining changes in economic growth and
joblessness as the result of economic fluctuations, commercial Keynesians argued that the
fiscal role of government should be limited to temporarily moderating these business
fluctuations. Commercial Keynesians advocated tax cuts and automatic stabilizers rather
than direct spending as the policy mechanisms of choice for dealing with these economic
fluctuations. Although nominally committed to pursuing high levels of employment, this
goal competed with concerns about inflation and the desire to restrain the growth of the
federal budget.716
With the abandonment of the notion of the market economy as fundamentally
flawed, many Keynesians turned towards explanations for unemployment that focused on
the individual. Although normal business fluctuations would lead to some
unemployment, it would not affect all workers equally. Commercial Keynesians argued
that those affected would largely be the most marginal workers, those with little skill or
ability to adapt to the changing demands of the labor market, a view largely borrowed
from the increasingly popular human capital theory. Human capital theory, which posits
that resources such as education, specific skills or personality traits possessed by the
individual determine the worth of labor that an individual brings to the marketplace,
715
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quickly gained acceptance across the political spectrum as an explanation for why
individuals were poor or jobless.717 Human capital theory offered an interpretation of
wage earning not as the result of work performed, or as the result of political struggle
between labor and management, or of structural conditions imposed by the broader
economic system, but rather as a result of the yield on investment in an individual’s
human capital.718 As economist Gary Becker argued, “because observed earnings are
gross of the return on human capital, some persons earn more than others simply because
they invest more of themselves.”719
As human capital theory gained credibility with policymakers, the solution to
unemployment and poverty was increasingly phrased in how best to increase the human
capital of certain individuals rather than the direct provision of jobs or income
supplements.720 The growing critiques of the stagnationists and the rehabilitated image
of business in the postwar years provided an opening for the emergence of a version of
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Keynesianism that envisioned a drastically limited role for federal government that was
much more appealing to the business community.
The victory of the commercial Keynesian viewpoint was evident by 1964 in both
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s State of the Union Address announcing the War on
Poverty as well as his Economic Report to Congress, which was delivered along with the
annual report of the CEA. Arguing that, “a lack of jobs and money is not the cause of
poverty, but the symptom,”721 Johnson noted that “far too long, our economy has labored
under the handicap of a Federal income tax rates born of war and inflation,”722 and
identified the “release of $11 billion of tax reduction into the private spending stream to
create new jobs,” as the most immediate solution to the problem of unemployment.723
The CEA praised the Johnson tax bill in its annual report to Congress, echoing the call for
“a large reduction in corporate taxes, a cutback of risk-inhibiting top bracket individual
tax rates, and a further broadening of the investment credit” as these would “insure the
increase in demand necessary to provide markets for our growing productive potential”
and “encourage investment.”724 But the CEA report, in a move that would be repeated by
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President Johnson and other Great Society liberals, coupled the emphasis on tax cuts with
policies aimed at easing what it knew would be the increased job insecurity for millions
of Americans by advocating increased focus on vocational education and unemployment
insurance. The report also stated: “In our concern with the problems of today’s
unemployed, it should not be forgotten that a strengthened system of basic education will
be the best guarantee against significant problems of displacement and dislocation in
tomorrow’s full-employment economy.”725 These policies were based on the assumption
that jobs were available for all who were qualified, turning the focus squarely on the
deficiencies of the individual.
The adoption of the commercial Keynesian management policy and the broad
acceptance of human capital theory brought education into the spotlight as a crucial piece
of the policy solution to the problem of unemployment. This shift was evident in 1963
hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower, which heard
seven days of testimony relating on the importance of education as an important part of
the Manpower needs of the nation. Francis Keppel, the Commissioner of Education,
described unemployment as in part a problem of “the fit between the educational
arrangements in the United States and the nature of the labor market ... the gears are not
joining successfully.”726 He argued that, “Manpower development is education.
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Education is manpower development ... the only way we can develop our manpower
resources fully and effectively is to develop our whole educational system.”727 This
sentiment was echoed repeatedly throughout the days of testimony, perhaps most
forcefully by Dr. Grant Venn, a representative from the American Council on Education.
Claiming that an individual’s “job is more than ever a function of his education,” Dr.
Venn argued for a renewed focus on the relationship between the labor market and
education since “without a job a man is lost and without educational preparation few jobs
are available.”728 This testimony helped shape the 1963 Manpower Development and
Training Act, which was premised on the belief “that an individual is unemployed
because he lacks a marketable skill.”729
In 1964 attention shifted more directly to education and the appropriate role for
the federal government. President Johnson pledged to “put education at the head of our
work agenda,” and soon followed through by submitting the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (ESEA) to Congress in 1965.730 In his statement accompanying the bill,
Johnson stated;

The purpose of this legislation is to meet a national problem. This
national problem is reflected in draft rejection rates because of basic
educational deficiencies. It is evidenced by the employment and
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manpower retraining problems aggravated by the fact that there are over 8
million adults who have completed less than 5 years of school. It is seen
in the 20-percent unemployment rate of our 18- to 24-year-olds ... The
solution to these problems lies in the ability of our local elementary and
secondary school systems to provide full opportunity for a high quality
program of instruction in the basic educational skills because of the strong
correlation between educational underachievement and poverty.731
President Johnson’s reasoning reflected that of the CEA, which had argued that, “the
chief reason for low rates of pay is low productivity, which in turn can reflect lack of
education or training, physical and mental disability, or poor motivation.”732 The CEA
had also suggested a renewed focus on primary and secondary education by noting, “ if
children of poor families can be given skills and motivation, they will not become poor
adults.”733 The increased federal interest in education by Great Society liberals was
driven by the reinterpretation of unemployment and underemployment as a problem of
individual deficiencies in human capital rather than as an indication of a fundamental
weakness of the market economy.
Understanding that the interest in federal investment in education was premised
on a more limited vision of federal regulation of the economy is critical for
comprehending why federal education policies took the form they did. In fact, it is much
less likely that the federal government would have been able to establish any authority in
this realm had the stagnationist version of Keynesianism been guiding public policy. As
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Harvey Kantor and Robert Lowe have noted, during the New Deal “education typically
was not a conscious tool of federal policy and was of secondary importance compared to
other federal measures to revive the economy and alleviate immediate economic
sufferings,” and those educational measures that were present were geared toward
directly providing work for the unemployed, such as school construction.734 By the time
that Johnson proposed the ESEA, the economic shift repositioned education as an
alternative to the more direct government intervention pursued during the New Deal Era.
Although there was still a significant contingent of executive branch employees calling
for public job creation as the solution to unemployment, particularly within the
Department of Labor, the turn by Kennedy and Johnson towards tax cuts and human
capital investment through education signified that the vision of the commercial
Keynesians were the guiding doctrine of Great Society.735

Education and the War on Poverty
As the Kennedy administration began to solidify a commercial Keynesian
economic policy, it also turned its focus to poverty, an issue that was receiving increasing
attention in the popular press. In part driven by a concern about having a policy program
for those that would not benefit directly from the proposed tax cuts, President Kennedy
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asked Walter Heller, the chairman of the CEA, to investigate what could be done about
the problem of poverty.736 The programmatic approach that would develop was
dominated by cultural understandings of poverty, which reinforced the notion from
human capital theory that the proper focus of policy attention was addressing deficiencies
within the individual. Much like the unemployment policy emerging from the era, the
War on Poverty placed a renewed focus on education as essential to solving the problem
of poverty.
Although the federal government had not focused on the issue of poverty prior to
President Kennedy’s directive to Walter Heller, it did have an institutional source that
provided an intellectual understanding of poverty, as well as strategies to address it. In
1961, Attorney General Robert Kennedy announced the formation of the President’s
Commission on Juvenile Delinquency (PCJD). Created by executive order, this cabinetlevel body was composed of the secretaries of the Labor and Health, Education, and
Welfare departments, and chaired by the Attorney General. Charged with investigating
and tackling the then salient problem of juvenile delinquency, the PCJD reached out to
academics early on for guidance on what kind of programs might best address the issue.
Chicago sociologist Lloyd Ohlin was a major influence on the committee’s interpretation
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of juvenile delinquency and the programs it proposed, signing on as the committee’s chief
research consultant and personally advising the Attorney General.737
Ohlin and fellow sociologist Richard Cloward had argued in their book, Delinquency and
Opportunity, that delinquency was primarily the result of a deviant subculture that arose
among the lower class frustrated over their inability to realize their aspiration because of
blocked opportunities.738 This “opportunity theory” was fundamentally a cultural
explanation of delinquency, and the notion of differential access to opportunity gained
widespread traction as the explanation for delinquent behavior by the early 1960s.739
Cloward and Ohlin’s book did not offer specific policy suggestions, however the
clear implication was that expansion of opportunities for would “close the gap between
aspiration and achievement,” and thus attack the aberrant culture at its source.740 The
authors did suggest that the local community would be the most effective level at which
to address the differential opportunity structures. Cloward and Ohlin also singled out
access to education as an important source of, and solution to, the origins of delinquent
cultures. According to Cloward and Ohlin, the lower-classes placed a lesser value on
education because they had fewer educational opportunities than their better off peers.741
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This fact was damaging, as “the lower-class boy who fails to secure an education is likely
to discover that he has little chance of improving his circumstances,” at which point
“discontent may be generated, leading in turn to aberrant behavior.”742 The clear
implication was that a concerted focus on increasing the educational opportunities of the
lower-class could attack the problem of deviant subcultures at the source. The close
association of Ohlin with the PCJD, the limited scholarly literature, and the active
movement of members of the PCJD into other executive departments resulted in the
‘opportunity theory,’ and the important position it ascribed to education, guiding the
policy approach of the broader War on Poverty.743
Despite the fact that Cloward and Ohlin claimed their theory applied to the
society within which individuals existed, it meshed well with other culture of poverty
explanations which tended to take the focus off of the broader economic structures and
concentrate the focus on the individual. Culture of poverty theories claimed deviant
cultures among some groups had resulted in warped values and family structures leading
to widespread poverty and other social problems within these groups. Children raised in
these deviant households were mostly doomed to perpetuate the failings of the culture,
resulting in the passage of poverty from one generation to the next. The 1965 report by
Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan entitled, The Negro Family: The
Case for National Action, best exemplifies the modified version of the culture of poverty
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theory that ultimately held sway with policymakers. Moynihan argued that the source of
poverty among blacks was a vicious cycle in which “[l]ow education levels in turn
produce low income levels, which deprive children of many opportunities, and so the
cycle repeats itself.”744 Like most other culture of poverty theorists, Moynihan argued
that addressing poverty meant breaking this cycle, and argued that the lack of education
was a critical component of the cycle.
This understanding of the relationship between education and the economic
success of the individual is completely consistent with that of human capital theory,
which was frequently formulated as “the belief that a good education would lead to
individual financial success, higher personal status, and the benefits of a flourishing
economy.”745 With human capital theory and the culture of poverty theory both pushing
similar interpretations of poverty, policymakers increasingly turned towards “youth, who
human capital theorists argued were in the best position to reap the rewards of greater
investment in themselves ….in the hopes that doing so would break the ‘cycle of
poverty.’”746 President Johnson clearly drew on this understanding of education in
justifying the need for a federal role in education targeted at the disadvantaged. His
message accompanying the delivery of the ESEA to Congress indicated, “with education,
instead of being condemned to poverty and idleness, young Americans can learn the skills
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to find a job and provide for a family.”747 Johnson also mentioned the “cost in other
terms” of failing to invest in education, noting “we spend $1,800 a year to keep a
delinquent youth in a detention home - $2,500 for a family on relief - $3,500 a year for a
criminal in a State prison.”748 Senator Robert Kennedy agreed on the need for an early
educational focus in breaking the cycle of poverty, noting, “by the time you start to focus
the attention on them at the age of 12, they are already lost to society.”749
The CEA enthusiastically supported education as a poverty program, in part
because it was a substantially cheaper approach that was compatible with its primary
policy proposal of tax cuts,750 but it also fit well with its broader political goals. In a
particularly revealing statement of the degree to which education had come to replace
more direct programs aimed at the poor, the 1964 CEA report asserted that “tax reduction
is the first requisite in 1964 of a concerted attack on poverty,” and praised the focus on
education as an attack on the root cause of poverty:
Conquest of poverty is well within our power. About $11 billion a year
would bring poor families up to the $3,000 income level we have taken to
be the minimum for a decent life. The majority of the Nation could
simply tax themselves enough to provide the necessary income
supplements to their less fortunate citizens. The burden ... would certainly
not be intolerable. But this ‘solution’ would leave untouched most of the
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roots of poverty. Americans want to earn the American standard of living
by their own efforts and contributions ... We can surely afford greater
generosity in relief of distress. But the major thrust of our campaign must
be against causes rather than symptoms.751
The use of the cultural understanding of poverty served as powerful weapon for the CEA.
This understanding positioned the individual as the proper policy focus, and further
allowed the CEA to claim that policies of direct redistribution and job creation advocated
by the Labor Department would not only degrade recipient, but would likely only
perpetuate the poverty problem. In its place, the CEA advocated attacking the “roots” of
the problem through educational investment aimed at breaking the intergenerational cycle
poverty.
The theoretical understanding of poverty that drove the programmatic approach of
the War on Poverty echoed the ideological understanding of unemployment as a problem
of individual failing put forth by the commercial Keynesians. Furthermore, like the
unemployment dilemma, Great Society liberals looked toward education as the best
curative policy measure. Even as these understandings diverted attention from more
redistributionary policies, they did create a powerful argument for a federal presence in
public elementary and secondary education policy. The successful passage of ESEA after
years of failed attempts to pass general aid legislation represented a significant
achievement for the Johnson administration. Although liberals had succeeded in their
long-sought goal of institutionalizing a federal role in education, the shift in economic
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policy that paved the way for their success would significantly shape the policies that
would emerge.
Early Federal Policy Development: The Origins of Punitive Accountability Policies
The consensus that education was the most effective means of addressing the
issue of unemployment and poverty created a powerful coalition in Congress to push for
compensatory education. In an important shift, rather than the general aid bills that had
been proposed and defeated since the late 1800s, this bill would focus on the
disadvantaged. This focus was driven by the understanding that emerged from the
unemployment and poverty debates. In his 1964 Economic Report to Congress, President
Johnson outlined education as his first priority in the War on Poverty. Arguing that
education was key to earning power through the acquisition of marketable skills, he
implored Congress to “upgrade the education of the children of the poor, so that they
need not follow their parents in poverty.”752 This view was echoed in the Department of
Labor after the 1963 Manpower hearings, as assistant Labor Secretary Stanley Ruttenberg
noted:
It became increasingly evident that it was not the skilled workers, the
family men with long-time work experience, who were left behind ... it
was already evident that we were working with the wrong woodpile ... It
was the disadvantaged who filled the ranks of the unemployed -- those
who were discriminated against or were never equipped in the first
place to function successfully in the free labor
market. The problem
was the bottom of the labor barrel, not the top.753
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The interpretation of poverty and unemployment as largely attributable to individual
deficiencies in skill or culture drove the compensatory approach of ESEA, in which funds
were targeted towards the disadvantaged poor.
The centerpiece of the compensatory strategy was Title I, which accounted for
between 75 to 85 percent of total ESEA funding.754 Title I was a categorical grant that
provided schools funding based on the concentration of low-income families, defined as
families earning less than $2,000 annually. This design ensured that although Title I
funds would be targeted towards the poor, funding would also be widely distributed with
over 94 percent of school districts ultimately receiving Title I money.755 The formula
grant enabled substantial discretion for local educational agencies to pursue a variety of
approaches aimed at increasing the educational opportunity of the disadvantaged. The
school, with the help of federal funding, would help ensure that no individual was
arbitrarily relegated to economic squalor due to discrimination, cultural deprivation or
technological displacement.
In addition to inspiring hope, the understanding of education as the central
mechanism for overcoming poverty and unemployment also drove many Great Society
liberals to criticize schools and teachers as responsible for these problems in the first
place, and demand accountability for any federal funds distributed by the ESEA. No
member of Congress represented this tendency more than New York Senator Robert

754

Wayne J. Urban and Jennings L. Wagoner Jr, American Education: A History, 4 edition (New York, NY:
Routledge, 2008): 373.
755

McGuinn, No Child Left Behind, 31.

!308

Kennedy.

Reflecting the concerns of many of his constituents, particularly his minority

constituents,756 Senator Kennedy repeatedly expressed his belief that the schools and
teachers themselves bore a substantial portion of the blame for the state of education for
the poor.757 In questioning Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel, Senator Kennedy
charged, “would you agree ... that from your experience of studying the school systems
around the United States, that the school system itself has created an educationally
deprived system?”758 After Commissioner Keppel agreed, Kennedy questioned the
wisdom of giving these schools more money, saying, “if you are placing or putting
money into a school system which itself creates this problem or helps to create it ... are
we not just in fact wasting the money of the Federal Government and of the taxpayer?”759
Kennedy was concerned not that education could not help the disadvantaged, but that
absent a mechanism of accountability schools would continue to contribute to the
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“economic educational deprivation of the child,” a concern shared by Commissioner
Keppel.760
Senator Kennedy argued that funds distributed by Title I of ESEA should be
accompanied by “some standardized test that could be given in these areas where the
money has been invested to determine whether, in fact, the child is making the kind of
progress that we hope.”761 Kennedy had made clear to Commission Keppel and Wilbur
Cohen, the Assistant Secretary of Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(DHEW), that his support for ESEA was dependent upon modifications to the bill that
“hold educators responsive to their constituencies and to make educational achievement
the touchstone of success in judging ESEA.”762 Telling Keppel, “Look, I want to change
this bill because it doesn’t have any way of measuring those damned educators like you,
Frank,” Kennedy’s refusal to support the legislation absent an evaluation amendment
came close to derailing the legislation.763
Keppel agreed with Kennedy on the need for some sort of evaluation provision.
He helped draft an amendment that required any local educational authority wishing to
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receive federal grant to prove, “[t]hat effective procedures, including provision for
appropriate objective measurements of educational achievement, will be adopted for
evaluating at least annually the effectiveness of the programs in meeting the special
educational needs of educationally deprived children,” as well as make these results
public.764 Realizing that this type of evaluation provision would likely provoke strong
backlash from conservatives and professional education organizations such as the
American Federation of Teachers, Commissioner Keppel asked Samuel Halperin, the
Director of the Office of Legislation of the United States Office of Education (USOE), to
quietly insert the new provision into the bill. According to Halperin, he did this by giving
the new evaluation provision to Representative John Brademas while not divulging what
it was and therefore allowing him believe that it did not substantively change the bill and
therefore did not require a House debate or vote. The tactic worked, and the evaluation
requirement attracted no attention and received no substantive debate.765
In the Senate hearing, Senator Kennedy made sure to emphasize to Commissioner
Keppel that he expected the USOE to follow through on holding schools accountable.766
The commissioner assured Kennedy that the evaluation amendment, and the requirement
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that the results be shared and disseminated, would mean that “we can really depend on
the competitive instinct, the competition of American school systems,” to assure
accountability for raising educational achievement. If this did not work, Keppel argued,
“I think we have some instruments here frankly to needle a lot of the schools.”767
Secretary Anthony Celebrezze of the DHEW told Kennedy that local educational
agencies would have to submit plans that complied with the evaluation provisions, “or
they get no funds.”768
Although Kennedy was primarily responsible for the inclusion of the evaluation
provision and the raised achievement test score standard of success in the ESEA, his view
was shared by several of his fellow liberal Senators and several important members of the
executive branch who would be responsible for implementing the bill. Senator Wayne
Morse (D-OR), the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Education, repeatedly endorsed of
Kennedy’s line of questioning.769 Both Secretary Celebrezze and his assistant Wilbur
Cohen supported the strong evaluation requirements, as did Celebrezze’s replacement,
John Gardner. Secretary Gardner also created the position of assistant secretary of
program evaluation filled by William Gorham, who became a powerful advocate for
evaluation based on achievement scores within the DHEW.770 There was also pressure
from groups outside of government who were critical of the schools and teachers, most
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notably prominent African American social psychologist Kenneth Clark. Clark argued
that any reform needed to address the fact that the low expectation of schools and
teachers for “culturally deprived” students contributed to their poor performance.771
These voices represented a powerful coalition of liberal voices that were confident that
schools could help address the problem of joblessness and poverty, but only if schools
were held accountable for the achievement scores of their students. The result of the
active maneuvering of this likeminded group was evaluation and reporting requirements
that were unprecedented for a piece of social legislation.
Without the secretive strategy of adding evaluation requirements, it is unlikely
that the ESEA would have included such a provision. Professional education groups
were broadly against evaluations of the type mentioned in the Kennedy amendment.
Organizations such as the National Education Association argued that such requirements
would undermine the professionalism of teachers by reducing teacher autonomy, lead to
destructive comparisons among teachers, schools, and school districts, and narrow the
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focus of education to only tested subjects.772 These concerns meant that “educators were
in almost complete agreement that standardized tests were insensitive and inappropriate
measures of the effectiveness of a Title I program.”773 Republicans, some southern
Democrats, and religious organizations were also suspicious of the type of evaluation
proposed by Kennedy, as the use of such standardized measures could eventually lead to
national standards and curriculums, ultimately threatening local autonomy.774
Furthermore, the educational research community was largely in agreement that changes
in education strategies had little affect on academic achievement, prompting some
members of the American Educational Research Association to ask that the association
officially go on record as opposed to the Kennedy evaluation requirement of Title I at
their 1966 annual meeting.775 Had the amendment received open debate when it was
included in the ESEA, it is probable that these groups would have prevented its inclusion
in the final bill.
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After passage, mandated evaluations of the ESEA and compensatory education
began to shift the focus of the legislation towards the goal of increasing achievement
scores of disadvantaged students on standardized tests. The 1966 Equality of Educational
Opportunity Survey (EEOS), popularly know as the Coleman Report after its lead author,
cast doubt on whether compensatory funding could raise the achievement of poor and
minority students. Commissioned as part of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the EEOS
reported “it appears that differences between schools account for only a small fraction of
the differences in pupil achievement.”776 The conclusion that inequalities in school
resources, variations in curriculums, and teacher experience had little effect on student
achievement scores measured by standardized tests sent shockwaves through the
educational community. The report’s finding that 80 percent of variation in student
achievement occurred within schools rather than between them appeared to directly rebut
the intellectual foundation of compensatory funding: the belief that greater funding would
result in greater achievement.777 The negative findings of the Coleman Report were soon
confirmed by a study conducted by E.J Mosbaek of the General Electric Company,
commissioned by the DHEW. Known as the G.E. Tempo report, it was authorized by the
Kennedy Amendments, and drew its data from the of achievement test evaluations
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mandated by the same amendments.778 The G.E. Tempo report looked at the effect on
standardized test scores of Title I funds on five school districts, finding that scores
increased in one district, remained the same in three districts, and decreased in the final
district despite the increased funding.779 The high profile reports shocked Congressional
liberals, and quickly put them on the defensive.
These findings should not have been surprising given that such negative and null
findings had long been the norm in education research. However, the liberal
incorporationist faith that education was the key to solving important social problems and
the belief that greater funding was central to raising educational achievement meant that
much of this earlier evidence was ignored. Congressional Democrats and others
interpreted this new evidence of the failure of compensatory education programs to raise
achievement as an indication of failing institutions, rather than the result of a flawed
educational (and broader social welfare) strategy. The negative reports that followed the
passage of ESEA therefore had the effect of enshrining the raising of standardized test
scores and the closing of achievement gaps as the primary purpose of the ESEA, and the
standard by which it would be judged.
This development was not a forgone conclusion, as Title I had never specified that
improvement on standardized tests of achievement was the legislation’s objective.
Indeed, this topic had been intentionally avoided because of the likely backlash such an
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objective would have provoked. Furthermore, as Milbrey McLaughlin notes, there were
many other metrics by which Title I could have been judged. Researchers easily “could
have looked at the efficiency of the delivery of Title I services, or examined the effects of
Title I on the redistribution of educational services between socioeconomic groups,” and
in fact, “such study designs [were] more typical of evaluations conducted in other areas
of DHEW.”780 Congressional liberals did not raise any of these issues. Instead, they
largely adopted the view that improvement in achievement test scores and the narrowing
achievement gap should be the standard of success for Title I.
As several reports focused on the limited effect of compensatory education on
achievement scores, others focused on where the ESEA funds were actually being spent.
A particularly influential report sponsored by the NAACP’s Legal Defense and Education
Fund and the Washington Research Project, questioned whether Title I funds were being
used for their intended purposes. The 1969 report, entitled Title I of ESEA: Is It Helping
Poor Children?, argued that although “the central purpose of Title I is to raise academic
achievement ... Title I in some school systems is not being used at all, or only in a limited
way, for academic programs for the special educational needs of children from poor and
minority communities.”781 The report noted several instances in which Title I funds were
being used for programs that had existed before ESEA, not targeted specifically at the
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disadvantaged, or diverted into programs that were not specifically education related.
Claiming that many states were treating Title I funds as if it were general aid rather than
compensatory, the authors urged Congress, the Department of Justice and the USOE to
crack down on schools systems that had misused funds. Their suggestions included the
“immediate action” of demanding “restitution of misused funds” against local education
authorities not in compliance, a Congressional oversight hearing, additional staff
members within the USOE devoted to enforcing that States and local authorities were in
compliance as well as additional audits and evaluation of Title I programs.782 The report
positively cited the recent action taken by the USOE against the state of Mississippi. In
response to several complaints, the USOE conducted a review in the summer of 1969 of
the State’s administration of Title I funds and found that it had violated several federal
policies. Then Commissioner of Education James Allen ordered that no Title I projects
be approved in Mississippi for 1970 until remedial action had been taken, and froze Title
I expenditures for several broad areas such as construction, supplies and equipment, and
custodial services.783 The report endorsed a more muscular federal enforcement of ESEA
provisions, and sanctions for those who violated them, as the best means of “fulfilling a
long-needed promise to our Nation’s poor children.”784
The reports finding limited effects on achievement of compensatory funding and
misspent funds resulted in quick Congressional action. Through the 1969 amendments to
782

Ibid., iii-iv.

783

Ibid., 54.

784

Ibid., 58.

!318

the ESEA, Congress increased the focus on standardized tests and sought to strengthen
and encourage the USOE to sanction states and localities that did not comply with Title I
provisions. Despite testimony by academics and policy specialists expressing concern
over the extent to which the ESEA had come to be judged by standardized tests,785
Congress passed amendments that provided funding for states and the USOE to help
localities develop and implement these tests,786 required local educational agencies to set
objectives and report annually on their progress,787 and extended the “objective
measurement of education achievement” requirements to sections of the bill targeting
handicapped children788 and districts receiving additional funds for the having the highest
concentration of disadvantaged students.789 By 1974, Congress moved decisively to
orient the ESEA around improving academic performance, requiring DHEW to “develop
and publish standards for evaluation of program effectiveness,” including “goals and
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specific objectives in qualitative and quantitative terms,” and required annual reports on
the “effectiveness” of compensatory programs.790
Along with increasing the focus on objective educational achievement measures
originally desired by Senator Kennedy, the 1969 amendments also encouraged more
aggressive oversight, including sanctions on noncompliant states, by the USOE. Citing
the NAACP Legal Defense Education Fund Report, the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare expressed its “deep concern about the necessity for stronger enforcement
of Title I requirements by both Federal and State agencies in monitoring the legitimate
and effective use of Title I funds by local educational agencies.”791 Praising the action
the USOE had taken in the case of Mississippi, the committee pushed for “vigorous
action” and increased prioritization and staff devoted to compliance, and a greater focus
on auditing and state program reviews within the USOE.792 The USOE appeared to get
the message from Congress when the next year the Commissioner of Education sent out
letters to states indicating violations from the previous three years, and expected to
request a total repayment as high as $30 million from the nearly thirty states that were not
in compliance.793 By 1977, the total amount of repayment of Title I funds sought by the
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USOE had reached $240 million.794 Although much of the compliance action had been
geared towards misspent funds, the 1974 ESEA extension required that the USOE report
on plans for “implementing corrective action” for those programs that had not met their
specific qualitative or quantitative effectiveness objectives.795 As Samuel Halperin, the
former Director of the Office of Legislation of the USOE who helped slip the Kennedy
Amendments into the original ESEA, pointed out, this clearly oriented the federal
education state around “ensur[ing] that public funds result in gains in learning,
particularly in reading and mathematics.”796
The quick alignment of the ESEA around the goal of increasing achievement as
measured in part by standardized test scores, and the emerging strategy of sanctions as a
means of insuring progress towards this goal, was the result of understanding education
as an unemployment and poverty program. The reason that Senator Kennedy,
Commissioner Keppel and others liberals supported the extensive evaluation
requirements and the standardized test score standard was due to a belief that education
could eliminate these problems if educational opportunity was equalized. Moreover, as
this belief triggered widespread liberal support for investment in education, it also
triggered suspicions of the role the existing educational structures had played in
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perpetuating disadvantage and demands for accountability. As Senator Kennedy noted in
the Senate ESEA hearings:
Most of us, 95 percent of us, are doing well, but there are 5, 8, or 10 percent of
our young people who, through no fault of their own, are never going to be able to
live decent lives... I just do not believe that we can meet our responsibilities here
as Members of Congress or others, or as American citizens, and let that kind of
situation exist. I think it is the fault of the school system that has been permitted
to exist as long as it has.797
The disappointing results of the initial reports on the effectiveness of ESEA programs at
raising the test scores of low-income children did not result in a questioning of the
appropriateness of test scores as measure of success or a reexamination of the ability of
compensatory education to raise achievement scores. Instead, the early results
strengthened the use of achievement scores as a yardstick, increased evaluation of ESEA
programs, and the led to increased enforcement of stricter sanctions on states who failed
to deliver.
Liberal Incorporationism and Displacement
The institutionalization of the liberal incorporationist vision of education that
stressed the ability of education to solve social problems such as unemployment, poverty
and racial inequality in lieu of broader political economic change set education policy in
the United States on a punitive path. Importantly, the victory of this educational ideology
also had considerable, and often overlooked, consequences for the material circumstances
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of black educators employed in southern states. The passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and the ESEA in 1965 greatly increased the pace of desegregation in southern schools.
As southern states began to transition away from a dual school system, thousands of
schools throughout the south were shuttered as students and staff of previously
segregated schools were consolidated under one roof.
The desegregation and consolidation of public schools had dramatic consequences
for black public school teachers and principals. Recalcitrant southern school districts
used the massive reorganization that consolidation required as an opportunity to
intimidate, demote, and eliminate thousands of black public school employees. This
phenomena, commonly known as “displacement,” involved numerous tactics and became
widespread as the federal government increased efforts to hold states accountable for
failing to desegregate. As a researcher for the Race Relations Information Center
(RRIC), a non-profit organization funded by the Ford Foundation, noted, “[t]he irony of
displacement is that it has followed compliance with federal laws designed to end
discrimination …[i]n state after state, black educators’ positions, pay and prestige have
diminished with each newly desegregated school.”798 Significantly, mainstream black
political organizations such as the NAACP were caught flat-footed and failed to respond
until several years into the process. These groups had largely ignored warnings from a
economic democrats such as Oliver Cox and Bayard Rustin about the likelihood of, and
need to combat, black teacher displacement, in part because they saw it as a distraction
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and potential problem for their primary goal of ending segregation in public schooling.
Although these groups certainly did not support the displacement of black teachers, their
response to the displacement crisis reveals both the political commitments and
ideological blindspots of the liberal incorporationists when it came the material
conditions of black workers.
The Methods of Displacement
Early displacement efforts centered on weakening teacher tenure protections,
firing teachers who challenged segregation, and implementing discriminatory teacher
examinations. Within eighteen months of the 1954 Brown decision, seven southern states
made efforts to change tenure laws to make it easier to fire public school teachers. North
Carolina took the strongest step and terminated all teacher contracts, and required that all
future contracts be limited to one-year terms.799 The roll-back of tenure protection was
coupled with efforts to eliminate black teachers who supported desegregation efforts. In
1955, the Georgia Board of Education adopted a resolution that permanently revoked the
teaching license of any individual who supported desegregation or held membership in
any “subversive group,” such as the NAACP, that advocated for desegregation. Fears
over whether the resolution would withstand judicial scrutiny led to its replacement with
a loyalty oath that required teachers to “support, uphold, and defend” the state
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constitution, a constitution that required segregation.800 This loyalty oath requirement
became common practice in many southern and border states.
The Brown decision also intensified a trend in southern states of relying on the
National Teacher Examination (NTE) as a means of controlling teacher pay, certification,
and retention. Developed in the late 1930s by Ben Wood of the Educational Testing
Service, the NTE was a standardized test for public school teachers designed to provide
school superintendents “objective measures” to help eliminate ineffective teachers and
establish a “meritocracy in teaching.”801 The dramatic teacher shortages during World
War II meant that there was limited demand for a test that would reduce the number of
certified teachers with one prominent exception, southern and border states. As the
NAACP legal campaign demanding equal salaries for black teachers was increasingly
successful in federal courts in the late 1930s and early 1940s, southern political and
educational leaders looked for new means of holding down pay for black teachers. The
legal victories of the NAACP created an opening for Wood to pitch the NTE to a new
market, and he embarked on a tour of several southern states to advocate for use of the
NTE. Wood suggested that the NTE could be used to constrain the effects of the equal
pay movement by providing school districts with a tool to base salary on test scores
rather than experience. When pressed on the likely racial breakdown of test scores, Wood
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assured southern school leaders that in all previous administrations of the test, the
average scores for black teachers significantly lower than those of whites.802
Several southern school districts adopted the NTE as a means of maintaining
disparities in teacher pay in the 1940s. The courts consistently allowed this new way of
determining salary, in large part by accepting the argument that the NTE was an objective
means of determining merit.803 The popularity of the NTE grew exponentially after the
Brown decision, with use of the test growing by 65 percent between 1955 and 1956. By
1960, the NTE had been adopted by every large southern city, and by five state education
departments in southern and border states. The test was used both to maintain salary
disparity and increasingly to fire and demote black teachers in newly desegregated school
systems.804 The effectiveness of these strategies of displacing black teachers is reflected
in the fact that by the 1963-4 school year, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina and South Carolina still had entirely segregated teaching
staffs, despite the fact that every state except Mississippi had begun the process of
desegregating school children.805
The Federal Role in Displacement
Passage of the ESEA provided the federal government a powerful new tool in its
efforts to enforce desegregation of students and teaching staffs. Ironically, the new tools
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provided by the ESEA and the 1964 Civil Rights Act - both traditionally thought of
liberal triumphs- ultimately helped facilitate teacher displacement, particularly in the
southern states. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination in
programs that received federal financial assistance and authorized the termination of
funds to any recipient of federal funds that violated this law. During Congressional
debate, Title VI receive little debate and virtually no public attention, in large part
because it was expected to have minimal effect. This was particularly true for the issue
of desegregation, where the average school district received only $4,000 in federal
funding, an amount that could be absorbed relatively easily by school districts.806 The
passage of the ESEA, and $1 billion in new federal funding for public education
substantially altered the status quo and gave the federal government significant financial
leverage over recalcitrant school districts. Commissioner Keppel recognized this new
possibility, noting in a memo to Secretary Celebrezze that the ESEA, “makes possible a
new approach in handling civil rights problems in education,” where “Title VI can
become less a negative threat and more of a condition necessary to progress in the
future.”807
By the mid-1960s, the problem of black teacher displacement in the south became
increasingly clear. In a July 2, 1965 speech before the NEA convention in New York
City, President Johnson noted that “you and I are both concerned about the problem of
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dismissal of Negro teachers as we move forward … with the desegregation of the schools
of America.” He told the crowd that he had instructed Commissioner Keppel “to pay
very special attention, in reviewing the desegregation plans, to guard against any pattern
of teacher dismissal based on race or national origin.” However, Johnson acknowledged
that there was likely to be continued displacement, and noted that he had ordered federal
officials to provide funds under the Manpower Development and Training Act for
retraining displaced teachers for new employment.808
After Johnson’s speech, the NEA, with funding from federal government followed
up with an investigation into the problem of teacher displacement in the south. The result
was the 1965 Report of Task Force Survey of Teacher Displacement in Seventeen States,
which highlighted the importance of the issue of displacement. Based on hundreds of
interviews with teachers and administrators during the first few weeks of the 1965 school
year, the report found increased displacement activity in the wake of desegregation. The
report described renewed efforts to limit teacher tenure, firing for any involvement in
civil rights activity, revocation of teacher licenses for black teachers at segregated schools
closed,809 increased use of teacher quality measures as means of displacement,810 and
widespread loss of status and pay for black teachers in the states examined.811 For those
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black teachers who kept their jobs, the report noted that “the threat of job loss is so great
in many places that fear permeates the teaching force,” and this fear was used “to
intimidate Negro teachers and to inhibit their personal and professional activities.”812
This overwhelming fear made it difficult for the NEA to gather information on the full
extent of displacement, as teachers refused to speak to investigators both because many
hoped to be hired at some point in the future and over fear of further blacklisting in their
communities.813 Despite the fact that the NEA acknowledged that they could only
capture a small fraction of the extent of displacement, the report found 668 cases in of
displacement in 1965 alone.814
Following the report and the interest of President Johnson, Commissioner Keppel
did in fact change policy in the Office of Education to include race-based teacher firing as
a violation of federal desegregation guidelines, punishable by loss of ESEA funds.815
However, the efforts to increase enforcement of desegregation in southern and border
states resulted in new strategies of resistance that affected black teachers particularly
harshly. As these states began the process of integrating teaching staffs, black teachers
faced widespread displacement, including firing through non-renewal of contract,
transfer, and widespread demotion. In many instances, the most experienced teachers
were targeted first, as their higher salaries made them targets for dismissal or
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demotion.816 Many districts reassigned black teachers to subject areas for which they
were uncertified, and then subsequently dismissed them for “incompetence” or “lack of
preparation in assigned field.”817 Districts also began to drastically limit the number of
new black teachers hired, and the percentage of black teachers in employed public
schools decreased throughout the south.818
The NTE played an increasingly important role in teacher displacement as schools
were consolidated. Reports by the NEA and RRIC found that the NTE was used to as a
discriminatory screen in determining who received teaching certification, as well as a
means to dismiss, demote, and reduce the pay of black public school employees across
the south.819 The popularity of the NTE soared in the mid-1960s as Texas, South
Carolina, and North Carolina made it statewide requirement for all teachers. The racially
motivated aspect of this turn towards teacher testing was clear. An administrator in the
Georgia State Department of Education justified this new focus on teacher quality and the
dismissal of large number of black educators, arguing, “We were lax about the quality of
black teachers before desegregation … Now we are paying the price and having to clean

816

Boyd Bosma, Planning for and Implementing Effective School Desegregation: The Role of Teacher
Associations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Education, Office of Educational Research and
Improvement, National Institute of Education, 1980): 6. In fact, Bosma, notes that in some states black
teachers had higher average salaries because of greater experience and qualification than their white
counterparts. This meant that “consolidations and closings of former black schools offered unique
opportunities to dismiss the higher paid black teachers as white administrators sought to economize and to
appease their white constituents”(Ibid., 6).
817

Report of NEA Task Force III, “School Desegregation: Louisiana and Mississippi.” (Washington, D.C.:
National Education Association, November 12, 1970): 20-21. See also, Hooker, “Displacement of Black
Teachers,” 6.
818

Hooker, “Displacement of Black Teachers,” 6-7.

819

See Report of NEA Task Force III, “School Desegregation”; Hooker, “Displacement of Black Teachers.”

!330

house, which is why more blacks have been fired in the last 12 months.”820 In some
cases, black educators were fired for failing to meet minimum NTE test scores,
minimums that were set after they had taken the exams.821 White teachers did not face
the same scrutiny and school districts in Louisiana and Florida abandoned the NTE when
too many whites scored poorly on the test.822
Ironically, the massive influx of federal funds for compensatory education
provided southern school districts with a particularly effective means of displacing black
teachers. A 1970 NEA report on school desegregation found that “Title I offers a unique
opportunity for districts to get teachers off the regular payroll and back into the system
under a federal subsidy and without normal continuing employment rights.”823 Several
states shifted black teachers to newly created Title I teaching positions, technically
“lateral transfers” that were widely understood to be less prestigious, and more
precarious, positions.824 A 1970 RRIC report found examples in Tennessee where black
teachers were demoted from classroom teaching positions and placed in Title I positions.
In Arkansas, the report found evidence that school districts only assigned black teachers
to Title I positions. Importantly, these Title I positions did not come with the limited
protections and job security afforded to non-Title I teachers.
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The broad shifting of black teachers into Title I positions was particularly
problematic in the context of increased enforcement efforts of desegregation plans by the
Office of Education. School systems began to reclassify general teaching positions under
new federally supported categories as a means of dismissing black teachers in large
numbers. After shifting black educators to these newly categorized positions, school
districts that faced termination of ESEA funds for failing to comply with desegregation
guidelines simply fired black teachers in the positions supported by these funds, and
blamed the federal government.825 Reports from the NEA and RRIC found that this
strategy was a widespread and particularly effective tool of mass displacement.826
Limitations of the Great Society’s Hidden Labor Policy
The black educational displacement of the 1960s and 1970s, and the fact that it
was in part facilitated by federal sanctioning efforts associated with the ESEA,
complicates scholarly accounts that portray public-sector expansion Great Society era as
boon for black employment. Most notably, Michael B. Katz, Mark J. Stern, and Jamie J.
Fader have argued that the large increase in public expenditure in the 1960s and early
1970s resulted in the creation of a substantial number of public-sector jobs, which were
disproportionately filled by black Americans. In fact, these authors argue that government
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expenditures that resulted in the reduction of racial inequality through public employment
represented the “hidden labor market policy” of the Great Society and War on Poverty.827
The massive displacement of black teachers and principals in southern schools
suggests that this was not true across public-service sectors, particularly when considered
regionally. Analysis of census data on teacher employment from the eleven former
confederate states demonstrates the limits public education expansion for black
employment during the Great Society. Although as Graph 1 demonstrates, it true that
Graph 1: Number of Black Teachers in Southern States

Data compiled by author from census information (see footnote 830).
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employment of black teachers steadily increased from 1920 through 1970 in these states,
when black teacher employment numbers are put in context with white teacher
employment, a different picture emerges.
Graph 2 indicates that although the 1950s and 1960s was an era of massive
growth in the education sector, the vast majority of these jobs in the south went to white
teachers. In the decade between 1960 and 1970 alone, there were approximately 361,000
new jobs created, 85% of which went to white teachers.828 Critically, this represents a
significant shift from earlier years, where blacks had been expanding their foothold in the
Graph 2: Number of Teachers by Race in Southern States

Data compiled by author from census information (see footnote 830).
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public education sector. Indeed, between 1920 and 1950, blacks had gained a
disproportionate number of new education jobs, and had grown to over 30% of the total
teaching workforce. As Graph 3 indicates, by 1970, this number had shrunk back to
23%. The trends in educational employment in the former confederacy provide evidence
of the devastating effects of displacement in the educational workforce.
Graph 3. Percent of Black Teachers of Total Teacher Workforce

Data compiled by author from census information (see footnote 830).

Despite large increases to the overall teaching force, the raw number of black
teachers actually decreased in Alabama and South Carolina between 1970 and 1975, and
the ratio of black to white teachers continued to decline in Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi,
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North Carolina, and Virginia.829 The increasing marginalization of blacks in the
educational sector hit black women particularly hard, as the job of public school teacher
was one of the few professional occupations open to black women. Indeed, public school
teachers represented a substantial majority of black women in professional and semiprofessional positions in many of these states throughout the time period examined. This
suggests that this time period that Katz, Stern, and Fader point to as a significant
advancement of black public employment actually represented a reversal of fortune for
black employees in the public education sector in the south. This reversal occurred
despite, and in part, ironically, because of a massive increase in federal education funding
and the sanctions that came with it.830
The limited data available provides a glimpse of the staggering consequences of
these efforts for black educators. Using data from the HEW’s Office of Civil Rights, the
NEA’s Samuel Ethridge estimated that by the 1970-1971 school year, 31,584 black
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teaching positions had been lost since the Brown decision.831 Ethridge estimated that for
the 1970-1971 school year alone, this level of displacement represented a loss of over
$240 million in salary to black educators. The ongoing nature problem was made clear
when Etheridge calculated that the number of displaced black teachers had increased to
39,386 by the 1972-1973 school year.832
The displacement numbers were not only high for black teachers. Black
principals suffered as well. Ethridge reported that 2,235 black principals had been
displaced by 1972.833 The extent of this displacement is captured by another 1972 report
that found that in the thirteen southern and border states, 90% of black high school
principals had lost their jobs, and the percentage was even higher for elementary
principals.834 In his RRIC report, Robert Hooker noted that between 1967 and 1970, the
number of black principals decreased from 620 to less than 170 in North Carolina, from
250 to less than 50 in Alabama, and that Mississippi lost more than 250 black
principals.835
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Like earlier reports, these numbers are likely gross underestimates of the true
extent of displacement. The numbers represent only job losses, ignoring the thousands of
teachers and principals who faced demotions and salary reductions. Furthermore, the
effects of displacement extended beyond monetary consequences, as thousands of black
educators lost homes, and were forced to leave friends, family members, and
communities in search of employment in different school districts.836
Ideological Blindspots
The widespread displacement of black teachers in the south highlights the
consequences of the victory of a liberal incorporationist vision of education that was
largely divorced from the political economic concerns of black workers. This vision
privileged the incorporation of blacks into existing social and economic structures and the
elimination of racial disparity through equality of educational opportunity. In the 1950s
and 1960s, this ideology situated the pursuit of desegregation in public school as a toporder grievance, and relegated other concerns, like the material consequences to black
teachers, to the back burner. Indeed, black political intellectuals committed to economic
democracy had long warned of the danger of pursuing a politics that focused so
prominently on desegregation. Oliver Cox argued the right of black teachers to earn a
living deserved as a high a priority as desegregation, noting “[t]he right to employment in
tax-supported institutions of learning is equally as important as the right to a nondiscriminatory form of education.”837 Many were aware that desegregation might harm
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black teachers, as Herman Long warned presciently, “The great advance in school
desegregation under the impetus of Federal sanctions may well result in what we feared
when desegregation began; namely, the use of the Negro teacher as a pawn, as the
dispensable element with which gains in desegregation can be bought.”838
The strong chorus of racial democrats, who argued both that displacement was
unlikely to happen and that if it did, it was a price that black teachers should be willing to
pay, drowned out the voices warning of the dangers of displacement. Charles Johnson,
the president of Fisk University, proclaimed, “[i]t does not appear that there will be any
serious displacement of Negro teachers,”839 a sentiment echoed by the NAACP’s Roy
Wilkins, who argued “[t]here is little logical prospect that Negro teachers will lose their
employment.”840 Others positioned the job losses as necessary sacrifices. Education
professor Willard Gandy argued that black teachers should accept their new
unemployment because “[t]hey are Negroes first, and teachers second.”841 Oliver Cox
noted that the argument urging blacks to accept job losses was common. Cox pointed to
a particularly stark example of this tendency in the editorial page of a black newspaper,
which had remarked, “Is it too great a sacrifice to pay for integration and a beginning
toward real democratic living? We cannot have our cake and eat it too.”842
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Ultimately, the views of the NAACP, Charles Johnson, and Roy Wilkins, and
other liberal incorporationists, which focused on eliminating racial disparity through
equality of educational opportunity, drove public policy. The main policy program of this
coalition focused on desegregation of public schools and increased funding to ensure
equality of educational opportunity to raise the marketable skills of the disadvantaged as
the most effective way of raising individuals out of poverty and reducing racial disparity.
Importantly, as the case of teacher displacement demonstrates, this political program had
significant ideological blindspots. Although the rate of displacement began to decline
from after 1972 and 1973, the process had already exacted staggering material costs from
black educators in the south. One of the unintended consequences of pursuing a narrow
educational program focused on increasing educational skills and desegregation of the
student body was the loss of thousands of black jobs in the public education sector.

Conclusion
The shift in the economic policy agenda of the Democratic Party coupled with the
dominance of the liberal incorporationist understanding of education economic that paved
the way for enactment of the first major federal involvement in public elementary and
secondary education policy also set the federal education state down a path of punitive
policies aimed at increasing standardized test scores. The design of the ESEA reflected
the commercial Keynesian interpretation of the problem of poverty and joblessness,
which meshed well with the prominent academic diagnoses of these problems as
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fundamentally the result of individual failings of culture or human capital. The liberal
incorporationist understandings of the purpose and possibilities of education that
dominated the educational landscape helped position education policy as the ideal policy
realm to attack these problems. Furthermore, the liberal incorporationist understanding
of education was fundamentally compatible with the political commitments of human
capital and culture of poverty theories, and offered policymakers a way of attempting to
address unemployment, poverty, and racial inequality without pursuing interventionist
and redistributive economic policies.
The resulting federal education program aimed at the disadvantaged was a way to
implement a poverty and unemployment program without tackling these issues more
directly, and more expensively, through direct job creation or redistribution. As the faith
in the education solution provided tremendous political capital in getting an education bill
through Congress, it also led policymakers to demand an unprecedented level of
evaluation and insist that standardized achievement scores be the metric by which
teachers, schools, and educational programs ultimately be judged. Failing to raise scores
became grounds for punitive sanctions, as schools and teachers became the front line of
the nation’s unemployment and poverty program. Furthermore, as education was
positioned as a potential panacea, the interests teachers and the public schools were
increasingly pitted against the students, parents, and communities they served. Attacks
on teacher tenure and demands for greater accountability destabilized the teaching
profession in the name of providing better educational outcomes. The widespread
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displacement of black teachers in the south in the wake of desegregation and
consolidation was an early indication of the ideological commitments and political
blindspots of the new educational order.
Most current accounts of punitive accountability policies suggest that they
emerged largely in response to the excesses and failed promises of the federal education
state and the Great Society more broadly. Present explanations describe the 1965 ESEA
as the high point of the Great Society attack on poverty and inequality that was later
reined in by conservatives committed to an agenda of expanded use of standardized tests,
school choice, and a renewed focus on excellence over equity.843 This narrative
overlooks the extent to which accountability, evaluation and sanctions were first
supported and institutionalized in the ESEA by liberal lawmakers. Placing the passage of
the 1965 ESEA within the larger debates about unemployment and poverty, and the long
ideological history of national debates about the purpose of education, clarifies that as
liberals successfully institutionalized a federal role in public education, they also
institutionalized a liberal incorporationist educational vision that quickly led to
increasingly punitive policies.
The dominance of the liberal incorporationist ideology in education has led to a
fixation on the best way to hold schools, teachers and students accountable for
standardized test scores and achievement gaps. This orientation show little sign of
changing despite extensive evidence of the inability of schools or teachers to change test
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scores, and recent research that has called into question the assumed connection between
education, wages and employment.844 As long as federal education policy is premised on
the understanding of education as a poverty and employment program, the immense
expectations and responsibility placed on the primary and secondary public education
system of the United States will continue to push federal policy in a punitive direction.
Chapter six briefly covers developments in federal education policy from the 1970s to the
present, demonstrating the continued influence of liberal incorporationist ideology, and
the pernicious effects for students, teachers, and communities.

844

See Jeffrey, Education for Children of the Poor; Lafer, The Job Training Charade; McLaughlin,
Evaluation and Reform; Wolff, Does Education Really Help?

!343

Chapter Six
Conclusion: Liberal Incorporationism and the Modern Punitive Education State
[E]ducation is no longer just a pathway to opportunity and success, it's a prerequisite for
success.
[D]espite resources that are unmatched anywhere in the world, we've let our grades slip,
our schools crumble, our teacher quality fall short, and other nations outpace us…year
after year, a stubborn gap persists between how well white students are doing compared
to their African American and Latino classmates. The relative decline of American
education is untenable for our economy, it's unsustainable for our democracy, it's
unacceptable for our children, and we can't afford to let it continue…It is time to expect
more from our students. It's time to start rewarding good teachers, stop making excuses
for bad ones. It's time to demand results from government at every level. It's time to
prepare every child, everywhere in America, to outcompete any worker, anywhere in the
world.
-Barack Obama, March 10, 2009.845

The quote from President Obama that opens this chapter indicates the current
consensus on the state of public primary and secondary education. According to this
consensus, public schools are facing a crisis of poor achievement, low standards, and bad
teachers. These problems of the public education system are pointed to as the root cause
of poor economic outcomes for individuals in a changing labor market and as the
foundation of racial inequality. The educational vision President Obama’s articulated in
the above quote - one that positioned the primary function of education as equitably
providing individuals with skills needed to compete in global marketplace - is a
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thoroughly liberal incorporationist one. This liberal incorporationist understanding of
education, while justifying greater federal investment in the education system, has also
led to increasingly punitive policies targeted at students, teachers, and public schools.
A full comprehension of the modern educational landscape requires an
understanding of the foundations of the liberal incorporationist order. Recent federal
reform efforts such as No Child Left Behind (NCLB), Race to the Top (RTT), and the
Every Child Succeeds Act (ESSA) rely on an ideological understanding of education’s
purpose that emerged from fierce debates of the 1930s through 1950s, and rely on policy
mechanisms fundamentally similar to those first established by the ESEA in 1965. This
concluding chapter traces the continuity of recent punitive reform effort with the
ideological and institutional order established in the 1960s. Although the liberal
incorporationist order remains the dominant driver of federal education policy and
discourse, the increasingly devastating consequences of recent educational reforms for
teachers, students, and communities has engendered a growing resistance to this
educational order.

Origins of the Liberal Incorporationist Order
The dominance of liberal incorporationist ideology at the time of constructing the
federal education state can be traced to the settlement of fierce ideological battles in the
decades preceding the passage of the ESEA. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the
progressive education movement was riven by a debate over whether schools and
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teachers should lead the efforts to fundamentally change an unfair social and economic
order, or whether the education system should attempt to fit students into the existing
social order. As the social efficiency progressive vision proved better able to
accommodate the changing political context of the 1940s, its vision of the purpose of
education came to dominate the progressive education reform landscape. This vision
articulated an incorporationist function for education and promoted a particular set of
policies, including extensive use of testing, educational tracking, and routinization of
teaching methods.846
A similar divide characterized black political organizations and thought
throughout the same era, as one coalition argued that advancing the concerns of black
Americans required fundamental changes to the economic order, and another argued that
justice could be achieved through fair racial incorporation into the existing economic and
social structures. The educational vision of the racial democrats was much more
amenable to the international and domestic developments of the 1940s and 1950s. The
Cold War, shifting Supreme Court doctrines, and brutal political repression of the
economic democrats during the Second Red Scare all helped position the racial
democratic vision as the most influential articulation of black political interests by the
1960s. Much like the social efficiency progressive vision, the racial democratic
educational vision was centered primarily on the incorporation of students into the
existing economic and social order, with the central difference that racial democrats
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demanded that this incorporation not be unfairly structured on the basis of race. The
ideological concerns of the racial democrats also drove their preferred educational
policies, including equal educational opportunities for black and white students,
intercultural education to combat racial prejudice and strong accountability policies to
ensure equal opportunity across racial lines.
The two perspectives that proved best suited for the changing political context had
substantial ideological commonalities. Both the racial democrats and the social
efficiency progressives viewed the function of schools as preparing students for
successful integration into the labor market. The two ideological perspectives placed
great faith in the ability of efficient and fair educational organization to significantly
improve human welfare and social goods. Both also warned of the long term
consequences and significant human suffering that could result from a poorly organized
educational system. These commonalities in broader education vision meant that there
was also significant overlap in the programmatic approach of the two groups. Both
supported the implementation of standardized testing, curriculum more tied to the skills
demanded by the labor market, and increased accountability for schools and teachers.
At first blush, the commonalities between the social efficiency progressives and
racial democrats are quite surprising. One of the core beliefs of the social efficiency
progressives was in the heritability of intelligence and fundamentally different levels of
intelligence between racial categories. This vision justified very different educational
experiences and opportunities for white and black students in the social efficiency vision,
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which sought to align educational opportunities on the basis of intelligence. However,
the Nazi embrace of the idea of genetic racial superiority and eugenics led many
progressives in the U.S to turn away from theories of genetic racial difference. Many in
the educational arena continued to point to the value of the intelligence testing as an
educational tool, but after WWII, few continued to claim that there were racial
differences in intelligence levels.
Importantly, racial democrats had few qualms with the differentiation sought by
social efficiency progressives, as long as the differentiation was not based on race. Many
racial democrats openly embraced differentiation on the basis of factors such as
intelligence or merit as both wise and, more importantly, fair. By the end of WWII, the
broader acceptance of the fundamental similarity of the distribution of intelligence levels
between blacks and whites meant that the differentiation of educational opportunities on
the basis of intelligence or merit did not necessarily imply the creation of racial disparity.
Both the racial democrats and the social efficiency progressives embraced the usefulness
of markers such as merit, talent, and intelligence in distributing opportunity and power.
Shorn of racial overtones, psychologist Henry Goddard’s ideal of “Aristocracy in
Democracy” is fundamentally similar to Phelps-Stokes fund director F.D. Patterson’s call
to transform college admissions to ensure that “[t]he aristocracy of such institutions must
be an aristocracy … of talent.”847 As these two perspectives increasingly dominated the
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educational landscape, both positioned merit, talent, and intelligence as legitimate means
of differentiation in the education system, and in social destiny more broadly.
Perhaps most significantly, neither of these groups pressed for substantial changes
to the existing economic order. Whereas the transformation of the fundamentally unfair
and undemocratic economic order was central to vision of economic democrats and social
reconstructionists, the social efficiency progressives and racial democrats sought
relatively minor adjustments. The social efficiency progressives wanted schools to
prepare students for success in the existing institutional landscape. Racial democrats also
wanted schools to prepare students for success within the existing social order, but
wanted to make sure that this preparation was the same across racial lines. The
compatibility of both positions with the capitalist organization of the economy proved
greatly advantageous as the radicalism of the New Deal years gave way to the more
conservative Post-WWII era.
The changing political context of the 1940s and 1950s also led the Democratic
Party to look to different economic management techniques than the ones relied on by the
New Deal coalition. By the mid-1940s, the consensus within the Democratic coalition
around high levels of taxation, centralized economic planning, and extensive public job
creation had begun to crack. Policymakers within the party increasingly turned to
commercial Keynesian approaches to dealing with economic issues, such as tax cuts to
stimulate growth and job training to help workers adjust to labor market demands. The
turn to commercial Keynesian approaches shifted the focus of policymakers from broader
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structural forces to the individual. Persistent economic problems such as poverty and
unemployment were increasingly explained by pointing to deficiencies within
individuals that prevented their success in the existing labor market. The turn to the
individualized explanation for economic inequality and disparities also positioned
education as a particularly effective and relatively inexpensive means of addressing these
concerns. By the 1960s, as the Democratic Party turned away from the most expansive
and redistributive policies of the New Deal, it increasingly positioned education as a
means of addressing myriad social problems such as poverty, unemployment, and racial
disparity.
Greater investment in education, particularly on the terms advocated by social
efficiency progressives and racial democrats, was also increasingly attractive to the
business community.
A 1966 report by the Chamber of Commerce entitled “The Disadvantaged Poor:
Education and Employment,” reflected this new consensus and declared the importance
of education for the efficient incorporation of poor and minority students into the nation’s
economy. The report stated that “[e]ducation is necessary to prepare the minority poor to
take advantage of the opportunities a fair and efficient free economy presents.”848
Adopting the language of racial democrats, the report stated that “systemic exclusion of
any ethnic group from full participation is not only morally and politically wrong, but
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economically wasteful as well.”849 The report contained several policy proposals as
well, including greater federal investment in education, more vocational education
opportunities, and an extensive use of testing both to measure the effectiveness of schools
and to match students to future vocations.850 The report argued that society, and the
business community in particular, would see broad benefits from greater investment in,
and appropriate reforms to, the education system.851
By the end of the 1960s, a powerful coalition backed the liberal incorporationist
education order. Faith in the ability of education to meaningfully address the persistent
issue of poverty, unemployment and racial disparity had united a coalition of
policymakers to pass the first major federal intervention in primary and secondary
education policy. The programmatic approach chosen by federal policymakers was
liberal in its attempt to ensure that all students, regardless of race or economic status,
were given equal opportunity to reach their potential. The approach was also explicitly
incorporationist in that justification for targeting aid to poor students was done in the
attempt to give all students an equal chance for success within the existing economic
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order. Within the Democratic Party, positioning education as one of the most effective
solutions to poverty, unemployment, and racial disparities largely replaced more directly
economically redistributive policies - such as public job guarantees and a progressive
taxation system.
These ideological commitments were reflected in the design of the educational
policies of the ESEA. The vast majority of ESEA funds were distributed through Title I,
which targeted aid on the basis of the number of low-income students each district
served. The design of the program ensured that although nearly every district in the
country would see some federal money, those districts serving the poorest populations
would receive the greatest amount of funding. Given the close association between race
and income, this also meant a sizable portion of federal dollars went to schools serving
minority students. By providing a more equitable base of funding, policymakers hoped
to provide more educational resources that would place poor children - and black students
- on equitable footing with their wealthy peers when they graduated high school. This
faith in the ability of education to address the causes of poverty, racial disparity and
unemployment also meant that policymakers included means of holding schools
accountable in the ESEA. The ESEA included language that encouraged the evaluation
of program effectiveness through changes in standardized test scores and authorized the
withholding of funds from states and districts that failed to use funds appropriately. The
decision to structure the ESEA in this way was driven by particular ideological beliefs
about the relationship between education policy and broader social and economic
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problems. The liberal incorporationist educational ideology positioned education as a
particularly effective social policy arena for addressing problems within the existing
economic order.
Developments within the Liberal Incorporationist Order: 1965-2000
The substantial federal investment in education premised on the faith that
education could solve problems such as racial disparity, poverty, and unemployment
spurred the development of increasingly punitive reforms as education failed to solve
these problems. The persistent racial disparities in the education and society more
broadly were frequently blamed on failures of the education system and prompted calls
for greater accountability. These calls often took the form of demands for more objective
evaluation of school performance, such as through standardized tests, and reforms aimed
at eliminating racial disparities on these measures. In his 1967 testimony before the
Commission on Tests, Kenneth Clark, the prominent psychologist reiterated his continued
disappointment with the public education system accountability, arguing:
If I were doing any studies now … concerned with getting the American
people to understand the enormity of the injustice inherent in differential
educational quality of out biracial school systems, I would search for the
most rigorous, objective, standardized test that was relevant to the
question of educational achievement, and I would administer it to all of
the children in public schools. [Then] I would present … the stark
differential results and say to the American people: ‘This is what you are
doing by way of damming up human potential and human resources …
You can either continue this and know … that you are spawning hundreds
of thousands of human casualties, or you can make the necessary changes
in the educational system to narrow this gap, and hopefully obviate it.852
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Clark’s argument positioned standardized tests as the most accurate indicator of both
educational success and racial injustice in the public education system. Racial
achievement gaps in standardized tests, and the belief that continues to motivate calls for
education reform to this day
Clark’s call for increased testing and measurement of educational effectiveness
was echoed by Democrats at the federal level who were anxious for evidence that
increased federal expenditure was improving educational outcomes. Democrats had
argued that the ESEA would help improve the quality of education for low-income
students, ultimately helping to address problems of persistent poverty. After several
reports in the late 1960s found that increased federal spending had resulted in few
positive gains on test scores, Congressional Democrats began to demand more
accountability for the federal funds.

John F. Jennings, a long-time Democratic staffer on

the House Subcommittee on Education, has stated that by the 1970s, “success came to be
measured by achievement. Democrats who in 1964-65 had looked to Title I as a poverty
program had to try to find achievement data with which to defend it. We were forced into
wanting data.”853 Throughout the 1970s, federal Democrats supported a number of
amendments to the ESEA that increased the state reporting requirements and sanctioning
power of federal education officials. These changes were made in an attempt to ensure
that federal money was being well spent on measures that would improve outcomes,
which were increasingly measured through standardized test scores.
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Although some Republicans had supported the ESEA, many in the party remained
opposed to the idea of a federal role in education policy throughout the 1970s and the
early 1980s. Reflecting this position, President Reagan attempted to abolish the recently
created Department of Education multiple times early in his first term. President
Reagan’s opposition to federal involvement in education early in his term represented a
potential challenge to the development of a punitive federal education state. However, the
President and the broader Republican Party dramatically shifted course with the publication
in 1983 of A Nation At Risk.854 This federal report made national headlines by suggesting
that the poor state of education in the United States represented a serious economic and
national security risk in an increasingly globalized world. This report mobilized the
educational, civil rights, and business communities to press for more federal funding and
guidance in education and eliminated much of the opposition to a federal role in education
from elites within the Republican Party.
Republican politicians increasingly adopted liberal incorporationist language
when talking about the purpose of education, particularly in its relationship to the labor
market. Republicans began to push for education reform as a means of ensuring students
were gaining the skills demanded by a globalized marketplace. Shortly after the
publication of A Nation at Risk, President Reagan reiterated its warning of a dangerously
ineffective public education system, noting that “[b]etween 1963 and 1980, Scholastic
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Aptitude Test scores were in a virtually unbroken decline. Too many of our States
demanded too little of their students, imposing lax graduation requirements. And
compared to students in other industrialized nations, many of ours performed badly.”855
Reagan called on states to hold schools accountable, and urged states to partner with
businesses to pursue needed reform. Spurred by A Nation at Risk and the appeals of the
Reagan administration, states across the country raised education standards. In addition
to updating teacher quality standards, states took steps to increase requirements for grade
promotion, high schools graduation, and college entrance and exit.856 The new embrace
of the federal role by the Republican Party also opened new avenues for the Party to craft
conservative educational appeals - such as vouchers - to unlikely constituents,
particularly racial minorities and the poor.
With its growing embrace of a federal role in education, the Republican Party began
to make inroads with voters concerned about education by the late 1980s and early 1990s.
The Democratic Party recognized the need to adjust their stance as Republican efforts
gained traction with voters, including racial minorities and urban families, constituencies
that had traditionally voted for the Democratic Party. By the 1990s, Democrats at the
national level were increasingly willing to adopt the Republican Party tactic of publicly
criticizing failing public schools, and began to call for greater accountability and higher
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standards. Passed under a Democratic Congress and President, the 1994 Improving
America’s Schools Act (IASA), a reauthorization of the ESEA, called for state to
implement more stringent accountability measures to improve student outcomes and
provided funding for charter schools. As a means of stimulating competition and
innovation in the public education sector, funding for charter schools was increased in
1998 with the passage of the Charter School Expansion Act. The IASA and the Charter
School Expansion Act passed with substantial support from both parties.
By the end of the 1990s, both political parties agreed that the public education
system was failing. Importantly, this bipartisan convergence in rhetoric and policy was
firmly within the liberal incorporationist order, and the criticism stemmed from a
fundamentally liberal incorporationist understanding of the purpose of education. Both
parties argued that public schools were failing to provide equitable opportunities to
minority students and were failing to provide individuals with the skills needed to
succeed in an increasingly globalized economy. Both parties pointed to racial test score
gaps and international test comparisons to justify policies aimed at holding schools and
teachers accountable for educational outcomes. By the end of the 1990s, the bipartisan
consensus that schools had failed in their central function of the equitable provision of
skills needed for success in the labor market began to justify an increasingly punitive
array of educational policies.

Current Educational Landscape: 2000-Today
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The consequences of the origins of and developments in the federal education
policy victories can be seen in the modern education policy landscape and the rhetoric
surrounding the education system. The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act passed under
President George W. Bush, and the Race to the Top Initiative (RTT) and Every Student
Succeeds Act (ESSA) under President Obama have solidified the liberal incorporationist
ideology that has driven federal education policy since the passage of the ESEA. These
post-2000 federal education policies have made the receipt of federal funds contingent on
the implementation of statewide standards, frequent student evaluation, and harsh
turnaround methods for schools failing to meet standards. The NCLB Act, RTT, and
ESSA have all positioned standardized achievement tests scores as the method of choice
for evaluating the success of students, teachers, and schools. A brief examination of the
structure and policies of recent reform efforts reveals the the ideological continuity of
recent reforms with the liberal incorporationist vision that provided the foundation for the
1965 ESEA.
NCLB, ESSA, and RTT
Passed with widespread bipartisan support in 2001 as a reauthorization of the
ESEA, the NCLB Act represented a dramatic expansion of federal influence in education
policy. The act required states to develop subject area standards to determine what
students should learn throughout their elementary and secondary school years, with the
goal that every student would reach a minimum level of proficiency as determined by
these new standards. In order to hold schools accountable, the new law also required that
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states test every student in grades three through eight, and once more in high school to
ensure that every student reached the standards set by the state. The law also required
that schools keep track of the scores of “sub-group” populations, most notably racial
minorities, in order to insure the elimination of test score achievement gaps. Critically,
the new federal law required states to intervene in schools who's students failed to meet
proficiency standards (determined by standardized test scores) and implement
“turnaround” strategies. These turnaround strategies included many punitive measures,
including forcing schools to pay for private tutors for students out of already strained
budgets, mass firing of teachers, or closing the school completely. The ultimate goal that
the NCLB set for states was that 100% of students would be meet proficiency levels by
2014.
Although the NCLB Act faced widespread criticism, the measure that replaced it the 2015 ESSA - maintains much of the NCLB Act’s programmatic structure and clearly
shares the same ideological understanding of the purpose of education and the perceived
shortcomings of public schools. Like the NCLB, the ESSA requires states to test all
children in grades three through eight and once in high school and continues the practice
of requiring separate sub-group testing records. Unlike the NCLB, the ESSA allows
states to determine their own accountability goals (doing away with the 100% proficiency
goal). However, it does require that states submit their accountability plans to the
Department of Education for approval and also requires that test scores be given greater
weight than more subjective measures. Finally, the ESSA retains punitive turnaround
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requirements for schools failing to meet the standards set by the state. The law requires
that states implement turnaround strategies for any schools with a graduation rate lower
than 67%, with persistent disparities in subgroup test scores, or at the bottom 5% of state
assessment scores. The states have more leeway in determining which strategy to pursue,
however, many of the strategies recommended by the ESSA are similar those of the
NCLB and are quite punitive, including mass firings, conversion to charter school, and
state takeover.857
Although the RTT Initiative differs from NCLB and ESSA in structure and origin,
there are many similarities in the policies and overall vision of reform it promotes. At the
request of the Obama administration, the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
set aside $4.35 billion for the creation of the RTT fund. The Obama administration
committed to use these funds to motivate states to create “the conditions for education
innovation and reform…including making substantial gains in student achievement,
closing achievement gaps, improving high school graduation rates, and ensuring student
preparation for success in college and careers.”858 The RTT funds were distributed
through a total of three rounds of grants, with states submitting applications for
funding.859 Grant winners were determined on basis of a points system, with states
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getting points for adopting rigorous standards, eliminating barriers to the expansion of
charter schools, implementing extensive new teacher evaluation plans, and turnaround
plans for the poor performing schools, promotion and emphasis on STEM (Science,
Technology, Engineering, and Math) education, and expanding the use of data systems.
Facing dire financial straits in the wake of the 2008 recession, many states
enthusiastically passed reforms in an attempt to be competitive for RTT funds. In the
three rounds of RTT grants funding, forty-five states and the District of Columbia
submitted applications, and eighteen states and the District of Columbia eventually
received funding. Ultimately, RTT proved to be a dramatically effective means of
inducing states to enact substantial changes in education policy, regardless of whether
these states ultimately received RTT funds.860
These latest federal efforts reflect the liberal incorporationist faith and
understanding of the purpose of education. Expansive and punitive reforms are pursued
based on the belief that public schools are failing children and are the root cause of a
number of social ills such as unemployment and racial disparities. These federal policies
are responsible for the development of a number of policy reforms at the local level with
particularly pernicious consequences for teachers, students, and communities.
Teacher Evaluation
The reliance on standardized test scores as a metic of evaluation has opened up
new lines of attacks on public school teachers. Nearly a century after John Franklin
860
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Bobbitt praised the the usefulness of standards and frequent testing in the identification of
good and bad teachers (and suggested tying teacher pay, promotion, and retention to the
test scores of their pupils), policymakers have again turned to tying teacher evaluation to
student test scores. A coalition of large-city school superintendents, including Michelle
Rhee in Washington D.C. and Joel Klein in New York City, and national non-profit
organizations, such as the Gates Foundation, argued that persistent low student test scores
were a reflection of poor teaching. Arguing that teachers needed to be held accountable
and could no longer be allowed to rely on the poverty of students as an excuse for poor
performance, this coalition pressed for greater teacher evaluation on the basis of
standardized test scores and greater administrative freedom to fire teachers whose
students scored poorly.861 This demand for greater administrative authority to fire
teachers with low performance scores is often framed as a necessary reform to ensure
quality education in schools serving high numbers of poor and racial minority students.862
The Obama administration was responsive to these arguments and made the receipt of
Race to the Top funds and NCLB waivers contingent upon the implementation of teacher
evaluation systems that included evaluation on the basis of improvement in student
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standardized test scores.863 This organized support has led to the rapid expansion of this
type of teacher evaluation, with the number of states requiring student standardized test
scores be a part of teacher evaluation growing from fifteen in 2009, to forty-three in
2015.864
Educational Tracking
Although educational tracking of the type envisioned by the social efficiency
progressives, where students would be grouped by ability and placed in entirely separate
educational tracks aimed at preparing them for their future professions, is not a major
aspect of the educational landscape today, the elementary and secondary schools do still
use forms of tracking.865 The placing of students in different classes on the basis of
ability or prior performance continues to be a widespread practice. At the elementary
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level, although students of differing ability are housed in the same classroom, they are
frequently grouped with children of similar ability (known as ability grouping) with each
group receiving instruction on the basis of the group’s perceived ability. Tracking today
is predominantly used in high school and is determined on a subject by subject basis, with
students assigned to different classrooms based on past performance.866 Although getting
a firm grasp of the extent of tracking in schools is difficult given the lack of longitudinal
national survey data, recent comprehensive surveys of teachers indicates that between
70-90% of elementary classrooms use ability grouping, and 65-85% of high school
students experience tracked classrooms.867
Education Research
Recent federal reforms have also ushered in a decisive shift in the definition of
educational research and what types of research schools and educators are allowed to rely
on in guiding pedagogy. NCLB included provisions that made receipt of federal funds
for turnaround schools contingent on schools and districts using these funds to develop
educational programs based on the best available evidence of effectiveness, or
“scientifically based research.” Much like the social efficiency progressives’ importation
866
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of the scientific methods of industrial organization to the schools, the term and definition
of “scientifically based research” originates in the medical field and is seen as a way of
rationalizing and improving a disorganized education system. The importance of this
requirement is reflected by the fact that the term “scientifically based research” appears
over 100 times in the NCLB Act.868 The act also outlined what constituted “scientifically
based research,” ultimately settling on an extremely narrow definition that limits research
to “testing hypotheses and using experimental and quasi-experimental designs only, and
preferring random assignment.”869 This narrow definition of what counts as research is
particularly consequential as it provides support for educational research that frames
success in education through testing whether educational methods have effects that can
be detected through easily quantifiable and replicable observations. Standardized tests
scores provide ideal observations, and the desire for the “certainty” of scientifically based
research reinforces the proliferation of testing in education. Furthermore, as education
professor Suzanne Wright has pointed out, the definition adopted by the NCLB inevitably
“leads one to the conclusion that forms of research that do not conform to SBR
[scientifically based research] are invalid.”870 The 2015 ESSA similarly emphasizes the
value of scientifically based research and continues to point to experimental studies as the
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gold standard in education research.871 Defining the boundaries of education research in
terms that support limited conceptions of educational success reinforces the liberal
incorporationist order by delegitimizing research that might challenge its ideological
foundations and preventing schools from implementing an alternative policy approach.
Common Core
Aspects of social efficiency ideology are also present in the justifications used for
the recent push to implement the so-called “Common Core State Standards” nationwide.
The original standards were first developed in 2009, with considerable support from the
testing industry, which dominated the working groups that wrote the standards, and the
Gates Foundation, which poured roughly $230 million into efforts to get states to adopt
the standards.872 The Obama administration also got on board, requiring states competing
for the $4 billion in Race to the Top funds to adopt rigorous “standards that build toward
college and career readiness,” and that were “supported by evidence.”873 The Common
Core website describes the standards as “[r]esearch and evidenced based,” “[a]ligned
871
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with college and career expectations,” and designed to prepare all students for “success in
college, career, and life in our global economy and society.”874 The website notes that the
standards would impact teachers by providing them “with consistent goals and
benchmarks to ensure students are progressing on a path towards success in college,
career, and life.”875 Remarkably, by 2011, 45 states and the District of Columbia had
adopted the Common Core State Standards.
The development and implementation of these standards followed a top-down
approach with little initial input from the public or teachers. These new “evidencedbased” standards, the evaluation of teachers on basis of student test scores aligned with
these standards, and the design of standards that reflect the needs of the labor market or
“global economy,” clearly echo the scientific management techniques of the social
efficiency progressives. The Common Core standards movement also employs racial
democracy ideology, as advocates have framed it as a way to ensure racial equity.876
Reform advocates like Bill Gates have argued that ensuring that all schools were holding
students to the same high standards, and punishing those schools and teachers that failed
to improve student scores, would not only improve education - but would help combat
poverty and racial disparity. As Gates remarked in a speech before the National Urban
League, “let's end the myth that we have to solve poverty before we improve education. I
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say it's more the other way around: Improving education is the best way to solve
poverty.”877
School Choice and School Closings
Recent federal education policy efforts have been at the forefront of the twin
developments of rapid expansion of charter schools and closing of traditional public
schools. The NCLB specially named transfer to charter school as one of the schoolchoice options that must be given to children in low-performing schools. The promotion
of charter schools as a turnaround strategy continued under RTT, which made elimination
of state barriers to charter school expansion a significant factor in determining which
states won grants.878 Since the start of RTT, fifteen states have lifted caps on charter
school growth and one state enacted its first charter law. The rapid growth of charter
schools shows little sign of slowing down. In September of 2015, the U.S. Department of
Education announced that it would give $157 million to expand charter schools
nationally, and the passage of the ESSA in December of 2015 channeled even more
federal funds to charter expansion.879
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As charter schools expand, the requirements that states intervene in poor
performing schools has pushed a number of states and local school districts to pursue a
strategy of mass school closure. Spurred by these federal requirements, cities such as
Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, and Columbus have aggressively closed low-performing
schools as a central aspect of their reform agendas. The closure of traditional public
schools often goes hand-in-hand with the expansion of charter schools. In a recent
twelve city study, the Pew Charitable Trust found that more than 40% of closed school
buildings were ultimately reopened as charter schools.880 The shift towards charters is
also evident in enrollment numbers. In Chicago, between 2005 and 2013 enrollment in
traditional public schools fell by 14% while charter school enrollment grew by 219%
over the same period.881
The move towards widespread school closure and rapid expansion of charter
schools is particularly problematic given growing evidence of the pernicious effects of
these reform strategies. Studies have consistently shown that expansion of charter
schools comes with a significant risk of increasing segregation by race, ethnicity, and
income. The expansion of charter schools is also associated with increased segregation
for special education and language minority students.882 The reform strategy of school
closure and charter expansion has also been tied to diminished teacher effectiveness and
880

Emily Dowdall and Susan Warner, “Shuttered Public Schools: The Struggle to Bring Old Buildings to
New Life” (The Pew Charitable Trust, February 11, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/
2013/02/11/philadelphia_school_closings_report.pdf?la=en.
881

Journey for Justice Alliance, “Death By a Thousand Cuts: Racism, School Closures, and Public School
Sabotage” (Journey for Justice Alliance, May 2014): 3.
882

Iris C. Rotberg, “Charter Schools and the Risk of Increased Segregation,” Phi Delta Kappan 95, no. 5
(February 1, 2014): 26–31.

!369

working conditions, increased student conflict, and a weakening of community
connection to local schools.883 Additionally, the expansion of charter schools has
provided the opportunity for the private sector to reap massive profits even as hundreds
of traditional schools are closed down in part due to lack of funds.884 Finally, there is
little evidence that charters schools offer better student outcomes, even on the
standardized testing metrics preferred by reform advocates.885
Beyond school closings and charter expansion, mounting evidence suggests that
the broader federal reform agenda has had similarly negative consequences for schools
across the country. In addition to the consequences mentioned above, researchers have
found that these reforms have narrowed the curriculum,886 increased the practice of
expelling poor performing students to boost test score averages,887 caused teachers to
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focus on small set of students most likely to raise test scores,888 increased dropout
rates,889 decreased teacher satisfaction and increased teacher turnover.890 Unsurprisingly,
these negative consequences are felt disproportionately by poor, minority, and urban
communities.891
Despite growing evidence of the negative consequences, the bipartisan punitive
education reform agenda has proceeded full speed ahead at the federal level. The
continued popularity of these reforms among federal policymakers can be explained by
dominance of the liberal incorporationist ideology. Both parties continue to articulate an
educational vision that couples calls for equal educational opportunity regardless of racial
identity with an understanding that central purpose of education is providing individuals
with the skills needed to successfully compete in the existing labor market. Republicans
and Democrats continue to agree that primary and secondary education is key to solving
888
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the persistent problems of poverty, unemployment, and racial disparity. This faith in
education justifies the increasingly punitive reforms targeted at the public schools when
these problems persist. The expansion of high-stakes testing, destabilization of the
teaching force, and increasing privatization and charterization of public schools represent
the latest destructive extension of the institutional and ideological commitments of the
liberal incorporationist order in education. The federal government continues to rely on
the essentially same institutional mechanism to induce change as it has since the 1960s,
the threat of withholding compensatory funds from states failing to demonstrate objective
gains in student achievement. The common ideological foundations explain why so
many of the reforms of the current era look similar - in some cases nearly identical - to
those proposed over 50 years ago. The continued support of this reform agenda despite
mounting evidence of negative consequences for vulnerable populations demonstrates the
thoroughly entrenched nature of the liberal incorporationist order.
Moving Forward
Despite the dominance of the liberal incorporationist educational vision and the
punitive reform effort it justifies, there is growing evidence of increasingly organized
efforts to push back against the punitive education policies that have flourished under this
hegemonic educational ideology. Although the ideas of the social reconstructionists and
economic democrats were marginalized by the 1960s, the vision put forth by these
coalitions never completely disappeared from the national discussion. Coalitions pushing
against the liberal incorporationist education order and the punitive policies it has
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supported have increasingly mobilized these ideas in the past decade. The most
prominent organized opposition to the bipartisan liberal incorporationist order has come
from a number of progressive teacher’s unions situated in large cities that have born the
brunt of the negative consequences of punitive educational reforms. Frustrated with the
traditional approach of supporting the Democratic Party as the “lesser of two evils” only
to see enthusiastic Democratic support for punitive reforms, progressive groups such as
the Caucus of Rank and File Educators (CORE) in Chicago, the Progressive Educators
for Action Caucus (PEAC) in Los Angeles, and Educators for a Democratic Union (EDU)
in San Francisco, have successfully pushed their unions toward a more combative
approach to the liberal incorporationist order.892
Karen Lewis, the president of the Chicago teacher’s union (CTU) since 2010, is
perhaps the most visible national leader of teacher led efforts to combat the bipartisan
punitive reform consensus. In her 2010 election acceptance speech, Lewis announced,
“Today marks the beginning of the end of scapegoating educators for all the social ills
that our children, families and schools struggle against every day.”893 Lewis outlined an
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educational vision that placed the CTU in clear opposition to the liberal incorporationist
ideology, and harkened back to the ideas of the economic democrats and social
reconstructionists. Lewis called for greater teacher autonomy,894 substantial reduction in
the use of testing,895 and a renewed teacher activism outside the classroom.896 In a
reflection of the new activist stance, Lewis led the CTU on a strike in 2012 and won
substantial concessions from Mayor Rahm Emmanuel’s initial proposed contract.
Notably, the CTU halted the implementation of merit pay, limited the use of student
standardized test scores in teacher evaluations, stopped the city’s plan to increase class
sizes, and won a pay raise.897
In language sounding distinctly similar to the social reconstructionist of the
1930s, Lewis and CTU have expanded their political agenda and the proposed role for
teachers as agents of political change. In 2015, Lewis gave a speech drawing attention to
the limited and politically problematic nature of the liberal incorporationist educational
vision, arguing that, “[t]hey want ‘Stepford Teachers’ and ‘Children of the Corn’—kids
who are compliant and will not challenge authority or the system on eradicating
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inequality, poverty, and injustice.”898 In the same speech, Lewis announced her
endorsement of a number of progressive challengers to Democratic City Council
members, including a number of teachers from the ranks of the CTU. The CTU
emphasized its commitment to expand the involvement of teachers in bringing about
social change through the 2015 release of “A Just Chicago: Fighting for the City Our
Students Deserve,” a report detailing an expansive political agenda. In addition to calling
for greater and more equitable funding of schools, the CTU pointed to the need to take on
broader economic issues and called for expansive reforms including “increas[ing] the
numbers of affordable and homeless housing units built across the city”899 and
“guarantee[d] jobs that pay living wage and provide heath insurance for families of
Chicago’s students.”900 The report channels the analytical outlook of both the economic
democrats and social reconstructionists by framing the existing economic and social
order as fundamentally unfair and positioning teachers as powerful agents in bringing
about a just future.901
898

Karen Lewis, “Karen Lewis Speech to City Club Today,” Chicago Teachers Union Net, February 2,
2015, http://www.ctunet.com/blog/karen-lewis-speech-to-city-club-today. In the same speech Lewis argued
forcefully that attacking teacher through accountability discourse distracts from those that truly needed to
be held accountable. Lewis asked, “who holds the venture capitalist accountable? Who has been held
responsible for the foreclosure crisis that saw the greatest reduction of wealth among the middle class in
our nation’s history? Who has been held accountable for the rampant pension thefts? For the destruction of
American jobs?”
899

Chicago Teachers Union Research Department, “A Just Chicago: Fighting for the City Our Students
Deserve” (Chicago Teacher’s Union, February 2015): 22.
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Ibid., 13. Significantly, the CTU report positioned their proposals as a corrective to “current CPS
policies of closing schools, attacking teachers, and giving more tests,” arguing that instead of this approach,
“students need policies that acknowledge the existence of and work to eradicate poverty and
segregation.”(13)
901

In one of its most damning passages, the report critiqued the economic by noting that “[i]nequitable
justice policies, healthcare, housing, education, and job availability is the expected outcome of a system
designed to maintain two distinct Chicagos: one for those with access to income …. and one for those left
to navigate whatever is left over” (Ibid., 29).
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Within the past few years, the efforts of activist teachers unions to combat
punitive education reform has been accompanied by a number of community groups, that
have become increasingly critical of the liberal incorporationist education order. Groups
such as Parents United for Public Education in Philadelphia have organized to push back
against the privatization, rapid characterization, and widespread school closings that have
served as the backbone of the school reform efforts in Philadelphia for the last 15 years.
Helen Gym, a co-founder of Parents United for Public Education who had criticized the
reform approach as a “brand of disaster capitalism,” won a seat on the Philadelphia City
Council in 2015, largely on a platform of halting punitive education reforms.902
In an effort to resist the national reform, Journey for Justice (J4J), an alliance of
36 community based organizations from 21 different cities, released a report entitled
“Death by Thousand Cuts: Racism, School Closures, and Public School Sabotage.” This
report explicitly criticized President Obama, Secretary Duncan, Bill Gates, Michelle
Rhee and others of promoting educational reforms that attempted to “driv[e] a wedge
between low-income communities of color and the teachers that serve their schools,”
reducing schools to “fungible businesses,”903 and ultimately perpetuating a social order in
which “wealth, ideology, and political opportunism have been allowed to triumph over
the interests and well-being of our communities.”904 This coalescing of groups and
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Helen Gym, “Commentary: You’re Not Speaking to Me, Mr. Knudsen,” The Philadelphia Public
School Notebook, April 24, 2012, http://thenotebook.org/articles/2012/04/24/commentary-you-re-notspeaking-to-me-mr-knudsen.
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Sabotage” (Journey for Justice Alliance, May 2014): 18.
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unions from cities throughout the country underscores the degree to which the dominance
of the liberal incorporationist ideology at the federal level has produced problems for
schools across the nation.
Teacher and community resistance to the liberal incorporationist understanding of
education and the punitive reforms it supports is a promising development. However,
these developments have yet to meaningfully shift federal education policy from the
liberal incorporationist ideology that motivated the first significant federal intervention in
primary and secondary education policy back in 1965. At the national level, both
political parties continue to broadly articulate a liberal incorporationist understanding of
the function of public education, as evidenced by overwhelmingly bipartisan support of
the ESSA in 2015.905 In his remarks at the bill signing, President Obama noted the
fundamental ideological continuity of the new bill with earlier federal efforts, stating,
“The goals of No Child Left Behind, the predecessor of this law, were the right one: High
Standards. Accountability. Closing the achievement gap.”906 Invoking the spirit of
President Johnson, Obama proclaimed, “With this bill, we reaffirm that fundamental
American ideal that every child, regardless of race, income, background, the zip code
where they live, deserves the chance to make out of their lives what they will.”907
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The final bill passed the House by a vote of 359-64 in the House, and 85-12 in the Senate. In both
chambers, Democrats supported the bill unanimously.
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Obama’s remarks indicate the continued hegemony of the liberal incorporationist
understanding of education’s purpose, limited to providing students with the tools to
compete equally in the labor market.
Moving forward, a more just education system requires a fundamental
reconceptualization of the purpose of education, and of the role of the federal
government. Education must be understood as something valuable beyond its ability to
provide marketable skills for students. Problems that are at their core issues of broader
economic structure, such as unemployment, poverty, and racial disparity can no longer be
laid at the doorstep of education. Efforts to address the problems that have been blamed
on education require expansive federal efforts to shift fundamentally unfair economic
arrangements that are the real causes of unemployment, poverty, and racial disparity.
Absent these fundamental shifts in ideology and political commitment, the cycle of
blaming schools leading to ever more punitive reform measures will no doubt continue to
dominate the education landscape in the United States.
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Appendix I.
Table 1: Political and Educational Program of Four Ideologies
Problem with
US Democracy

Broad Political
Program

Purpose of
Education

Pedagogical
Program

Economic
Democracy

• Capitalist
Economy
• Economic
inequality
• Working class
unorganized and
exploited

• Egalitarian
Redistribution
• Income Guarantee
• Worker solidarity
and unionization

• Expose students to
community
problems, and
ways to help deal
with them
• Foster solidarity
• Schools not central
to solving
fundamental
problems

• Education for
workplace
solidarity
• community based
education
• integrated
• citizenship
focused
• not particularly
clear

Racial
Democracy

• Racial exclusion
from full
citizenship rights
• Lack of equality
of opportunity
• Arbitrary social
destiny chances
on basis of race

• Racial
incorporation to
existing order
• Equality of
Opportunity
• Civil Rights

• Provide equal
footing for labor
market competition
• Sort on the basis of
talent, intelligence,
or merit
• Foster interracial
understanding
• Incorporation of
blacks into existing
social structures

• Integration to
address
psychological
harm
• Intercultural/
Interracial
education
• Emphasis on
ensuring equality
of test results,
facilities, and
teacher quality
between racial
groups

Scientific
Efficiency
Progressives

• Inefficiently
organized
• Individuals in
positions they are
either under- or
over-qualified for

• Reform political
institutions based
on the most recent
scientific
techniques
• Those with power
should be the most
intelligent

• Efficient
incorporation into
existing order
• Preparation of
students to meet the
needs of labor
market
• Sort students to
employment most
suitable base on
inherited
intelligence

• Standardization
of teaching
methods
• Tracking
• Intelligence tests
• Achievement tests
• Standards set
outside schools
• Preparation for
success with
existing order

Social Reconstructionist

• Capitalist
Economy
• Exploitative
economic
arrangements

• Teacher led
reconstruction of
social and
economic order
• Transition away
from Capitalism

• School as the
vanguard of social
change/lead the
way to societal
reconstruction
• Inculcate proper
character needed
for new order

• Community
based and
experimental
• Anti-competitive
• Communal rather
than
individualistic
focus
• Unique to
teacher,
community, and
students

(Points in red represent the educational program of Liberal Incorporationism)
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